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In this thesis, I examine the construction of gendered and ethnicised national identities 
in Australia and Japan. I conceptualise national identities as discourses of national 
belonging, discourses which are actively negotiated and ever-shifting. Specifically, I 
examine authorised, mass mediated and folk discourses of national identity in these 
two national settings. I draw my data from the following: Australian and Japanese 
state and academic publications; a sample of television advertisements in Australia 
and Japan; and focus groups and in-depth interviews with participants in two 
communities, Plainsview,' Tasmania and `Hirogawa,' Hokkaido. 
I pursue three main objectives in the thesis: I examine the ways national 
identities are constituted in authorised discourses, the mass media and face-to-face 
interactions in Australia and Japan; I examine the way discourses of national identity 
reflect, reinforce and challenge current power relations in Australia and Japan; and I 
examine the place of globalisation in Australian and Japanese constructions of 
national identity. 
I argue that authorised, mass mediated and folk discourses of national identity 
in Australia and Japan are imbricated in complex ways. Widely circulating discourses 
of national identity are not imposed on the masses in a top-down fashion, but are the 
product of active negotiations of meaning. Neither do such discourses go 
uncontested. I demonstrate that individuals in a variety of social locations challenge 
dominant discourses of national identity and construct counter-narratives of nation. 
Furthermore, I argue that discourses of national identity which marginalise 
women and ethnic Others in Australia and Japan, both mirror and help sustain the 
continued subordination of these social groups. At the same time, counter-narratives 
of nation constructed by Australians and Japanese both reflect and contribute to the 
changing status of marginalised groups in these two settings. 
iv 
Finally, I critique the notion that globalising political, economic and other 
social changes are destabilising national identities and rendering them less salient. 
Evidence presented in the thesis suggests that globalised social conditions are 
conducive to the generation of gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity 
in Australia and Japan. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I examine the complex linkages between gender, ethnicity and national 
identity in Australia and Japan. I analyse empirical data from two similar municipalities, 
`Plainsview,' Tasmania and `Hirogawa,' Hokkaidol to draw conclusions about the ways 
national identities are constituted; the ways they reflect, reinforce and challenge the 
marginalisation of women and ethnic minorities in Australia and Japan; and the place of 
globalising social processes in recent constructions of Australian and Japanese national 
identities. 
Setting the Scene 
My arrival in Hirogawa in December, 1997 coincided with Hokkaido's first snowfall 
of the season. Ms. Honda and I settled into the second-floor sitting room of her 
brother's house. The walls were bright with sunlight reflecting off the snow below. 
Steaming mugs of coffee sat on the low table between us. Ms. Honda said she 
preferred Hawaiian coffee to Japanese green tea. 
I asked her about her new teaching post, about her recent trip overseas, about 
Japanese internationalisation. Then I asked her to tell me about Japanese national 
identity. 'Japan, the "monoracial" nation,' she answered, a hint of irony in her voice. 
1 Names of the communities and individuals involved in the study have been changed 
to protect the anonymity of research participants. To be consistent with both cultural 
practice and my fieldwork practice, I refer to Australian participants by first names 
and Japanese participants by surnames. All Japanese men are given the title 'Mr.' and 
all women the title 'Ms.' regardless of social or marital status, a practice which most 
closely resembles the Japanese use of ' san.' Also consistent with cultural practice, 
where both Japanese surname and personal name are used, the surname appears first, 
except where the Western name order is used by a cited author. 
Throughout the thesis, I use a modified Hepburn system of Romanisation. That 
is, in place of diacritics to lengthen vowels, vowels are 'doubled' to indicate 
lengthening (cf. Hamabata 1990). To illustrate, a lengthened 'o' is notated as `oo,' a 
lengthened `i' as 'ii,' and so on. There are two exceptions to this. First, I do not 
indicate lengthened vowels for words that have standardised English spellings, such as 
'Kyoto' or 'sumo.' Secondly, where a different spelling convention has been used by 
a cited Japanese author, I adopt the spelling used in the original publication. 
2 
'I'm a little different from other Japanese, because I don't have the fantasy that Japan 
is a monoracial nation. . . . I think it's not monoracial because I read a book about it 
when I was a university student, and also I have Korean-Japanese friends.' 
Contrary to popular belief, she continued, the Japanese are not somehow 
racially `pure;' rather, they just happen to share a common language, common 
customs and common religious beliefs. Furthermore, she observed, even those 
things are changing to such an extent that she questioned whether she could even 
talk about a unified Japanese national identity. 
A long time ago, in my grandmother's generation, there was a Japanese 
identity. . . . People in the same community had very similar values. .. . I 
think the kind of Japanese ethnic consciousness people used to have in 
common is now fading. . . so I think the national identity of the Japanese 
is in a shaky state. 
Eight months later and 9,500 kilometres away, I sat in a sparsely furnished 
high school classroom in Plainsview, Tasmania. Roger Hardy, a career educator, 
explained that he had lived his whole life in Tasmania. He spoke of his attachment 
to the land and his involvement in the activities of his tight-knit community. I 
asked him to tell me about Australian national identity. 
Well, it's a very hard thing to put a finger on, in a way. . . . To an extent, 
it's the stereotypical ideas that come out. And very often they seem to be 
sort of like the male stereotype Australian rather than anyone having sort 
of a stere-otype of a female Australian. And so it's some ideas about the 
beer drinking and that sort of very gregarious type character, or the 
outback-type image, or the sun-bronzed beach life-saver-type of image. . . 
the beer-drinking, sort of mateship type. . . or, perhaps, the outback-type 
image, which is very much fostered through the media. 
The comments of these two research participants cast light on the central concerns of 
this thesis.2 These concerns are summarised in the three guiding research questions 
below. 
2 Throughout the thesis, I use the term research 'participants,' rather than 'subjects' or 
'respondents,' to highlight their active contribution to the research process. 
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Research Questions 
How are gendered and ethnicised national identities constituted? 
In the excerpts above, Ms. Honda suggested that her notions of Japanese national identity 
come from two principal sources: a text she read as a university student, and her own 
personal experiences. Roger observed that the most widely circulating notions of 
Australian national identity are those constructed in the mass media. The question is how 
these scholarly writings, personal experiences and mass mediated texts coalesce into 
something people experience as 'national identities.' My first research question, 
therefore, is how are national identities constituted? 
To date, comprehensive definitions of 'national identity' have been lacking in the 
social scientific literature. Vague or contradictory usage of the term leaves the reader 
with the impression that 'national identity,' nationalism' and even 'nationality' are one 
and the same. Yet these are distinct concepts, the conflation of which has rendered many 
discussions of national identity nebulous and untenable. In this thesis I provide both a 
detailed conceptual framework for the discussion of national identity and the empirical 
evidence to support this conceptualisation. 
I conceptualise national identities as discourses, or sets of interconnected 
discourses, of national belonging. These discourses are actively negotiated, constantly in 
flux, and imbricated; and they both shape and are shaped by individual experiences and 
institutional arrangements. Since discourses are, by definition, mutually constructed, 
'negotiated discourse' is admittedly redundant. However, I use the terms 'negotiated' and 
'negotiation' throughout the thesis to stress this mutuality, and to avoid implying that 
discourses are top-down constructs, imposed on the masses by calculating elites. I do not 
wish to overemphasise intentionality, however. Discourses are mutually constructed 
through the exchange of symbols, but this is not necessarily done with specific outcomes 
in mind. 
I focus here on authorised, mass mediated, and folk discourses of national identity. 
First, I analyse authorised discourses of national identity, which consist of the following: 
4 
state constructions of national identity, primarily in the form of government publications; 
and scholarly explications of national identity, the bodies of social scientific literature 
which inform my research, and to which this thesis itself contributes. Next, in my 
analysis of mass mediated discourses of national identity, I focus primarily on Australian 
and Japanese television advertisements. Finally, I examine those narratives of nation 
constructed by research participants in Australian and Japanese interviews and focus 
groups; I conceptualise these as folk discourses of national identity. Although there is 
considerable overlap between these discourses, I address each in its turn, because each 
represents a significant site of the negotiation of national identity. 
How do discourses of national identity reflect, reinforce and challenge current social 
hierarchies based on gender and ethnicity? 
The interview excerpts above suggest that discourses of national identity in Australia and 
Japan are profoundly gendered and ethnicised. Roger described the (stereo)typical 
Australian as a sun-bronzed ('white') male, a beer-drinker, an outdoorsman, a 'mate.' 
Likewise, at the first mention of Japanese national identity, Ms. Honda evoked the 
popular notion of Japanese racial and cultural homogeneity, 'Japan, the "monoracial" 
nation.' Evidence presented in this thesis suggests that such widely circulating images of 
national identity in Australia and Japan, both reflect and reinforce the marginalisation of 
women and ethnic minorities in these two settings. However, the fact that Roger, Ms. 
Honda and many other participants critique and remake such gendered and ethnicised 
discourses of national identity suggests that narratives of nation are also used to challenge 
current social hierarchies. 
This thesis is not the first study to explore the relationship between gender, 
ethnicity and national identity. Feminist and post-colonialist scholars have examined 
gendered and ethnicised narratives of nation in diverse national contexts. 3 However, such 
analyses typically rely heavily on the deconstruction of textual material, and often fail to 
3 See for instance, De Groot (1993), Dixson (1976), Kapferer (1996), Lake (1986), 
Magarey et al. (1993), McClintock (1993), Radcliffe (1999), Radhakrishnan (1992), 
Summers (1975), and Willis (1993). 
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account for the individuals, institutions and processes that shape the production and 
consumption of these texts. In this thesis I examine not only the content of discourses of 
national identity, but also discursive f)rocesses: the ways Australians and Japanese 
interpret, contest and reshape such discourses, and employ them in explanations of their 
own locations within the national community. 
I argue here that those widely circulating discourses of national identity that 
symbolically marginalise women and ethnic minorities naturalise and help sustain the 
subordination of these groups. However, I also assert that alternative constructions of 
national identity both reflect and contribute to the changing status of women and ethnic 
minorities. Symbolic and material processes are inextricably linked. 
What is the place of globalising social changes in recent constructions of national 
identity in Australia and Japan? 
'I think the kind of Japanese ethnic consciousness people used to have in common is now 
fading . . . so I think the national identity of the Japanese is in a shaky state' [Ms. Honda]. 
Ms. Honda suggested that recent social changes in Japan have destabilised and hollowed 
out Japanese national identity. Likewise, some globalisation theorists suggest that with 
increasingly global flows of people, commodities and ideas, nations and national 
identities are losing their relevance. 4 These theorists argue that under conditions of 
globalisation, national-level 'imagined communities' (Anderson 1983) start to give way 
to sub-national and supra-national social cleavages based not so much on geo-political 
boundaries as on identity politics, consumption practices, and issues such as human rights 
or the environment. 
Although in much of the social scientific literature such identity transformations 
are assumed to be a key part of globalisation, few researchers have attempted to chart 
such transformations of national identity in individuals' lived experiences. Furthermore, 
such theorisations are premised on an overly stabilised notion of identity. In this thesis I 
empirically examine the ways Australian and Japanese research participants experience 
and understand globalisation, and I analyse the ways their experiences of globalising 
4 See detailed discussion in Chapter Three. 
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social changes inform their constructions of gendered and ethnicised discourses of 
national identity. 
Significance of the Research 
In this thesis I make both theoretical and empirical contributions to the field. I offer a 
detailed conceptualisation of national identity, and examine ways national identities are 
constituted through complex, competing and overlapping discourses. I argue that these 
discourses have profound material consequences, and yet are demonstrably malleable, 
subject to contestation and revision. In my exploration of ways Australian and Japanese 
participants negotiate the conflicting possibilities of their constantly reinvented national 
identities, I demonstrate that the processes of discourse are of equal importance to the 
products of discourse. That is, the analysis of the kinds of finished texts generally 
scrutinised by scholars of national identity (novels, political speeches or official histories, 
for example) reveals only a partial understanding of discourses of national identity. A 
fuller understanding is derived from an analysis of the ways people assemble and make 
sense of discourses of national identity in relation to their own lives. 
Throughout the thesis I provide a detailed account of the gendering and 
ethnicisation of folk, mass mediated, and authorised discourses of national identity in 
Australia and Japan. I show that these discursive patterns are grounded in national 
specificities (economic, political, cultural and historical); and yet the commonalities that 
emerge provide a fuller understanding of discourses of national identity more generally. 
While the specific content of discourses of national identity differs from Australia to 
Japan, I argue here that in both national settings such discourses both legitimate and pose 
challenges to the privilege of dominant groups and the subordination of marginalised 
groups. 
Through evidence presented in the thesis, I challenge the notion that national 
identities are losing their salience in the context of globalisation. Because globalisation 
theory, to date, has largely neglected to substantiate empirically its claims of waning 
7 
national identities, I analyse empirical data in order to gauge the salience of discourses of 
national identity among Australian and Japanese participants. Furthermore, because 
globalisation theory has been premised on putatively universal, although often implicitly 
'Western,' processes and populations, I examine the applicability of such theories to a 
'non-Western' context. 5 
Finally, as I maintain throughout the thesis, national identities are discourses that 
shape and are shaped by individual and institutional actions. For this reason, I empirically 
examine both the content of discourses and discursive processes. I combine an engaged 
reading of Australian and Japanese state and academic discourses of national identity with 
the content analysis of Australian and Japanese television advertisements, the results of 
audience response surveys, and the analysis of in-depth interviews and focus groups with 
Australian and Japanese participants. In so doing, I present a wealth of empirical data to 
support the claims of the thesis. 
Thesis Overview 
Thus far, I have summarised the key concerns of the thesis and previewed its theoretical 
and empirical contributions to the field. In Chapter Two I outline the basic parameters of 
the research project. I begin by explicating two key concepts: discourse and national 
identity. I then present my research methodology, and conclude with a description of the 
Australian and Japanese municipalities I studied, and the people who participated in the 
research. In Chapter Three I undertake an engaged literature review. It is 'engaged' in 
that it is structured not simply to situate the thesis within the existing social scientific 
literature, but also to examine the ways my engagement with academic and state 
discourses has shaped my approach to the research project, and to highlight the ways the 
thesis contributes to and challenges such discourses. In addition, the chapter serves as an 
empirical point of reference for subsequent chapters in which I examine evidence of 
5 The categories of 'East' and 'West' are heavily laden and conceptually 
unsatisfactory signs. Nonetheless, for the lack of more precise terminology, in this 
thesis I use the terms in ways that are consistent with current usage in Australia, in 
Japan, and in the international academic community. 
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complex linkages between these authorised discourses and mass mediated and folk 
discourses of national identity. 
In Chapter Four I analyse mass mediated discourses of national identity. Because 
mass mediated texts are a particularly rich source of discourses of national identity, the 
analysis of such texts provides a window onto gendered and ethnicised narratives of 
nation. In the first part of the chapter, I present a content analysis of Australian and 
Japanese television advertisements, coding for representations of gender, ethnicity and 
national identity. In the second part of the chapter, I examine audience responses to these 
representations. 
In Chapters Five and Six I analyse transcripts from focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews in Australia and Japan to trace the contours of gendered and 
ethnicised national identity in these nations. Furthermore, I explore the ways participants 
embrace, reject, revise and negotiate discourses of national identity, and use them in the 
process of interpreting their social worlds. 
In Chapter Seven I draw on interview and focus-group data to examine 
participants' understandings of and responses to globalisation, principally in the form of 
Australian multiculturalism and Japanese internationalisation. I then analyse the place of 
such experiences of globalisation in participants' constructions of gendered and 
ethnicised discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan. 
In Chapter Eight I recapitulate the key findings of the thesis and draw together the 
diverse theoretical issues and empirical evidence presented in the previous chapters. I 
conclude with a discussion of the ways the thesis contributes to a fuller understanding of 
national identities in Australia, Japan and beyond. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
In my methodological approach, I start from the position that the social world is 
collectively constructed, interpreted and experienced by individuals through their creation 
and use of systems of signs. While spoken and written language is the semiotic system 
which has received more attention from social scientists than any other, systems of 
signification include, for instance, non-linguistic visual representations, 'body language,' 
and the richly stylised significatory codes of advertising, a key focus of this study. 
Accepting that the social world is constituted, in part, through the exchange of 
signs, I attempt to understand social phenomena by analysing both the ways individuals 
negotiate meaning, and the contexts in which such negotiations take place. Throughout 
this thesis, therefore, my primary units of analysis are the discourses and discursive 
practices through which individuals, from intellectuals, politicians and advertisers to non-
elite Australians and Japanese, constitute and interpret their social world. 
Key Concepts 
A central premise of this thesis is that national identities are negotiated discourses. I 
begin, therefore, with an explication of two key concepts: discourse (particularly in 
relation to power and ideology); and national identity. 
Understanding discourse, power and ideology 
In its broadest sense, a discourse is both a product—a complex collection of verbal, 
visual or other symbolic units used to order the world in some way—and a process—the 
active production and interpretation of such symbolic orderings. However, discourses are 
not simply ways of representing or symbolically ordering the world; discourses are, to 
borrow Bourdieu's terminology, both 'structured and structuring' (Bourdieu 1992); they 
both reflect and construct social reality; and they are 'lived,' that is, enacted in and 
I0 
through material processes and social institutions. In my approach to discourse, I borrow 
principally from semiotics and from Foucauldian theory. 
I start with a distinction between contextually-specific discursive exchanges 
between individuals and more widely circulating and less context-dependent discourses. 
The difference between the two is closely analogous to Saussure's distinction between 
parole and langue (Saussure 1959). The former is a concrete communicative act, by a 
specific individual in a specific time and space. The latter is the totality of the linguistic 
system within which each concrete communicative act is located. In other words, each 
instance of parole is but a single point of light in the linguistic universe of langue. 
Likewise, I make a distinction between specific articulations of national identity and 
more widely circulating, less context-dependent discourses of national identity. The 
former include, in the case of this thesis, specific statements made by research 
participants, specific television advertisements, specific government documents, and 
specific scholarly writings, while the latter consist of the whole universe of symbols of 
national identity. In this thesis I analyse specific articulations of national identity to 
understand the ways they shape and are shaped by more widely circulating discourses of 
national identity and the material conditions within which they are generated. 
These discourses and discursive practices are significant because, as Foucauldian 
theory suggests, individuals and social collectivities are constituted within and through 
discourses, and are inscribed with (and in turn reinscribe) power relations. Power 
structures, therefore, are maintained not through the direct intervention of influential 
elites, but through the discursive process itself, the repetition and naturalisation of 
power/knowledge.6 
In other words, widely circulating discourses serve a 'double function:' in 
Barthes' words, they 'hail us,' they call our attention to something; and in so doing, they 
'establish' something, they make it so (Barthes 1972: 117-125). 7 However, I do not wish 
6 See Weedon (1996) for an examination of Foucauldian approaches to discourse. 
7 While Barthes discusses this 'double function' in relation to myth, it is equally 
applicable to discourses of national identity. Barthes himself discusses in detail 
mythic discourses of `Frenchness' and 'French imperiality.' 
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to imply that individuals are powerless in this process, that individual actions are 
somehow determined by discourses. Rather, through specific articulations, individuals 
and institutions subtly reshape larger discourses, just as the vocabulary and grammar that 
constitute langue are changed over time. 
The malleability of these discourses does not render them less ideologically 
powerful, however. Because both 'ideology' and 'power' are defined in a variety of ways 
in the social sciences, I offer my own explication of these concepts here. Drawing on 
Foucault, I conceive of power as a 'mode of action upon the action of others' (Rabinow 
1984: 221). Power is not an object that is possessed by an individual or institution; 
rather, it is enacted, it is the effect of one's actions. This is not to deny, however, that 
certain individuals and institutions, by virtue of their social location, are more readily able 
to enact power. Foucault suggests that when the free flow of power relations stagnate, 
reciprocal relations are no longer possible. This results in the emergence of relations of 
domination (Rabinow 1984: 103). 
The maintenance of relations of domination is accomplished, in part, through 
ideology. The term 'ideology' has been used to mean one, or some combination, of the 
following: a worldview; a system of ideas/practices which maintains social inequalities; 
and/or a distorted understanding of the world, or 'false consciousness.' 8 For the purposes 
of this thesis, I conceptualise ideology as encompassing the first two of these usages: an 
ideology is a way of thinking about (and acting in) the world, which is widely understood 
to be 'natural,' neutral and commonsensical, but which, in fact, is located within relations 
of power and functions to reproduce those power relations. I do not draw on 'false 
consciousness' theories, because their emphasis on the imposition of ideologies on the 
masses by calculating elites is incompatible with my understanding that discourses of 
national identity are constructed (and constantly reconstructed) by diverse elite and non-
elite agents. 
8 See, for example, Althusser (1968), Fowler (1985), and Marx (1977). 
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The concepts of ideology, power and discourse are usefully stitched together 
under a fourth concept, hegemony. 9 I conceptualise hegemony as modes of 
thought/action which are characterised by the following: they are dominant in a particular 
culture at a particular point in time; they reflect the interests of dominant social groups, 
but only imperfectly (that is, dominant groups can and do attempt to impose their 
thought/actions from the top down, but this is never, and can never be, unproblematically 
successful); and they are maintained in part through material domination and in part 
through a loose consensus. Hegemony, as I conceptualise it, is not static, once-and-for-all 
ideological domination; it is malleable and processual. It is not generated by or around a 
single centre, but is shaped by diverse and competing interests. Nonetheless, hegemony 
constrains discourse by establishing the terms of reference for debate. 
In sum, hegemonic discourses of national identity are infused with, and enact, 
ideology. Thus, these discourses may be used in the exercise of power to maintain 
relations of domination. However, this does not preclude the possibility of discourses 
that challenge relations of domination. As Foucault argued, discourses generate the 
means of their own critique, just as all forms of power generate their own forms of 
resistance (Rabinow 1984). Empirical evidence in this thesis demonstrates that elites and 
non-elites alike frequently read against the grain of hegemonic discourses. That is, they 
render explicit the ideologies implicit in dominant discourses of national identity in 
Australia and Japan; they critique those discourses; and frequently construct alternate 
discourses, or what Bhabha (1990) calls 'counter-narratives of nation.' Bhabha argues 
that counter-narratives of nation, 'continually evoke and erase its totalising boundaries—
both actual and conceptual—[and] disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which 
"imagined communities" are given essentialist identities' (1990: 300). 
My adoption of the term 'counter-narrative' requires some clarification here. In 
my use of the term, counter-narratives are not 'counter' in the sense of having a unified 
whole against which they are positioned; neither are they 'narratives' in the sense of 
9 I take my understanding of 'hegemony' from Gramsci (1971) and from Laclau and 
Mouffe's (1985) post-Marxian re-reading of Gramsci's work. 
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seamless, highly elaborated stories of national belonging. Rather, for the purposes of this 
thesis, counter-narratives encompass a diverse range of challenges to widely circulating 
discourses of national identity. These include, among others, participants' assertions that 
widely circulating discourses of national identity are inaccurate, anachronistic or 
exclusionary; assertions that such discourses have been constructed by elites to serve their 
own interests; assertions that these discourses are irrelevant to the participants' 
experiences; and both generalised expressions of discomfort with these widely circulating 
discourses, and more detailed stories of who, how and what the nation is. 
National identities as negotiated discourses 
An emphasis on discourse is particularly appropriate for the study of national identities, 
which I understand as negotiated discourses of national belonging. With the rise of 
identity politics, neo-nationalism and Balkanisation, 10 recently the concept of national 
identity has been much discussed. Current literature on national identity suffers from two 
shortcomings, however. First, in the absence of rich and explicit definitions of the term, 
'national identity' is often conflated with 'nationalism' and even 'nationality,' all related, 
yet distinct, concepts. The second shortcoming of the national identity literature is 
apparent confusion over the location of national identity. At one pole, national identity is 
understood as a kind of omnipresent national essence that exists in the very fabric of the 
nation's land, culture and people. At the other pole, national identity is conceptualised as 
an individual's affective ties to a (sometimes sub-national) social collectivity based on 
attributes such as shared ethnicity or shared territory. However, national identity can be 
neither essentialised nor individualised; for national identity is both the process and the 
product of negotiation. 
10 Although the term 'Balkanisation' originally referred to the explicit nineteenth 
century British policy of fostering divisions amongst Balkan states and peoples in 
order to hold Russia, Turkey and Austria/Hungary in check, most contemporary 
commentators apply the term to any fragmentation of nation-states, whether 
deliberately encouraged or not. 
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Understanding 'nation'  
In working toward an understanding of national identity, it is first necessary to understand 
the concept of 'nation.' Greenfeld (1992: 4-9) has charted the semantic transformation 
of the term, which was first used by early Romans to mean a 'foreigner,' and later came to 
refer to 'a community of opinion,' a political, cultural and social elite,' and 'a sovereign 
people.' Later, as nation-states came to be associated with the ethnicity, ways of life, and 
other characteristics of their populations, 'nation' came to mean 'a unique sovereign 
people.' While the latter comes closest to popular understandings of 'nation' today, the 
term continues to be used variously to refer to sub-national ethnic groups, supranational 
religious communities, and other collectivities with limited or no political sovereignty. 
Greenfeld's archaeology of the shifting and contested nature of 'nation' reveals 
that nations are more than simply geographical and political entities; they are discursive 
constructs. Anderson argues, in fact, that nations are 'imagined communities,' imagined 
because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
their communion' (1983: 15). In Anderson's much discussed thesis, so-called 'print 
capitalism' is central to the project of nation-building. He argues that early improvements 
in print technology led to the unification of national vernaculars, increased literacy and 
the rise of such early mass commodities as the newspaper and the popular novel, and thus 
opened up the possibility of national-level identifications. In other words, nations have 
been created, in part, through shared vernaculars, representational systems and texts: they 
have been created, in part, through discourse. Following this logic, I agree With Hall that, 
'a nation is not only a political entity but something which produces meanings--a system 
of cultural representation' (Hall 1992: 292; emphasis in the original)) I 
Some writers have conceptualised national identity as a national mythology, a 
hegemonic body of stories that describe the birth of the nation, and explain and legitimate 
II Hall goes on to argue, however, that these systems of meaning are being challenged 
and fragmented as globalisation diversifies the national languages, cultures and 
institutions which unite, and in a sense create, nations. 
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contemporary socio-cultural conditions. 12 While I accept that discourses of national 
identity have such effects, in this thesis I do not use the term 'mythology' because 'myth' 
carries with it connotations of falsity and fantasy. Instead, I prefer Hall's term, 'narrative 
of nation,' which he defines as 'a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical 
events, national symbols and rituals which stand for or represent the shared experiences, 
sorrows, and triumphs and disasters which give meaning to the nation' (1992: 293). 13 In 
the current nation-state system, such narratives provide powerful contemporary symbols 
of collectivity. Just as religious faith inspires believers to give their lives in jihads or 
crusades, so faith in the narrative of nation inspires people to die in war to preserve the 
imagined national collective. Tales of wartime sacrifice and heroism are then 
incorporated into the very discourses of nation which inspired such acts, thus making 
national narratives, like many religious doctrines, self-perpetuating. 
Just as nations are discursive constructs, 'national identity' is a negotiated 
discourse of national belonging. While 'national identity' is used throughout the thesis in 
an effort to be consistent with previous literature, it would be more appropriate to speak 
of 'national-level identifications;' for while the term 'identity' resonates with 
Enlightenment notions of a unified self with an unchanging essence or core, 
'identification' highlights the negotiated, and highly changeable, nature of discourses of 
national belonging (see Hall 1992: 285-90). 
National identity is in no sense immutable, but by its very nature is continually 
shifting. As Willis (1993: 29) has noted, discourses of national identity are sets of 
representations which are only rendered meaningful by participants in these discourses; 
and since participants themselves are in a constant state of flux, changing atid being 
changed by current social conditions, so discourses of national identity are ever changing. 
It is crucial to acknowledge, however, that even as individuals shape widely circulating 
discourses of national identity, these discourses frequently serve to reinforce dominant 
12 See, for instance, Kapferer (1996) and Willis (1993). 
13 Hall's theoretical approach to national identity is compatible with my own. While 
I consider his 'narrative of nation' roughly synonymous with my 'discourse of 
national identity,' and use it accordingly, I prefer 'discourse' for its emphasis on 
mutual, and ever-shifting, constructions of meaning. 
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social norms by legitimating ideal types of individuals and actions. Such discourses are, 
in other words, both 'structured and structuring;' they reflect and reproduce unequal 
power relations. 
Discourses of national identity are, inherently, practices of inclusion and 
exclusion; for stories of who 'we' are, are also stories of who 'we' are not. Such stories 
of nation frequently exclude not only those outside the nation, but also marginalised 
groups within the nation. So it is that ethnic Chinese are virtually invisible in Fijian 
discourses of national identity (Ewins 1998), the Burakumin ('untouchables') disappear 
from Japanese discourses of national identity (as I will demonstrate in this thesis), and 
women have been marginalised in Australian discourses of national identity (Summers 
1975; Dixson 1976; Pettman 1988; Willis 1993). Exclusionary discursive practices 
mirror and help maintain the material disadvantage of marginalised groups, and 
contribute to the establishment and maintenance of social boundaries, boundaries between 
the imagined 'us' and the imagined 'them.' 
The question of the material effects of such discourses of nation leads logically to 
a discussion of nationalism. As noted above, in much of the social scientific literature, 
there is considerable conceptual slippage between 'national identity' and 'nationalism.' 14 
For my analytical purposes, however, the two are distinct: national identity consists of 
shared stories of membership in an 'imagined community;' nationalism is the practical 
mobilisation of national identity. 15 
National identity and nationalism are undeniably interrelated. Gellner (1983) 
suggests that the origins of both nations and nationalism can be traced to the demand for 
an increased division of labour under increasing industrialisation, a demand which could 
only be satisfied through centralised, standardised systems of communication and 
14 This is not to imply that most other words have more stable, less contested, 
meanings, nor is it to imply that conceptual stability is desirable for its own sake. 
However, for analytical purposes, it is essential to explore the subtle differences 
between these two concepts. 
15 Hutchinson (1987) makes a useful distinction between civic nationalism, centred 
on the equal civic participation of all members of the nation state, and cultural 
nationalism, centred on the presumed cultural distinctiveness and homogeneity of the 
nation. 
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education. In standardising these systems, the state created institutions for the 
transmission and legitimation of an increasingly standardised national culture; and thus, 
strengthened the link between state and culture. The standardisation and centralisation of 
these systems both laid the foundations for national identity (by educating the citizenry 
with a standardised language and knowledge), and opened up the possibility of 
nationalism (by institutionalising the newly standardised national culture in the political 
and bureaucratic structures of the state). 
Eventually the concept of 'nationality' became naturalised. Gellner notes, 'A 
man without a nation defies the recognised categories and provokes revulsion. . . . A man 
must have a nationality as he must have a nose and two ears' (1983: 6). In a similar vein, 
Anderson (1983: 14) argues that, 'In the modern world everyone can, should and will 
"have" a nationality, as he or she "has" a gender.' Both of these statements hint at the 
links between gender and nation. While Gellner suggests a naturalised tie between a man 
and his nation, leaving unanswered the question of whether women are bound to nation in 
this same way, Anderson draws a parallel between nationality and gender as two 
essential(ised) aspects of contemporary identity. 16 
This naturalisation of the notion of 'nationality' accounts, in part, for the 
conflation of 'nationality' and 'national identity.' However, individuals do not 'have' 
national identity in the way they 'have' a nationality. Throughout this thesis, nationality 
is understood as the legal status of citizenship which is granted to individuals by the state. 
Quite distinct from this, national identity consists of collectively constructed and shared 
discourses of belonging; it does not, and cannot, belong to any one individual or 
institution. 
Defining national identity 
In sum, then, I define national identities as negotiated discourses, or sets of 
interconnected discourses, of national belonging. Such discourses are found in texts as 
16 Neither Gellner nor Anderson explicitly examines gender in relation to nationalism 
or national identity, however. 
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diverse as political rallies (McClintock 1993), museum exhibits (Macdonald 1997), 
postcards (Willis 1993: 16-17), public monuments (Kapferer 1996: 200-226), television 
advertisements (Hogan 1999), government posters (Ang 1996), and even human bodies 
(Radcliffe 1999). Such texts draw on, and refigure, existing discourses of national 
identity, and in so doing they contribute to the on-going constitution of the national 
'imagined community.' Far from being static, these discourses are constantly contested 
and reshaped, and there is constant interplay between authorised, mass mediated and folk 
discourses of national identity. 
Authorised, mass mediated and folk discourses of national identity 
National identity is articulated in a diverse range of social contexts including everyday 
conversations, mass mediated texts, political rhetoric and scholarly texts. The discourses 
constructed in such exchanges are imbricated and mutually constitutive. For analytical 
purposes, I have categorised the varied discourses of national identity into authorised 
discourses, mass mediated discourses and folk discourses. 
By 'authorised discourses,' I mean those discourses of national identity generated 
by scholars and agents of the state. Such discourses are 'authorised' in the sense that they 
have institutional credentials behind them, and are frequently translated into official 
policy on such issues as immigration patterns, welfare policy, affirmative action 
programs, and tariff regulations. In addition to their wide ranging material effects, 
authorised discourses have widespread discursive effects. That is, as empirical evidence 
presented in this thesis demonstrates, authorised discourses frequently inform mass 
mediated and folk discourses of national identity. I do not wish to suggest that these 
authorised discourses determine individual articulations of national identity. However, as 
Chapters Four through Seven will demonstrate, the classificatory systems and terms of 
reference established in authorised discourses are, variously, reflected, reinforced and 
contested in both mass mediated texts and discussions of national identity among 
Australian and Japanese participants. 
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By mass mediated discourses of national identity of national identity, I simply 
refer to those discourses of national belonging prevalent in the mass media, that is in 
movies, novels, television programs, magazines, newspapers, internet sites, and 
advertisements, among others. For reasons detailed below, in this thesis I focus on 
Australian and Japanese television advertisements. 
Mass mediated discourses of national identity have certain commonalities with 
authorised discourses. Certainly in information-rich societies such as Australia and Japan 
the mass media are an important site of the exercise of ideological power, and political 
and intellectual elites undoubtedly exert a degree of control over the mass media. I have 
treated mass mediated discourses and authorised discourses of national identity as 
analytically distinct, however, out of recognition of the different ways in which people 
encounter these discourses. On the one hand, it is difficult not to encounter mass 
mediated representations of national identity. In Australia and Japan they are ever 
present: on roadside billboards; in news broadcasts; and in the television advertisements 
that reach into lounge rooms across these nations. On the other hand, the details of most 
scholarly research and most state policies are not as readily apparent to those not directly 
concerned with producing, implementing or analysing them. 
By 'folk' discourses of national identity, I refer to those discourses generated by 
members of the national community in the course of everyday interactions. In this thesis 
the folk discourses analysed consist of those articulations of national identity in 
interviews and focus groups with Australians and Japanese. As subsequent chapters will 
demonstrate, such discourses are by no means homogeneous, and their relationship to 
authorised and mass mediated discourses is both complex and unstable. 
Research Strategies 
My research methodology can be broadly characterised as engaged, interpretivist-
constructionist, and comparative. My primary methods of data collection and analysis 
have included the following: identifying and engaging with relevant state and academic 
20 
texts in Australia and Japan; collecting a sample of Australian and Japanese television 
advertisements and analysing the content of that sample; conducting and analysing focus 
group discussions and in-depth interviews with Australian and Japanese participants; 
and administering and analysing audience-response questionnaires. As detailed below, 
these research strategies have proven particularly appropriate for the investigation of 
discourses of national identity. 
An engaged approach 
Because I examine in this thesis not only the production of gendered and ethnicised 
discourses of national identity, but also the ways such discourses reflect, reinforce and 
challenge current social hierarchies, I have adopted certain perspectives and tools of 
critical theory. The aim of this engaged approach is to render explicit the links between 
discursive practices and the material consequences of such practices. 
My approach has grown out of an interest in hierarchies of gender and ethnicity. 
By 'interest,' I mean not only an intellectual curiosity about such social hierarchies, but 
my personal stake, or 'vested interest,' in such hierarchies. My biography as a 'white' 
American-born woman, a naturalised Australian citizen, and, variously, a manual 
labourer, a teacher, a student and a researcher in both Australia and Japan, has compelled 
me both to understand and, to some extent, challenge these hierarchies. In my research 
approach I draw on principles of feminist research methodology (as elaborated, for 
instance, by Ramazanoglu 1989) which suggest that the production of social scientific 
knowledge is not incompatible with the political engagement of the researcher. I argue 
that by acknowledging the ways my own biography has shaped both the research process 
and the research product, I am able to provide a nuanced and intellectually honest account 
of the social phenomena under consideration. I agree with Glesne and Peshkin (1992: 
104) that, 
My subjectivity is the basis for the story that I am able to tell. It is a 
strength on which I build. It makes me who I am as a person and as a 
researcher, equipping me with the perspectives and insights that shape all 
that I do as a researcher, from the selection of the topic clear through to 
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the emphases I make in my writing. . . . Subjectivity is something to 
capitalise on rather than to exorcise. 
A key tool in my engaged approach is the content analysis of mass mediated 
discourses of national identity in the form of television advertisements. In a project that 
seeks to examine discourses of national identity, advertisements are an obvious choice for 
analysis. Advertisements seek to persuade through their articulation of a society's core 
ideals. In Australia and Japan they are, in a sense, 'capitalist realist art' (Schudson 1984) 
in that they embody the values at the heart of such capitalist societies, chief among them, 
consumption itself. Just as socialist realist art constructed a vision not of contemporary 
social realities, but of a utopian socialist ideal, so advertisements provide the viewer with 
'reality as it should be--life and lives worth emulating' (Schudson 1984: 220). 
By constructing this 'reality as it should be,' advertisements provide models for 
identity formation, at the level of both the individual and the nation. At the same time, I 
am not asserting that audiences uncritically accept mass mediated images and build their 
identities around them. Critical theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition have long 
argued that advertisements, among other products of the so-called 'culture industry,' are 
created and used by capitalists in an attempt to mould docile workers and eager 
consumers and to obscure inequalities based on, for instance, class, gender and 
ethnicity. 17 While such a perspective goes some way toward revealing the power 
relations which shape discursive practices, it is limited in the following ways: it denies 
audience agency and the possibility of audience resistance; it elides viewer differences 
based in class, gender, ethnicity, sexual preference and so on; and it underestimates the 
mediating influences of other powerful social institutions. 18 
Recent theorists have challenged the usefulness of content analyses such as the 
one I undertake in Chapter Four. Hermes (1995: 10), for instance, argues that 'texts 
acquire meaning only in the interaction between readers and texts and. . . analysis of the 
17 See, for example, Adomo and Horkheimer (1993), Bowlby (1985), Ewen (1976), 
Root (1984) and Williamson (1978). 
18 For feminist critiques of critical media theory, see Ang (1989), Brown (1989), 
Deming (1989) and Press (1989a, 1989b). 
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text on its own is never enough to reconstruct these meanings.' I recognise the limitations 
of content analyses, particularly where the researcher's reading of the text is idiosyncratic 
and fails to account for other possible readings as well as for the conditions of the text's 
production and consumption. However, if Hermes' argument is taken to its logical 
conclusion, all texts are rendered politically innocent; they become no more than 
Rorschach tests from which readers construct idiosyncratic meanings. This denies the 
social ramifications of demeaning and exploitative representations, and places 
responsibility for such representations on readers, who themselves may be the demeaned 
or exploited. I argue instead that texts, including advertisements, carry dominant 
meanings, which audiences may appropriate, resist, reject, or modify in a variety of ways. 
From this position, analysis of both the content of texts and audience responses to 
those texts is necessary to an understanding of the complex relationship between mass 
mediated discourses and the power relations within which they are located and to which 
they contribute. For these reasons, in this thesis I combine content analysis with audience 
response research. 
I have chosen to analyse television advertisements rather than print or radio 
advertisements for a number of reasons. Television is perhaps the most pervasive and 
invasive of the mass media. Its multi-sensory messages demand the audience's attention 
in a way that other broadcast and print media cannot. Furthermore, unlike these other 
media whose messages are increasingly aimed at niche markets, television messages are 
directed toward a broader audience. 19 These messages, therefore, offer clues as to which 
values, experiences, and ways of life are assumed to be shared by the mass (usually 
national) target audience. Finally, while movies and magazines and other self-contained 
texts have beginnings and ends, television, on the other hand, consists of a never-ending 
flow of images. As Kaplan (1988: 136) writes, 
The television is seductive precisely because it speaks to a desire that is 
insatiable--it promises complete knowledge in some far distant and never-
to-be-experienced future; its strategy is to keep us endlessly consuming in 
19 With the spread of cable and satellite television, this is changing; however, my 
sample of advertisements was taken only from free-to-air stations. 
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the hopes of fulfilling our desire; it hypnotises us through addressing this 
desire, keeps us returning for more. 
By its very nature, this ever-shifting medium reveals the constant (re)construction of 
individual and collective identities, and provides fertile ground for discourses of national 
identity. 
An interpretivist-constructionist approach 
Although the term `interpretivist-constructionist' is somewhat cumbersome, I adopt it in 
order to emphasise that individuals both interpret and construct their social worlds. 
Because I understand national identity as a discourse, and because, as I have argued, 
discourses both reflect and constitute social reality, my primary interests in this thesis are 
the ways individuals in Australia and Japan negotiate understandings of national identity, 
and the ways such understandings are located within relations of power. In an attempt to 
reach a well-rounded understanding of how Australians and Japanese negotiate discourses 
of national identity and use them in the process of ordering their social worlds, I have 
combined focus group research with questionnaires and in-depth interviews. 
The methodological strength of focus group discussions of national identity is that 
they reveal the negotiated nature and the dynamism of discourses of national identity. 
Focus group data presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven reveal the ways participants 
construct, contest and revise understandings of national identity, at times consciously 
reflecting on the mutability of these shared discourses. While focus groups admittedly 
create a contrived social setting, controlled and monitored by the researcher, they 
nonetheless provide the researcher an opportunity to observe the active negotiation of 
discourses of national identity. 
Because even focus group data provide, at best, only a partial understanding of 
discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan, I have also made use of 
questionnaire data to gauge audience responses to mass mediated discourses of national 
identity in these two countries. Questionnaires asking participants to judge the 
`Australianness' or `Japaneseness' of a selection of television advertisements were 
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administered to 60 Australian and 102 Japanese focus group participants. These 
questionnaires were primarily introduced to draw participants' attention to the topic of 
national identity, which was then discussed at greater length. However, the questionnaire 
responses are analytically useful not only because they provide benchmarks of individual 
perceptions of national identity, but also because they can be set against my own reading 
of the mass mediated texts analysed in Chapter Four. Nonetheless, questionnaire 
responses cannot provide insights into the process of negotiating meaning so central to 
discourses of national identity. 
The final method I employ in my interpretivist-constructionist approach is the in-
depth interview. One of the strengths of this method is that it provides a richer 
understanding than other methods of the way participants' biographies inform their 
understandings of national identity. Because it is a one-on-one interaction, it also throws 
into sharp relief the role of the researcher as an active participant in the negotiation of 
discourses of national identity. Focus groups may provide researchers with a comforting 
illusion that naturally occurring social phenomena are being observed, and questionnaires 
may provide quantifiable and seemingly objective measures of participants' attitudes; 
however in-depth interviews make it (at times uncomfortably) clear that social scientific 
fieldwork is an embodied process, located within relations of power, and that the products 
of that fieldwork (field notes, transcripts, and, ultimately, the research report) are 
themselves negotiated texts or discourses.20 
A comparative approach 
I have already suggested that there is a dearth of empirical research on the links between 
gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity and globalisation. While an 
empirical study of such links in one specific national setting would go some way toward 
addressing this gap in the literature, there are considerable gains to be made in 
undertaking cross-national comparative research. First, a comparison of Japan and 
Australia, two nations with quite different cultural and historical trajectories, better 
20 This is not to deny, however, that researchers have the final say on what is 
included in their research reports. 
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allows me to examine certain universalising claims of globalisation theory. Secondly, a 
cross-national comparison such as the one I have undertaken, with carefully matched 
population samples, reveals the ways national cultural specificities shape discourses of 
national identity and responses to globalising social changes. 
I agree with Hofstede (1998), however, that because national populations are so 
complex and diverse, population samples in cross-national studies can never be 
considered 'representative.' My sampling logic, in any case, is not premised on statistical 
representativeness (of either participants or the mass mediated texts I analyse). Instead, I 
employ a theoretical sampling strategy that was designed to put me in contact with a 
reasonable cross-section of the Australian and Japanese municipalities I studied (in other 
words, to allow me to speak with men and women, young and old, of diverse 
occupational and educational backgrounds), and to gather a reasonable sample of the 
many thousands of television advertisements which air in Australia and Japan each year. 
The precise dimensions of these samples are detailed below and in Chapter Four. 
The Research Process 
Finally, an explication of my research methods and methodology would be incomplete 
without an examination of the recursivity of the research process, the on-going cyclical 
movement between data, analysis and theory. I did not begin the research process with a 
testable hypothesis, but rather with a list of questions aimed at guiding my inquiry 
toward points of possible relevance. Through a recursive process of engaging with the 
relevant social scientific literatures, and collecting and analysing empirical data, I 
gradually refined research concepts and categories; identified specific expectations about 
the links between gender, ethnicity, national identity and globalisation in Australia and 
Japan; and developed flexible sampling, data collection and coding strategies which 
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were constantly reviewed and revised to accommodate new information and 
observations. 21 
After my initial reading of the relevant literatures, I undertook a content analysis 
of approximately one thousand Australian and Japanese television advertisements, a 
process designed to sensitise me to the range of mass mediated discourses of national 
identity in these two national settings. My final coding categories and their dimensions 
emerged out of two exercises in extensive preliminary coding and analysis of general 
patterns of representation. These coding categories, in turn, shaped my choice of the 
questions and topics I covered in subsequent focus groups and in-depth interviews with 
Australian and Japanese participants. I then revised and expanded the coding categories 
again, as new concepts emerged from the collection/analysis of the interview data. 22 It is 
worth noting that throughout this process, my continued engagement with relevant state 
and academic discourses was shaped by my emergent understandings of the television and 
interview data, even as my approach to these data was shaped by my knowledge of, and 
commitment to some of, those authorised discourses. 
As I began to amass a rich collection of data, I undertook a thematic analysis of 
interview and focus group data in order to identify the key dimensions of participants' 
discourses of national identity in Japan and Australia. The process of analysis began with 
transcribing interview and focus group tapes, and then re-reading these transcripts from 
beginning to end. Listening to the original tapes while reading the transcripts allowed me 
to check the accuracy of transcriptions (and translations, in the case of the Japanese data); 
and it allowed me to become deeply familiar with the data, and thus to discern certain 
patterns emerging from the data. The next step in my analytical process was to read 
21 My methodology has some similarities with grounded theory, as set out by Corbin 
and Strauss (1990) and Glaser and Strauss (1967). However, while I find their 
emphasis on recursivity useful, I have not structured my research according to the 
quite specific criteria of grounded theory. 
22 Specific coding categories will be described in detail in Chapters Three through 
Seven. 
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through all of the transcripts, identifying recurrent themes and phrases. Once I identified 
these general themes, I examined their nuances by systematically coding the transcripts. 23 
One of the difficulties of undertaking such qualitative and inductive research, 
characterised by a constant cycling through data collection, data analysis and theory 
generation, is knowing when one has collected 'enough' data and done 'enough' analysis. 
While the engaged researcher could continue amassing pertinent data and refining 
analytical schemes in perpetuity, I argue that one eventually reaches 'theoretical 
saturation' (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 61-62), the point at which the data stop saying 
anything new. In terms of my research, I approached theoretical saturation when repeated 
coding and analysis of transcript data and mass mediated texts yielded recurring themes, 
rather than new dimensions or understandings of national identity. This said, however, I 
am attuned to the possibility that I failed to find 'anything new' in the data either due to 
my own theoretical preconceptions or due to my choice of participants and the ways I 
have asked them about national identity. While my sense is that I have collected and 
analysed sufficient data to provide a rich understanding of discourses of gendered and 
ethnicised national identity in the Australian and Japanese municipalities I studied, all 
research accounts are necessarily partial, in both senses of that word: fragmentary and 
incomplete; and shaped by personal experiences and expectations. 
23 It is important to stress that I did not begin with a set of coding categories and then 
simply identify those passages which 'fit' the codes; rather I started out with one 
simple question, 'Have I heard this before?' If I had seen a theme or phrase in a 
previous transcript, I lifted it out of the transcript and put it aside for later sorting. 
Finally I sorted these phrases and themes into any number of possible combinations, 
to explore the complex links between them without the constraint of predetermined 
categories. 
Although I used the computer software packages NUDIST and ATLASti early 
in my analysis, I decided that the organisational structures of these packages 
constrained rather than facilitated my analysis. I therefore abandoned my computer 
screen for poster boards, strips of paper and coloured pencils, which allowed me 




Because I aim to examine both the construction of gendered and ethnic ised national 
identities in Australia and Japan and the ways such constructions are shaped by 
experiences of globalisation, I have encountered somewhat of a methodological double 
bind. Only large-scale, longitudinal research conducted in a variety of locations across 
Australia and Japan would allow me to draw more generalisable conclusions about the 
contours and possible transformations of national identity in those two settings. 
However, as I have argued above, only qualitative research with an emphasis on 
participants' negotiated and context-specific constructions and interpretations of national 
identity can provide a rich understanding of national identity. In the interest of 
constructing a more detailed account of gendered and ethnicised discourses of national 
identity in these two settings, I have chosen to centre my research on two municipalities, 
one Australian and one Japanese. This approach yields a 'snapshot' view of national 
identity among specific participants in specific places at one moment in time, and allows 
for a deeper understanding of the social phenomena under consideration. The richness 
of this data more than compensates for any limitations on the generalisability of the 
analysis. Moreover, large-scale, statistically 'representative' survey research could not 
be considered more generalisable to the national population as a whole if it failed to 
capture in subtle detail the way participants negotiate meaning. 
The two municipalities chosen for this study are Plainsview' on the Australian 
island-state of Tasmania, and `Hirogawa' on the Japanese island-prefecture of Hokkaido. 
The islands of Tasmania and Hokkaido were chosen for two principal reasons. First, 
having lived a number of years in both locations, I had social contacts already in place 
that helped facilitate my entry into the municipalities there. Secondly, Tasmania and 
Hokkaido have similar geographic, demographic and economic profiles, both being 
largely agricultural, fishery, forestry and tourism regions, both experiencing rural 
depopulation and lower levels of economic growth than their respective mainlands, and 
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both being on the margins of their nations both geographically and socially (see Figures 
2.1 and 2.2). 
Figure 2.1 Tasmania and Hokkaido: Geography and Population 24 
Characteristics Tasmania Hokkaido 
Land area 68, 400 lcm2 83, 452 km2 
Location The southernmost state in The northernmost 
Australia, Tasmania is prefecture in Japan, 
located approximately 220 Hokkaido is located 
kilometres south of the approximately 30 









Population 474,000 people 5,699,000 people 
Population as 
percentage of total 
national population 
3% 5% 
Population by age 0-14 years 23% 0-14 years 15% 
15-64 years 65% 15-64 years 69% 






-0.1% +1.2% -0.4% +1.1% 
(1999-2000) (1999-2000) (1995-2000) (1995-2000) 
24 Sources: Asahi Shimbun (1996); Australian Bureau of Statistics, hereafter 
abbreviated ABS (2000a, 2000b, 1999a); and Japanese Statistics Bureau (1998, 2001). 
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Figure 2.2 Tasmania and Hokkaido: Labour, Economics and Social Services 25 














per capita income as 
percentage of national 
average per capita 
income 88% .91% 
Leading employment 
sectors in rank order26 















































25 Sources: Asahi Shimbun (1996); ABS (2000a, 2000b, 1999a); and Japanese 
Statistics Bureau (1998, 2001). 
26 The Australian Bureau of Statistics and the Japanese Statistics Bureau categorise 
employment sectors differently. I have retained the original categories here. 
27 'Hospital' is not defined in the publications from which these statistics are drawn. 
Differing definitions of the term may account for the relatively large apparent 
difference between Hokkaido and Tasmania. 
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Plainsview and Hirogawa are also similar in their population size relative to their 
respective state/prefectural populations, their proximity to the state/prefectural capital, 
and their concentration on agriculture, forestry, and light/cottage industries: jam 
factories, fish processing and timber processing in Plainsview; noodle factories, sake 
factories and timber processing in Hirogawa (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). 
Just as I attempted to choose municipalities with similar social profiles, I 
attempted to get 'matched' samples of participants from Plainsview and Hirogawa. To 
this end, I employed snowball sampling to contact individuals who met my specifications 
for gender, occupation and age. 28 This is not a statistically representative sample, but a 
theoretical sample, premised on an expectation that people in different social locations 
would have different understandings of national identity and different responses to 
globalising social changes. In total, I conducted in-depth interviews or focus groups with 
79 Australian and 116 Japanese participants, including students, teachers, public servants, 
business owners, private sector employees, farmers and retirees (see Figure 2.5). 
Keeping in mind the possibility that age (in particular wartime experiences) would 
shape participants' views of national identity and globalisation, I attempted to interview 
people born before the end of World War II and people born after World War II in each 
occupational group. I was able to interview male and female farmers of both generations 
in Plainsview and Hirogawa, perhaps because the prevalence of family farming in both 
these areas meant that both the older and younger generation continued to be active in the 
family business. I was not always able to separate other occupational groups by age, 
however, particularly in the case of women workers. In both Australia and Japan, before 
World War II, women had fewer employment, educational and entrepreneurial 
opportunities than in the post-war period, with the result that older women business 
owners, public servants and employees are harder to find. 
28 Because few members of ethnic minorities live in these two areas, my samples do 
not reflect the national ethnic diversity of Japan and Australia; however, the samples 
do reflect fairly accurately the ethnic composition of the two communities studied. 
The Australian sample includes several migrants from the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand, one migrant from Southern Europe, and several Australian-born descendants 
of European migrants. All Japanese participants were ethnically Japanese. 
Characteristics Plainsview Hirogawa 
' 5,620 km2 encompassing 
six semi-independent 
townships 






Age of population (%) 0-14 years 0-14 years 26% 13% 
15-64 years 64% 15-64 years 65% 
65+ years 
0.0 
65+ years 10% 22% 
:: Number of schoOlkby 
type30 
40 km 40 km 
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Figure 2.3 Plainsview and Hirogawa: Geography, Population and Education 29 
29 Sources: ABS (2000b, 1998); and town council publications from the communities 
studied. In order to protect the anonymity of participants, I do not provide a list of 
these community documents. 
30 In Plainsview, most students attend a primary school from kindergarten to year six, 
a high school in years seven to ten, and a college in years 11 and 12. In Hirogawa, 
most students attend a separate kindergarten, a primary school from years one to six, a 
junior high school in years seven to nine, and a senior high school in years ten to 12. 
In this table, Hirogawa's junior and senior high schools have been combined. 
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Figure 2.4 Plainsview and Hirogawa: Labour and Social Services31 






sectors by percentage of 
total workforce 
employed32 
Trade, service, transport and 
communications (54%) 
Trade, service, transport 
and communications (50%) 
Mining, construction and 
manufacturing (23%) 
Mining, construction and 
manufacturing (28%) 
Agriculture, forestry and 
fishery (23%) 











Hospital' beds 12 331 
Physicians 11 23 
Facilities for the elderly 4 (96 beds) „ 280 beds 
Childcare centres 8 3 
31 Sources: ABS (2000b, 1998); and town council publications from the communities 
studied. In order to protect the anonymity of participants, I do not provide a list of 
these community documents. 
32 Plainsview figures have been aggregated for comparison with Hirogawa aggregate 
categories. 
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Figure 2.5 Profile of Research Participants in Australia and Japan 
Participants N (Japan) N (Australia) N (TOTAL) 
High School Students 17 11 28 
Male 11 5 
Female 6 6 
•Teachers 17 4 21 
Male 7 2 
Female 10 2 
Public Servants 23 12 35 
Males born before 1945 6 0 
Males born after 1945 9 4 
Females born before 1945 0 0 
Females born after 1945 8 8 
Business Owners $. 	 - 12 11 23 
Male 7 5 
Female 5 6 
Employees 	rivate Sector) 12 8 20 
Male 7 5 
Female 5 3 
Farmers 21 21 42 
Males born before 1945 5 5 
Males born after 1945 5 7 
Females born before 1945 5 4 
Females born after 1945 6 5 
Retired People 14 12 26 
Male 8 6 
Female 6 6 
TOTAL 116 79 195 
While, on the whole, the number of Japanese and Australian participants in each 
category is fairly wel balanced, there are two obvious disparities. First, although I spent 
only three months conducting interviews in Hirogawa compared to seven months in 
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Plainsview, I was able to interview more and a wider variety of people in Hirogawa than 
in Plainsview. Secondly, in one occupational category, teachers, I was able to recruit very 
few Plainsview participants, despite contacting every primary and secondary government 
school in the municipality. Admittedly, I had a more established network of contacts in 
the Hirogawa than in Plainsview; but this is only a partial explanation of my greater 
difficulties recruiting participants in Tasmania. More interestingly, such difficulties 
highlight the extent to which field research is an embodied process, as argued above, a set 
of negotiated encounters located within relations of power. 
As a 'white' American-born researcher in Australia and Japan, I was always an 
outsider, which in most instances worked to my advantage, as I could play the 'socially 
acceptable incompetent' (Lofland and Lofland 1995: 56-57), allowing me to ask people 
to explain what would be common sense to a cultural insider. However, in Japan my 
ethnicity and nationality seemed to work to my advantage, while in Australia I was 
greeted with scepticism. These very different outcomes are likely the result of the very 
'different historical and contemporary encounters between Japan and the United States, 
and Australia and the United States. This is more than simply an interesting footnote. 
For these relationships shaped the research process, undoubtedly contributing to people's 
decisions whether or not to participate, and even colouring many of the comments they 
made in interviews. 
It was not unusual, for instance, for Australian participants to begin criticising 
America and Americans, and then suddenly stop and ask, 'You're not American, are 
you?' [Phillip, a teacher]. Likewise, the following comments made by Trudy, a public 
servant, reveal that participants may temper their statements to suit the perceived 
background of the researcher: 'I hate American-ness! . . . [But] I have nothing against 
you. I met you, met you as a person.. . . [and] I'm not really that nationalistic.' 
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Summary 
In this chapter, I have outlined the key concepts and research methods I employ in my 
examination of national identities in Australia and Japan. To recapitulate, I argue that the 
social world is collectively constructed by individuals as they create and use systems of 
meaning. I argue that nations are not merely geo-political entities, but are symbolic 
constructs, and that national identities, likewise, are constituted by overlapping 
authorised, mass mediated and folk discourses of national belonging. 
In my conceptualisation of discourse, both the products and process of discourse 
are given equal weight. Therefore, in my research methodology, I combine the analysis of 
the content of discourses of national identity with an examination of the negotiation of 
such discourses by research participants in Australia and Japan. Furthermore, because I 
argue that discourses of national identity reflect, reinforce and challenge power relations 
in these two settings, I examine not only the discourses themselves but how they are 
employed in ways which legitimate or contest the dominance of some social groups and 
the marginalisation of others. 
Finally, I make no claims for the statistical representativeness of my research 
samples. However, the municipalities studied were chosen for their demographic, 
economic and geographical similarities, and participants were selected on the basis of 
age, sex and occupational characteristics, to create carefully 'matched' samples of 
Australian and Japanese participants. These strategies allow for the examination of both 
local specificities and more general trends in the ways national identities are constituted 
under conditions of globalisation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ACADEMIC AND STATE DISCOURSES OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND 
GLOBALISATION: AN ENGAGED LITERATURE REVIEW 
My engagement with authorised discourses of national identity and globalisation has 
shaped the design of my empirical investigations, the analysis of the television and 
interview data I gathered, and the conclusions I have drawn from the research process. In 
this chapter, I outline the key theoretical premises of this thesis. These are premises in 
the sense that they serve as the starting point for my analysis of mass mediated and folk 
discourses of national identity in subsequent chapters; however, in a broader sense, these 
are guiding principles derived from my reading of authorised discourses of national 
identity and globalisation. 
It should be stressed that the authorised discourses to which I refer in this chapter 
are by no means static. They are as much the product/process of negotiation as are the 
mass mediated and folk discourses I analyse. However, my purpose in this chapter is not 
to provide a systematic analysis of the conditions of the production of these authorised 
discourses. Rather this chapter examines the ways this thesis incorporates, challenges, 
and ultimately contributes to authorised discourses of national identity. 
Key Premises 
Nations are discursively gendered. 
A central premise of this thesis is that nations are gendered through authorised, mass 
mediated and folk discourses of national identity. I have developed much of my 
understanding of these gendered discourses of national identity from feminist literatures. 
One strand of feminist literature suggests that while men have come to rule 
contemporary nations, women have come to symbolise them. 33 As McClintock argues, 
'Women are typically construed as the symbolic bearers of the nation, but are denied any 
33 See, for instance, De Groot (1993), Dixson (1976), Kapferer (1996), Lake (1986), 
Magarey et al. (1993), McClintock (1993), Radcliffe (1999), Radhakrishnan (1992), 
Sawer (1996), Summers (1975), and Willis (1993). 
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direct relation to national agency' (McClintock 1993: 62). Following Boehmer (1991), 
she suggests that men are metonymic with the nation, while women serve as metaphors of 
the nation. In other words, men are the nation, while women simply stand for the nation. 
At first glance, this argument seems intuitively correct. In the popular 
imagination, women are strongly linked to nature and to the home, two powerful symbols 
of nation. Moreover, because women bear the new members of the nation, women's 
bodies serve as markers of national boundaries, through limits on marriage and sexual 
relations with certain 'outsiders' (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989). As Peterson (1996: 7) 
argues: 
From the familiar personification of nature-as-female it is an easy slide to 
reading the nation-as-woman. This depicts the Motherland as spatial, 
embodied femaleness: The land's fecundity, upon which the people 
depend, must be protected by defending the body/nation's boundaries 
against invasion and violation by foreign males.. . . The rape of the 
body/nation not only violates frontiers but disrupts—by planting alien 
seed or destroying reproductive viability—the maintenance of the 
community through time. 
However, it would be overly simplistic to suggest that nations are always discursively 
gendered in the feminine. Figures such as Uncle Sam in the United States or John Bull in 
the United Kingdom sit alongside Lady Liberty and Britannia as powerful symbols of 
those nations. 
It is clear, however, that in many contemporary nations, women are discursively 
constructed as guardians of the hearth and conservators of `tradition.' 34 Women are 
represented as 'the atavistic and authentic "body" of the national tradition (inert, 
backward-looking and natural)' while men are portrayed as 'the progressive agent[s] of 
national modernity (forward-thrusting, potent and historic)' (McClintock 1993: 66). 
Such gendered discourses reproduce long-standing gender stereotypes, and in so doing, 
naturalise gender inequality. 
34 I agree with Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) that many so-called 'traditions' are not 
enduring practices from time immemorial, but are practices which are constructed as 
symbolically salient in a society. Therefore, throughout this thesis, I use the term 
'tradition' carefully, usually placing it in inverted commas to highlight that it is a 
social construct, what people perceive to be tradition. 
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State institutions are at least complicit and often actively engaged in the 
production of such gendered discourses of nation. Pateman (1988) argues, in fact, that 
the liberal democratic nation-state itself is based on an inherently male social contract, 
one which precludes women from full participation in patriarchal civil society. 35 
Empirical evidence presented in this thesis lends support to Pateman's argument that the 
rhetoric and practices of contemporary liberal democratic states contribute to the 
symbolic and material marginalisation of women. 
However, while such state discursive practices help maintain gender inequality, it 
is crucial to recognise that other authorised discourses (particularly academic discourses), 
as well as mass mediated and folk discourses, challenge this patriarchal state authority. A 
study such as this one, which explicates gendered narratives of nation in Australia and 
Japan, constitutes one such challenge to these gendered discourses and practices. 
Nations are discursively ethnicised 
A second premise of this thesis is that nations are ethnicised through authorised, mass 
mediated and folk discourses. In Australia and Japan, as in many other national settings, 
the concepts of ethnicity and 'race' are inextricably bound up with notions of nation. 36 
At the outset, the overlapping concepts of ethnicity and 'race' require careful definition. 37 
In this thesis 'ethnicity' refers to the cultural characteristics, such as language, religion or 
custom, shared by a group of people and used by that group, and/or by others, to define 
35 I would argue that states are those institutions which control the means of 
legitimate violence (the military and police), and that suffrage and citizenship can be 
understood as compensation for potentially sacrificing one's life in the service of 
institutions of state violence. Since women have been largely excluded from these 
institutions, it is clear that citizenship, the very foundation of the democratic nation-
state, is a contract largely between andfor men. 
36 See for instance, Dikotter's (1996) discussion of China; Goh (1999) and Waters 
(1997) on the United Kingdom; Rahier's (1998) analysis of Ecuador; and Yoshino's 
(1997) discussion of Japan and his (1999) volume on ethnicity and nationalism in 
Asia. 
37 Following recent scholarship, I place the term 'race' in inverted commas to reflect 
my position that it is not a biologically valid category. However, I do not customarily 
use inverted commas for terms such as `racialise' and 'racial,' because these refer, in 
most cases, to ways of using the concept of 'race.' For a discussion of the social 
construction of 'race,' see Gould (1984), Miles (1982), Stanton (1966) and Stocking 
(1982). 
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them as a group. 'Race,' on the other hand, refers to supposedly genetically inherited 
biological and behavioural traits thought to be characteristic of a particular group of 
people. Although there is a high degree of conceptual slippage between 'race' and 
'ethnicity,' I primarily focus on ethnicised discourses of nation, because few current 
discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan overtly centre on supposed 
biological characteristics of the national populace. 38 However, as evidence in subsequent 
chapters will show, while ethnicity figures more prominently in current discourses of 
Australian and Japanese national identity, 'race' is often implicit in such discourses. 39 
In my conceptualisation of ethnicised national identities, I draw primarily on 
Said's (1978) explication of 'Orientalism' and Hage's (1998) discussion of the 'white 
nation fantasy.' Said argues that Western European, and to some extent North American, 
nations have formulated their national identities through the definition and domination of 
the 'Oriental' Other.° Said defines Orientalism as, 'the corporate institution for dealing 
with the Orient--dealing with it by making statements about it, authorising views of it, 
describing it, by teaching it, settling it: in short, Orientalism is a Western style for 
dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient' (1978: 2-3). 
Through texts and processes as diverse as unequal trade and foreign relations 
treaties, colonial government administration, anthropological treatises and artistic works, 
the West has constructed itself as active, forward-looking and masculine, while 
constructing the East as passive, receptive and feminine. Such discourses have served a 
38 Such biologised explanations of national uniqueness are more common in Japan 
than in Australia. 
39 Where the distinction between ethnicised and racialised discourses is unclear, I use 
combined terms such as 'ethnic/racial.' 
40 Throughout the thesis, I use the term 'Other' to designate groups who are 
considered distinct from a dominant group in some way. As a consequence 'Other' is 
an inherently shifting and contested category. For instance, evidence presented in this 
thesis suggests that in Australia, 'non-white' migrants and their descendants are 
generally constructed by 'white' Australians as ethnic Others; however, even light-
skinned European migrants from non-English-speaking countries are sometimes 
constructed as Others. Likewise, in Japan, 'whites,' blacks' and non-Japanese Asians 
are generally constructed as ethnic Others; however sometimes even Japan's 
indigenous Ainu and Ryuukyuu peoples are constructed as Others. 
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dual purpose: they have allowed Westerners to imagine themselves as rational, mature 
and forthright; and, therefore, these discourses have provided Westerners with the 
justification for material practices of exploitation. Thus, in Said's discussion of 
Orientalism, symbolic and material practices of domination are inseparable. 
While Said discusses the framing of national identity in relation to foreign Others, 
Hage (1998) suggests that categories of ethnic difference within a nation can be defined 
and maintained to shore up the privileged position of the dominant group(s). Hage 
discusses what he terms the Australian 'white nation fantasy,' the taken-for-granted 
notion that 'whites' are the legitimate owners and rulers of the Australian nation. 4 I This 
assumed proprietorship surfaces in sites as diverse as graffiti, political speeches and such 
commonplace expressions as 'our coloured people' and 'our aborigines,' which position . 
'white' Australians as governors of the national space, with both the right and the 
responsibility to rule the Others within. 
Hage suggests that in Australia ethnic Others are identified and then excluded 
from national belonging not only by so-called 'racism' (overt racial discrimination) but 
also by 'anti-racism' (the denunciation of racism and the celebration of multiculturalism). 
He argues that the rhetoric of multicultural tolerance serves to reinforce 'white' privilege 
in Australia; it is, 'a strategy aimed at reproducing and disguising relationships of power 
in society, or being reproduced through that disguise. It is a form of symbolic violence in 
which a mode of domination is presented as a form of egalitarianism. . . . [It is] the power 
to position the other as an object within a space that one considers one's own, within 
limits one feels legitimately capable of setting' (1998: 87, 90). He argues that 
multiculturalism allows 'white' Australians to construct themselves as beneficent and 
tolerant toward Others, which further reinforces their implicit right of governance. 
41 Following Hage (1998), I use the term 'white Australian' rather than other common 
expressions such as `Anglo-,"Anglo-Saxon,' or 'Anglo-Celtic' Australian, which 
exclude the many Australians of non-British background who are still considered 
'white.' Where `Anglo-' is used, it refers specifically to those from the United 
Kingdom, or to the English language. I also agree with Hage (1998: 57-62) that 
whiteness is not an either/or category. One can be perceived as more 'white' or less 
'white' depending on such factors as one's religion, the language one speaks, or the 
degree to which one adopts 'white' ways of life. 
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Hage argues that what are often called 'racist' discourses and practices in 
Australia, are not solely about 'race,' but are about imagined control over the national 
space. 'Race' often only becomes problematic, he argues, when the proliferation or 
concentration of 'racial' Others renders them difficult for the dominant group to manage. 
Consequently, he argues that what are frequently categorised as 'racist' practices can be 
understood as strategies of 'spatial management' (1998: 37-38). 42 He notes, moreover, 
that those who commit 'racist' acts and engage in 'racist' discourses in one sense act from 
a position of power, in that they believe they are asserting their presumed right to say who 
does and does not belong in their nation. In another sense, however, they act from a 
position of disempowerment, for socially powerful individuals who feel secure in their 
right to rule, 
. . • don't need to deploy personal violence for national purposes. They are 
secure in the knowledge that the state is acting out their violence for them. 
In this sense, those who engage in such personal violent acts feel that they 
have lost this special relation to state power. They feel that the state is no 
longer doing their violence for them. . . . Nevertheless, they think they 
have a legitimate claim to represent the national will embodied in the state 
(Hage 1998: 69). 
In sum, economic and political conditions profoundly shape the way ethnicity is 
employed as a category of difference in discourses of national identity. As discourses of 
'us' and 'them,' national identities are formulated with reference to imagined Others, 
either foreign or internal. In terms of this thesis, while I do not use the term `Orientalige,' 
I will argue that foreign Others are essentialised in Australian and Japanese discourses in 
ways which more sharply define national identity. Furthermore, I will suggest that in 
both Australia and Japan, discourses of national identity reveal the assumed right and 
responsibility of the dominant ethnic group to rule the nation. Since Hage's term 'white 
nation fantasy' cannot be applied to Japan where 'whites' are not the dominant group, I 
discuss the ideologies of white proprietorship in Australia and ethnic Japanese 
proprietorship in Japan. More generally, I use the term ethnic proprietorship to refer to 
42 Of course, such practices and discourses are not necessarily politically innocent, for 
they may still be used to disempower and disadvantage Others. 
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the taken-for-granted notion that members of the dominant ethnic group are the legitimate 
owners and governors of the nation. 
Discourses of nation reflect, reinforce and challenge social inequalities. 
A key principle informing this work is that discourse matters. It matters because it 
shapes social worlds and social interactions. As Yeatman (1990: 155), drawing on 
Foucault, puts it, 'Discourse is the power to create reality by naming it and giving it 
meaning.' Discourses of national identity do not merely reflect national social order; they 
are constitutive of that order. When widely circulating narratives of nation in Australia 
and Japan discursively marginalise women and ethnic minorities, they both mirror and 
help sustain the inequalities faced by these groups. When counter-narratives of nation 
challenge the symbolic marginalisation of women and ethnic minorities, they both reflect 
and contribute to the increasing status of these groups. 
In recent decades, scholars have documented the material disadvantages faced by 
women and ethnic minorities in Australia and Japan. That this research exists at all is a 
testament to ever-shifting negotiations of the rights and roles of these groups within their 
national communities. Such scholarship is therefore significant as a reflection of the 
social standing of women and ethnic minorities in these two settings; however, it is also 
significant in that such discourses have the potential to contribute to social change. 
Research into the experiences of subordinated groups has translated into changes in 
institutional policies and in public perceptions, as detailed below. It has also fuelled 
further research into the complex origins and consequences of such inequality. My own 
research represents one such attempt to more fully understand the relationships between 
the symbolic and material marginalisation of women and ethnic minorities in Australia 
and Japan. I stress, however, that the literature on the disadvantage of women and ethnic 
minorities in Australia and Japan is by no means homogeneous or static. Research 
questions and conclusions are constantly being reshaped by diverse social conditions. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence presented below should itself be considered a 
discursive construct, shaped by complex political, economic and social factors. 
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Women as a subordinated social group in Australia and Japan 
Scholars have suggested that in terms of several key indicators, women in Australia and 
Japan face disadvantage relative to men, at home, at school and at work. They argue that 
in Australian and Japanese homes, it is women who shoulder the majority of unpaid 
domestic labour, including child care and elder care. 43 Feminist theorists argue that such 
unequal division of domestic labour contributes to the oppression of women in three key 
ways. First, employers appropriate, and profit from, the domestic labour of women by not 
paying them for reproducing and maintaining the workforce. Secondly, because women 
are not paid for their domestic labour, all women's labour comes to be devalued, so that 
even women in the paid workforce are paid, on average, less than men. Thirdly, the extra 
time women, compared to men, spend on domestic labour reduces the amount of time 
they are able to commit to pursuits such as political action or union membership which 
might lead to a more equitable representation of women's interests and concerns. 44 
However, scholars suggest that not only is the home a site of substantial amounts 
of unpaid female labour, it is also a site of violence against women. A 1996 survey of 
Australian women by the Commonwealth Office of the Status of Women 45 found that 23 
percent of respondents who had been married or in a de facto relationship had 
experienced violence by a partner at some time during that relationship (OSW 1999). 
Likewise, at least some Japanese scholars suggest that domestic violence is widespread 
and under-reported in Japan (Hada 1995). According to a survey conducted by the Prime 
Minister's Office in 1998, one in three women reported some form of physical abuse in 
the home (Japanese Cabinet Office 2001). The collection of such data by Australian and 
Japanese state agencies reflects an increased willingness to view domestic violence not as 
a 'private' matter but as a criminal matter requiring state scrutiny and intervention. 
Turning to education, it appears at first glance that women and girls in Australian 
and Japanese educational institutions have the same opportunities as their male 
counterparts. Enrolment and graduation figures suggest that similar proportions of young 
43 See, for instance, Bittman and Lovejoy (1993), Iwao (1993) and Sodei (1995). 
44 See, for example, Hochschild and Machung (1989) and Oakley (1974). 
45 Hereafter abbreviated OSW. 
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women and young men complete high school and attend post-secondary educational 
institutions. However, feminist scholars have argued that such overall trends belie 
substantial differences in educational outcomes for women and men. In both nations, 
men currently outnumber women in high-status, competitive degree programs such as 
law, engineering and medicine, while women are concentrated in lower-status fields such 
as education, nursing, the humanities and the arts. Furthermore, men outnumber women 
both in post-graduate studies, and among senior academic and administrative staff in the 
educational institutions of both countries. 46 
It is in scholarship on the workplace that women's disadvantage comes into 
sharpest focus, however. In a 1998 Australian labour survey, women constituted only 27 
percent of managers, eight percent of board members, and just over one percent of 
executive directors in private sector companies of 100 or more employees (OSW 1999). 
Women in public sector jobs fared little better, making up only 24 percent of permanent 
employees at the Senior Executive level and 29 percent of board members, and 
constituting just 24 percent of commonwealth parliamentarians (OSW 1999). In Japan, 
one Labour Ministry poll reported that women occupied only 4.1 percent of managerial 
positions across the nation, and 1.7 percent of directorships (The Japan Times, 11 May, 
1994), and constitute only 5.9 percent of members of parliament (Iwao 1993: 218). 
Tellingly, female employees in Japan are often called 'office flowers' (shokuba no hana) 
or 'tea fetchers' (ochakumi), and a woman's paid work is often called her 'temporary 
seat' (koshikake), revealing a view of female employees as decorative, low-skill, 
temporary workers (Iwao 1993: 156). Australian and Japanese women's under-
representation in high-level jobs accounts, in part, for their lower average earnings than 
their male colleagues. In Australia, women earn, on average, 20 percent less than men; 
and in Japan, women earn an average of almost 40 percent less than men (ABS 2000a; 
Iwao 1993: 190). 
46 ABS (2000c), Brinton (1993: 201-203), Japanese Ministry of Education (1990), 
and OSW (1999). 
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Again, the existence of state-funded research on the employment status of women 
in Australia and Japan, and the coverage such research receives in the mass media, signals 
increasing recognition by the state and society more generally of the importance of gender 
inequality. Such authorised accounts of women's disadvantage in Australia and Japan 
contribute to counter-narratives of nation which contest more widely circulating 
discourses which marginalise and inferiorise women in their respective national imagined 
communities. 
Ethnic minorities as subordinated Others in Australia and Japan 
Although discourses of national identity in Australia and particularly in Japan frequently 
obscure the presence of ethnic minorities, a number of ethnic groups coexist in the two 
nations. In Australia, of the nation's 18.6 million people, 3.9 million were born overseas 
(six percent in the United Kingdom and Ireland, almost seven percent in Europe, five 
percent in Asia, two percent in Oceania, one percent in the Middle East and North Africa, 
and another two percent elsewhere); almost 340,000 people self-identify as indigenous 
Australians; and more than 2.6 million speak a language other than English in the home 
(Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 1998; ABS 2000c). In Japan, of 
the nation's 122 million people, the largest ethnic minority groups include roughly 1.6 
million ethnic Okinawans (the Ryuukyuu), more than one million ethnic Koreans, over 
200,000 ethnic Chinese, more than 24,000 Ainu and an estimated three million 
Burakumin (Asahi Shimbun 1996; Murphy-Shigematsu 1993; Taira 1997: 142-43). 47 In 
addition, labour shortages in the 1980s brought an influx of migrant workers to Japan, 
mostly from East and Southeast Asia, the Middle East and South America, approximately 
700,000 of whom continue to work in Japan (Asahi Shimbun 1996). Scholars have 
47 While the Burakumin are marginalised more on the basis of caste-like 
characteristics (whether they and/or their ancestors engage/d in 'unclean' work) than 
ethnic characteristics, for analytical purposes I group them with Japan's ethnic 
minority groups. The exact size of Japan's Buraku and Ainu populations is difficult to 
determine because many in these marginalised groups choose to change their family 
names and 'pass' as majority Japanese. 
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suggested that ethnic minorities in both Australia and Japan face disadvantages in 
education, employment, criminal justice and health relative to dominant ethnic groups. 
Focusing on educational outcomes, some researchers note, for instance, that 
currently 11 percent of indigenous Australians hold post-secondary educational 
qualifications, compared with 31 percent of non-indigenous Australians (ABS 1999b); 
and that non-English-speaking background (NESB) migrants are less likely to receive 
employment-related training than their English-speaking background coworkers 
(VandenHeuvel and Wooden 1997). Other researchers point out, however, that migrants 
outperform native-borns in certain educational measures (Lamb, et al. 2000). In Japan, 
statistics on the educational outcomes of minority ethnic groups are not routinely 
collected, indicating the lack of official recognition of these groups. However, anecdotal 
evidence reported in the mass media suggests that ethnic Korean and ethnic Chinese 
children routinely face ostracism in Japanese public schools which negatively affects their 
educational outcomes (The Japan Times, 16 February, 1994). 
Scholars have also argued that ethnic minorities in Australia and Japan are 
disadvantaged in terms of employment. Maani (1994) has found that in Australia, young 
(16-25 year old) NESB migrants and children of NESB migrants experience more 
frequent and longer periods of unemployment relative to Australian-born youth of non-
migrant parents; and the ABS (1999b) has reported that the unemployment rate amongst 
indigenous Australians is 23 percent, considerably higher than the rate for non-indigenous 
Australians, at nine percent. ABS figures also indicate that indigenous Australians and 
NESB migrants are over-represented in low-status, low-pay jobs, which accounts, in part, 
for their lower median weekly incomes relative to majority Australians (ABS 1999b). 
However, state collection of employment statistics by ethnicity suggests official 
recognition of the importance of non-discriminatory employment practices, or at least the 
appearance of equity in employment for Australians of all ethnic backgrounds. 
By contrast, in Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare does not 
routinely calculate unemployment and income statistics for specific ethnic groups, once 
again rendering invisible the potential disadvantages of ethnic minority groups. However, 
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examination of Ministry of Home Affairs guidelines (revised in 1996) reveals that non-
citizens are restricted from holding, or even applying for, a wide range of jobs in the civil 
service (U.S. Department of State 2000). This restricts employment opportunities for 
ethnic Koreans and ethnic Chinese who are unlikely to hold Japanese citizenship even if 
their families have lived in Japan for several generations. While these groups are legally 
entitled to apply for naturalisation, the complicated and costly bureaucratic process, the 
inability to maintain dual nationality, and memories of Japan's military domination of 
Asia serve as barriers to the naturalisation of Korean and Chinese permanent residents of 
Japan. Anecdotal evidence also suggests that employment discrimination against 
Burakumin is widespread (Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Institute 2001). 
The lack of widely-accessible state-sponsored research on such issues suggests that ethnic 
relations are currently less dynamic in Japan than in Australia. 
Scholars and state agencies have also found that ethnic minorities in Australia and 
Japan face further disadvantages in their encounters with criminal justice agencies. For 
instance, the ABS reports that in Australia although indigenous people constitute just over 
two percent of the nation's population, they constitute 19 percent of the adult prison 
population and 40 percent of children in juvenile justice facilities (ABS 1999b). 
Likewise, there is growing evidence that in Japan non-Japanese face disadvantage, 
harassment and even physical abuse in their encounters with criminal justice and 
immigration authorities, and that they are frequently denied adequate legal representation 
and language translation services in criminal proceedings. 48 
Finally, some researchers argue that disadvantages Australian ethnic minorities 
face in education, employment and the criminal justice system translate into inequalities 
in health. The ABS has reported that those who speak languages other than English in the 
home are less likely than those speaking English to report being in good or excellent 
health (ABS 2000c); and Alcorso (1989) suggests that NESB migrants are more likely to 
suffer compensable work-related injuries than their Australian-born colleagues. 
48 See The Japan Times, 28 October, 1994; 25 December, 1994; 30 December, 1994; 
31 January, 1995; and U.S. Department of State 2000. 
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According to ABS statistics, Australia's indigenous population also experiences higher 
rates of smoking, alcoholism, obesity, over-crowding and violence than the non-
indigenous population, and is less likely to have adequate access to health care services. 
These factors go some way toward explaining the dramatically lower life expectancy of 
indigenous Australians: 56.9 years for indigenous males compared to 75.2 years for 
Australian males on the whole; and 61.7 years for indigenous females compared to 81.1 
years for Australian females on the whole (ABS 1999b). It is important to reiterate, 
however, that the existence of state-sponsored research into such issues in Australia 
signals official recognition of their importance. 
By contrast, statistics on the health of ethnic minorities in Japan are not readily 
available. Health statistics published by the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare are not broken down by ethnic group, demonstrating a lack of state recognition of 
ethnic differences within the nation. However, research bodies outside of Japan suggest 
that recent changes to the national health coverage scheme are certain to adversely affect 
already disadvantaged minorities in Japan (Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada 1999). 
These foreign scholars note that in 1998, the Japanese state shifted more of the financial 
burden for medical treatment to patients themselves, doubling the average out-of-pocket 
expenses for outpatient services. It is argued that such cost increases will 
disproportionately disadvantage social groups who are already economically marginalised 
in Japanese society. 
In sum, scholarship in Australia and Japan has documented the material 
disadvantage faced by women and ethnic minorities in these two nations. Such 
scholarship contributes to counter-narratives of nation which challenge more widely 
circulating discourses of national identity. I wish to argue that just as discourses of 
national identity which marginalise women and ethnic minorities reflect and reinforce the 
subordination of these groups, so counter-narratives of nation mirror and contribute to an 
increased and ever-increasing recognition of the roles of women and ethnic minorities in 
their national communities. 
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Historically, Australian national identity has been constructed as masculine and 
'white.' 
Starting in the 1970s, with a growing recognition of ethnic diversity and women's rights 
in Australia, a number of scholars began to focus on patriarchal and 'white' national 
imagery.49 These scholars suggested that, historically, narratives of Australian national 
identity have centred primarily on the values of egalitarianism and `mateship,' on popular 
pastimes such as sport, gambling and beer-drinking, and on national archetypes such as 
the ANZAC, the larrikin, the swagman, and the sun-bronzed surf lifesaver. 50 This 
national imaginary was strongly gendered and ethnicised in ways which privileged male 
over female and 'white' over 'non-white.' In fact, Summers (1975) argued that 
Australian national identity historically centred on 'white' masculine principles, pursuits 
and archetypes to such an extent that 'Australian' essentially meant 'white male 
Australian.' 51 
While there has been increased recognition in recent decades of the contributions 
of women and ethnic minorities to the nation (recognition that has, in part, grown out of 
the above scholarship and out of state discourses of multiculturalism), masculine and 
'white' discourses of national identity have been rekindled periodically. In two 
prominent examples, such gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity became 
apparent during the build-up to the Australian Bicentenary of 1988, and again in the mid-
to late-1990s with the rise of the populist One Nation Party and the national referendum 
on retaining links with the British monarchy. 
Turner (1994) has examined the key events and personalities which served to 
reinforce gendered and ethnicised discourses of nation in the 1980s. Crucially, he notes 
that 'white' Australian men defeated the United States in the America's Cup of 1983, and 
49 See, for example, Bennett et al. (1992), Kapferer (1996), Summers (1975), Turner 
(1994), White (1981) and Willis (1993). 
50ANZAC refers to the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps of World War I, but 
the term is often applied to Australian soldiers of both world wars; the larrikin is an 
irreverent urban wag; and the swagman, who appears in Australian folklore and songs 
such as 'Waltzing Matilda,' was an itinerant worker who travelled with nothing but 
the pack (or 'swag') on his back. 
51 As a telling historical example, at the turn of the twentieth century, the slogan of 
the popular Australian journal, The Bulletin, was 'Australia for the White Man.' 
51 
successfully challenged the British crown in the 1985 Maralinga Royal Commission 
hearings in London. 52 At the same time entrepreneurs such as Alan Bond, Kerry Packer 
and Rupert Murdoch were proving the grit of 'white' Australian manhood on a global 
stage, and Paul Hogan was embodying long-standing clichés of 'white' male 
Australianness as 'Crocodile Dundee.' These events and the 'white' Australian men at 
their centre, reinforced 'white' masculine discourses of Australianness in the 1980s. Such 
gendered and ethnicised visions of national identity did not go uncontested, however. 
Official bicentennial celebrations in 1988 were widely criticised for their 'white' bias and 
their failure to include non-British migrants and indigenous Australians (Turner 1994; 
- Castles, et al. 1988). 
In the mid- to late-1990s, national identity was once again hotly debated in 
Australia. The mid-1990s saw the rise of controversial parliamentarian Pauline Hanson 
and her One Nation Party. The party advocated restrictions both on immigration and on 
social welfare programs for migrant and indigenous Australians, a platform that raised 
issues of Australian racial and cultural integrity which were widely discussed by 
politicians, intellectuals, the mass media and the general public. At the same time, the 
nation was also preparing for the 2000 Sydney Olympics, the centenary of Federation, and 
a referendum on severing ties with the British monarchy. 
As the nation moved toward the referendum, proposed changes to the Australian 
Constitution, and particularly the proposed addition of a Constitutional Preamble, became 
the objects of intense media attention. While Prime Minister Howard, with the assistance 
of poet Les Murray, set about drafting a document which would reflect 'a sense of our 
history, a sense of who we are, a sense of what we believe in. . . and a sense of what we 
aspire to achieve' (Howard cited in The Australian, 24 March, 1999), politicians, literary 
figures and even school children were asked to submit their own versions of this historic 
narrative of nation to local and national newspapers. 53 The draft Preamble was released 
52 The America's Cup is an international yacht race; and in the Maralinga hearings, 
Australia challenged the British Crown on contamination of a British nuclear weapons 
test site named Maralinga in South Australia. 
53 This points to the interconnectedness of authorised and mass mediated discourses 
of national identity. 
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in March, 1999. However, two of its key elements attracted intense public scrutiny: 
references to the indigenous peoples of Australia and to `mateship.' 54 
While many Australian aboriginal leaders strongly advocated Preamble 
acknowledgment of aboriginal 'custodianship' of the land, the Prime Minister's reference 
to the nation's indigenous population instead read, 'Since time immemorial our land has 
been inhabited by Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, who are honoured for their 
ancient and continuing cultures.' This draft Preamble reveals the ideology of 'white' 
proprietorship of the nation. In its reference to 'our land' and 'their cultures,' the 
document constructs 'white' Australians as 'us,' the rightful owners and governors of the 
nation, and reduces indigenous Australians to 'them,' the 'passive object[s] of 
government' (cf. Hage 1998: 17). 
The draft Preamble sparked debate not only about the place of indigenous peoples 
in the national imaginary, but about the centrality of `mateship' in the life of the nation. 
Responding to the inclusion of the term `mateship' in the proposed Preamble, women's 
groups, such as the Australian Women Lawyers Association, protested that the term was 
'at the core of women's exclusion from business and public domains,' and a 'symbol of 
discrimination against women' (Australian Broadcasting Corporation 55 1999a). 
Likewise, the Australian Democrats, the party holding the balance of power in the Senate, 
lobbied for `mateship' to be dropped from the Preamble on the grounds that it privileged 
a 'white' masculinist vision of Australian national identity (ABC 1999a; 1999b). 56 
While linguists, historians, feminists and opposition politicians argued that 
`mateship' described only the bonds between 'white' males, particularly wartime and 
sporting bonds (ABC 1999a; 1999c; 1999d; 1999e), the Prime Minister defended the term 
54 See Appendix One for the full text of the draft Preamble. 
55 Hereafter abbreviated to ABC. The ABC is a state-owned but statutorily 
independent broadcaster. 
56 Significantly, the Democrats are the most feminised party in Australia. A higher 
proportion of their members of parliament have been women than in any other party, 
and they have had a higher percentage of female party leaders than the Liberal, Labor 
or National parties. They are also the first party with an indigenous Australian deputy 
party leader. That this party has recently held the balance of power in the parliament 
may reflect more widespread changes to the roles of women and indigenous people in 
Australia. 
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as 'unarguably, distinctively and dramatically and proudly Australian' (The Australian, 24 
March, 1999). 
With the draft Preamble lacking the parliamentary support required to see it 
included in the upcoming republic referendum, however, the Prime Minister entered into 
negotiations with Australian Democrats, who lobbied to strike `mateship' from the 
Preamble and to include a reference to aboriginal custodianship (ABC 1999b). The 
outcome of these negotiations saw a new draft Preamble released in August, 1999. 57 
`Mateship' disappeared from the revised Preamble, and the Prime Minister committed his 
fellow Australians to 'honouring Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the nation's first 
people, for their deep kinship with their lands and for their ancient and continuing 
cultures which enrich the life of our country' (emphasis added). 
While the revised Preamble represented a victory for those Australians who 
objected to enshrining a masculine national identity in the Constitution, Gatjil Djerrkura, 
Chair of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission, and other indigenous 
leaders suggested that the revised document only further weakened the status of the 
indigenous peoples of Australia (ABC 1999c). This raises the question of whether the 
battle against the marginalisation of women in the Preamble was won at the expense of 
the further marginalisation of Australia's indigenous peoples. 
Certainly, what the Preamble debate does demonstrate is that gendered and 
ethnicised metaphors of nation are hotly contested in contemporary Australia. It is 
suggestive that gendered and ethnicised representations of nationhood, such as those 
proposed for the Preamble, surfaced again at a time when the nation faced possible 
changes to its Constitution, its political structures and its identity, through separation 
from the British monarchy and the establishment of a fully independent Australian 
republic. Although the Australian electorate ultimately voted to retain formal links with 
the British monarchy, debate surrounding the referendum suggests that certain vestiges of 
historically masculine, 'white' discourses of Australian national identity remain today. 
57 See Appendix Two for the full text of the revised draft Preamble. 
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Historically, Japanese national identity has been constructed around notions of racial 
and cultural uniqueness; however, gendered constructions of national identity have 
varied with the discursive context. 
Japanese intellectuals have long concentrated on the 'uniqueness' of Japan and the 
Japanese. Popular throughout most of the twentieth century, the Nihonjinron, literatures 
propounding notions of Japanese uniqueness, have centred on the cultural and often racial 
distinctiveness of the Japanese. These discourses of national identity have been clearly 
ethnicised; however, the gendering of Japanese discourses of national identity has been 
less explicit. 58 The Nihonjinron and analyses of the Nihonjinron have shaped another key 
premise of this thesis, that historically, discourses of Japanese national identity have been 
strongly ethnicised, but only implicitly or ambiguously gendered. 59 
Theories of Japanese uniqueness are underpinned by the notion of Japanese ethnic 
homogeneity. According to the Nihonjinron, the Japanese are unique by virtue of their 
language, customs, psychology, and even their presumed genetic traits. Currently many 
such discourses are implicitly racialised. However, Morris-Suzuki (1998: 32) argues that 
notions of the Japanese as a (biological) 'race' only developed in Japan out of encounters 
with Western theories of 'race' in the Meiji Era (1868-1912). She suggests that prior to 
the Meiji Era, Japanese notions of identity centred primarily on ways of life, rather than 
on biological heredity. Only upon exposure to European theories of 'race' did the 
Japanese develop a racialised self concept; and only then was the name of the nation 
58Although relatively little has been written on the gendering of national identity in 
Japan, the 1990s saw a proliferation of literature on the lived experiences of Japanese 
women. See Allison (1994), Bernstein (1991), Brinton (1993), Buckley (1997), 
Fujimura-Fanselow and Kameda (1995), Imamura (1996), Iwao (1993), Kondo (1990, 
1997), Martinez (1998), Roberts (1994), Skov and Moeran (1995) and Tamanoi 
(1998). 
59Due to difficulties accessing Japanese-language sources, my analysis concentrates 
on works by Western scholars and by Japanese scholars whose work has been 
translated into English. However, it must be noted that Japanese scholars have written 
widely on issues of national identity and on globalisation. In terms of the discourse of 
national uniqueness, for example, Dale (1986: 14-16) reports that from 1946 to 1978 
alone, approximately 700 Nihonjinron publications came onto the Japanese market, 
with 25 percent of these publications appearing in the post-war boom years of the late 
1970s when Japanese thinkers were searching for explanations for the nation's rapid 
economic growth. 
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'transformed into an ethnonym, so that "Japanese" (Nihonjin) was seen as a racial 
designation' (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 32). 
Furthermore, the assumption of racial/ethnic homogeneity has been critiqued by a 
growing number of Japanese and Western scholars.° For not only does this ethnicised 
discourse of national identity obscure the presence of minority ethnic groups in Japan, it 
ultimately serves the interests of the Japanese state, by making it possible to ignore the 
real material disadvantages facing these marginalised groups (see Mouer and Sugimoto 
1983, 1986). 
Discourses of Japanese uniqueness are usefully characterised as reverse 
Orientalism. They exoticise Japanese social phenomena through the typical orientalist 
tropes identified by Said (1978), and yet they invert the effects of these tropes by making 
the 'exotic' a source of nationalist pride. However, the Nihonjinron essentialise not only 
Japan, but also 'the West' which is viewed as an undifferentiated (and largely 'white,' 
industrialised and implicitly male) Other. 
There is at least some explicit gendering of Japanese discourses of national 
identity, however. One symbol of Japanese national identity which is explicitly gendered 
is the Sun Goddess. The creation myths found in the eighth century texts, the Kojiki and 
the Nihon shoki, explain that sibling gods created the Sun Goddess, who then ruled the 
earth on her parents' authority. According to this legend, the grandson of the Sun 
Goddess became her first descendant to rule the earth; and one of his descendants married 
the daughter of the Sea God to produce Jimmu Tennoo, the founder of the Japanese 
imperial family. As symbolic mother of the nation, the Sun Goddess features prominently 
in some explanations of Japanese uniqueness. In 1937, Hoshi Hajime claimed, for 
instance, that many contemporary Japanese social traits could be traced back to the Sun 
Goddess. He suggested that the Japanese had inherited from the Sun Goddess the 
principles of cooperation, hard work, endurance, a concern with welfare and a focus on 
'things eternal' (Hoshi 1937: ii-10). 
60 See, for example, Befu (1993), Denoon, et al. (1996), Mouer and Sugimoto (1983, 
1986), Weiner (1995, 1997a, 1997b) and Yoshino (1992). 
56 
More frequently, however, Japanese discourses of national identity are less 
explicitly gendered. Dale (1986) argues that much of the Nihonjinron implicitly 
associates Japan with the feminine and the West with the masculine. Dale (1986: 45-51) 
identifies a number of such gendered dichotomies common in the Nihonjinron. While 
Japan is characterisdd as feminine or maternal (taoyameburi), the West is characterised as 
masculine or paternal (masuraoburi). Following the same logic, Japan is said to be 
emotional (kanjooteki), a purportedly feminine characteristic, while the West is rational 
(gooriteki), a trait associated with masculinity. Likewise, the stereotypically feminine 
principles of peace and harmony are attributed to Japan, while the West is characterised 
by the more stereotypically masculine bellicosity and rupture. Such gendered 
typifications continue as Japan is associated with the natural, the world most often tied to 
women through the biological processes of menstruation, childbirth and breast feeding, 
while the West is associated with the artificial, the built or man-made world. Finally, 
Japan is characterised as receptive or reactive, a common image of female sexuality, 
while the West is said to be donative and active, traits associated with phallic pleasure. 
The implicit femininity of Japaneseness is further apparent in scholarly 
discussions of the Japanese language and character. Watanabe Shooichi, an authority on 
the Japanese language, has characterised native Japanese words as 'soft, like the tender 
feel of a mother's skin,' while foreign loanwords, now in common usage in Japan, are 
characterised as 'hard, like the brawny muscles of the father' (Dale 1986: 87). Similarly, 
Japanese psychoanalysts have associated the West with paternal authority and Japan with 
maternal indulgence (Dale 1986: 117-19). 
As Dale points out, such gendered typifications fail to account for the fatherly 
figure of the emperor serving as the head of the Japanese family state (kazoku kokka). 
However, Morris-Suzuki argues that the figure of the emperor embodies both the 
masculine and the feminine (1998: 118-19). She suggests that, like kings in the 
European tradition, the Emperor in a sense has two bodies, one corporeal and one 
enduring and spiritual. In his person, the Emperor is both the current ruling son of the 
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imperial family and the embodiment of his divine ancestor, the Sun Goddess. He is, 
therefore, both father and mother to the nation. 
Just as the Emperor is, symbolically, both male and female, historically, 
discourses of Japanese national identity have been both masculinised and feminised, 
depending on the discursive context (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 110-139). Morris-Suzuki 
demonstrates that discourses of Japaneseness have been alternately masculinised to 
emphasise the nation's industriousness, its dynamism, and its martial and economic 
power, and feminised to emphasise its gentility and benign intentions. In this way, 
Japanese 'notions of femininity and masculinity have been deployed and combined in 
various ways to create visions of the nation which suited particular historical and political 
contexts' (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 135). Furthermore, these deployments of gendered 
discourses have had material consequences in Japan, serving variously to obscure (and 
thus maintain) gender inequalities, to restrict women to the 'traditional' realm of domestic 
duties, or to legitimate the expansion of women's public roles (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 110- 
139). 
Since the Meiji era, then, Japanese national identity has been strongly ethnicised 
to the near total exclusion of ethnic minorities, while gendered metaphors of nation have 
shifted over time to suit particular social, political and economic conditions. However, as 
Morris-Suzuki has noted, although the metaphorical gender of the nation has shifted 
according to context in discourses of Japanese national identity, historically, 'Men were 
seen as the dynamic face of the nation—the creative, though sometimes disruptive, agents 
of progress; while women were the face of cultural continuity, a source of stability in a 
changing world' (1998: 135). 
Globalisation is transforming economic, political and cultural conditions worldwide. 
Like the term 'national identity' discussed in Chapter Two, the term `globalisation' has a 
variety of connotations, and therefore requires careful definition here. In state, academic 
and popular discussions of globalisation, there is widespread disagreement over what 
globalisation is, when it started and what its outcomes may entail. Among academics, 
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theorists in fields as diverse as world systems theory, media theory, postmodern theory, 
cultural studies and international relations draw on globalisation as an explanatory factor; 
yet, depending on the theoretical perspective, `globalisation' may refer to the intensifying 
concentration of global capital, the hegemony of the Western (mainly U.S.) mass media, 
the destabilisation or liberation of individual and collective identities, the emergence of 
supra-national political institutions, or all of the above. Following Waters' (1995) 
detailed explication of the term, I define globalisation here as the increasing 
interconnectedness of individuals and collective bodies worldwide, in the arenas of the 
economy, politics and culture. I use this definition as a starting point to establish my next 
premise: that globalisation is transforming political, economic and cultural conditions 
worldwide; but that the direction and consequences of these transformations are by no 
means uniform or unidirectional. 
Globalisation is not new. Globalised trade, migration, cultural admixture and 
other constituent processes of globalisation have their roots in the earliest movements of 
people, goods and information across the landscapes of pre-history. There are convincing 
arguments, however, that advances in communication and transportation technologies, 
particularly in the twentieth century, have led to the dramatic acceleration of globalising 
social transformations (see Anderson 1983; Giddens 1990; Harvey 1989; Robertson 1990; 
and Wallerstein 1974). 61 These transformations include such readily observable 
phenomena as the rapid rise of transnational corporations, the cession of certain state 
powers to supra-national organisations such as the European Economic Community or the 
United Nations, and the proliferation of consumer choices of food, fashion, entertainment 
and lifestyles more generally, at least for more affluent individuals and groups. 
In addition to such observable material changes under conditions of globalisation, 
theorists have argued that globalisation is fundamentally altering the way people 
experience and understand the world. Notably, Giddens (1990) and Harvey (1989, 1993) 
61 Although Anderson focuses primarily on 'nationalism,' Giddens on 'modernity,' 
Harvey on `postmodernity,' and Wallerstein on the 'capitalist world economy,' each 
provides insight into the intensification of globalising processes. Robertson discusses 
the development of globalisation more explicitly. 
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suggest that advances in transportation and communications technologies have radically 
changed the nature of spatio-temporal relationships. Developments such as electronic 
commerce, Internet virtual communities, and live news coverage of events around the 
world have resulted in 'the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
miles away and vice versa' (Giddens 1990: 64). 62 
I do not dispute these readily observable transformations of global social relations. 
However, two aspects of such theorisations are problematic. The first is that these 
transformations are by no means uniform. The consequences of globalisation are uneven; 
globalisation affects people in different social locations in different ways. 63 The second 
is the implication that such changes result in the destabilisation of individual subjectivity 
and collective identities. This raises the larger issue of the nature of identity, at the 
individual or national level. 
Hall (1996: 596-97) supports the proposition that the social changes associated 
with globalisation, or 'late modernity' more generally, are undermining 'the cultural 
landscapes of class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, race, and nationality which give us firm 
locations as social individuals.' In his discussion of national (cultural) identities, he 
argues that such identities are ever-shifting, inherently unstable. Yet, he concludes that 
globalisation dislocates and decentres these collective identities. 
Globalisation does have the effect of contesting and dislocating centred 
and 'closed' identities of a national culture. It does have a pluralising 
impact on identities, producing a variety of possibilities and new positions 
of identification, making identities more positional, more political, more 
plural and diverse; less fixed, unified or trans-historical (1996: 628, 
emphasis in original). 
This begs the question, however, of what it means for individuals, groups, even nations, 
to have their identities 'de-centred' and 'dislocated.' Do (or did) identities ever have a 
'centre' or a fixed location? This uncharacteristic contradiction in Hall's work highlights 
62 There are similarities here with McLuhan's vision of a mass mediated 'global 
village,' with its 'heightened human awareness of responsibility' (1967: 5). 
63 I address this point in detail in the next section of this chapter. 
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an unfortunate blind spot of theorists who suggest that globalising social changes are 
undermining individual and collective identities and driving an 'identity crisis.' That is, 
theories of identity crises are necessarily premised on the Enlightenment notion that 
identities are unified and fixed, when, as I argued in Chapter Two, identities are always in 
flux, always in the process of becoming. 64 
A further shortcoming of claims of transformed subjectivity is the lack of 
empirical evidence in support of such claims. While changes to subjectivity are 
admittedly difficult to measure empirically, the explanations of globalisation outlined 
above are far removed from the everyday experiences of the very people whose lives (and 
identities) are supposedly being transformed by globalising processes. 
While the academic literature on globalisation is vast and diverse, it is possible to 
identify two broad visions of the consequences of globalisation: one which stresses wide-
scale economic, political and cultural convergence, and often highlights perceived threats 
to cultural diversity; and one which emphasises the liberating and diversifying effects of 
globalisation. I draw on both senses of globalisation: I argue that, in some contexts, 
globalisation promotes a degree of superficial homogenisation; but that political, 
economic and cultural homogenisation is far from inevitable. 
The notion that economic globalisation leads inevitably toward global 
homogeneity can be traced back to the nineteenth and early twentieth century period of 
colonialism and industrialisation, when Marx and Engels described the basic features of 
what is now often called globalisation. In a comment on intensifying global capitalism, 
Marx and Engels observed that, 'The need of a constantly expanding market for its 
products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere' (1977: 83). 
Marx and Engels suggested that the world was moving toward what they called 
the 'universal interdependence of nations' (1977: 84), with the basis of this 
64 Hall himself usually stresses the instability of identities/identifications, a feature of 
his work which has profoundly shaped my understanding of national identities. 
However, his discussion of the transformation of national identities by globalisation 
implies that national identities are relatively stable and unified. 
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interdependence the ever-expanding capitalist world market. They argued that as 
capitalism pushed its way into every quarter of the world, it brought with it destabilising 
and homogenising economic, political and cultural changes. In their vision, long-standing 
local industries and ways of life are choked out by the capitalist mode of production; local 
desires give way to 'new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant 
lands and climes' (1977: 84); markets are standardised and regulated to benefit the 
bourgeoisie; political power is centralised and mobilised in the service of this 
bourgeoisie-dominated market; and intellectual diversity is stifled. The future Marx and 
Engels envisioned was a world system of exploitation and struggle, where less powerful 
nations and social groups were forced into dependent relations with more powerful 
nations and social groups. However, Marx and Engels likened capitalism to a sorcerer 
who realises too late that the powers he has conjured up are beyond his control (1977: 
85-86). Just as the conjurer will be swallowed up by the monster of his making, so, Marx 
and Engels argued, capitalism and the bourgeoisie will succumb to the working class they 
have created, when a proletarian revolution sweeps them aside. 
While the world socialist revolution predicted by Marx and Engels has failed to 
eventuate, and recent decades have seen the general collapse of communism and the 
ascendancy of global capitalism, many of these writings describe the character of social, 
political and economic relations under what is now called globalisation. The continued 
applicability of Marxian concepts to contemporary conditions of globalisation is 
evidenced in the work of world systems theorists, principally Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 
1991; Wallerstein and Balibar 1991) and Sklair (1995). 
Wallerstein, the leading voice of world systems theory, analyses the contemporary 
world order as a 'capitalist world economy' consisting of core, peripheral and semi-
peripheral areas. Drawing on extensive historical examples, Wallerstein (1974) suggests 
that the current world system emerged in fifteenth century Europe, in a climate of 
increasing industrialisation, increasing divisions of labour, the transformation from feudal 
to capitalist modes of agricultural production, and widespread colonisation projects. 
Under conditions so favourable to the accumulation of capital, he suggests, states became 
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increasingly centralised with highly developed bureaucracies, allowing them to 
monopolise the means of legitimate violence, namely, armies and internal policing forces. 
This maintenance of armed forces both necessitated and facilitated the state's ability to 
tax the populace, and thus to accumulate more capital, which allowed for still more 
investment and capitalist development. 
Most relevant to the discussion here, however, Wallerstein argues that these early 
states were effective because they combined centralisation, bureaucratisation and capital 
accumulation with the homogenisation of the national populace, through the ideologies of 
religion and culture. These ideologies unified and homogenised national populations, 
rendering them more amenable to centralised state contro1. 65 In Wallerstein's 
formulation, the trends seen in the early capitalist world economy are readily observable 
today. The current world system, he argues, is characterised by exploitative divisions of 
labour based not only on class, but also on gender, ethnicity and geography. He argues 
that powerful core areas currently exploit the cheap labour of the periphery, and to some 
extent the semi-periphery, and at the same time exploit the unpaid or underpaid labour of 
women and disadvantaged ethnic groups both at home and abroad (Wallerstein and 
Balibar 1991).66 
Sklair (1995) extends and updates world systems theory to take into account not 
only economic relations within and between nation-states, or the sometimes overly 
generalised dynamics between global 'capital' and 'labour' which ignore regional 
specificities, but also the transnational processes, institutions and, importantly, ideologies 
that he suggests lie at the centre of the current capitalist world order. In Sklair's thesis, 
the shift toward a 'homogenised capitalist culture' (1995: 167) is facilitated by economic, 
political and culture-ideological transnational practices. Increasingly powerful 
65 Wallerstein rejects Weber's thesis (1930) that it was the particular tenets of 
Protestantism which drove early capital development. Rather, he argues, any mass 
religion, regardless of its doctrine, could have served to unite national populaces and 
bring them under state control. 
66 Waters (1995: 25) suggests that because Wallerstein emphasises relations to the 
near total exclusion of cultural and political relations, global systems theory cannot 
properly be considered globalisation theory. However, in terms of this thesis, 
Wallerstein offers insights into the links between nation, culture, and power. 
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transnational corporations and the transnational capitalist class who own or manage them 
or support their growth through political or commercial practices, are key figures in this 
homogenisation process, as are the mass media. 
Sklair suggests that it is, in part, through advertising and other media texts that the 
ideology of consumerism is popularised (1995: 147-85). The spread of this ideology, 
Sklair argues, works in tandem with the practices of transnational corporations which 
often undermine local industries and local ways of life, such as subsistence agriculture, 
bringing locals into the capitalist world market where they must sell their labour and buy 
the necessities of life they once produced for themselves. In this climate of rapid social 
change, he argues, the transnational mass media begin to supplant socialising institutions 
such as the church, school and family, further facilitating the spread of the homogenising 
ideology of capitalist consumerism. 
The critical approach of Mandan theories of global convergence provides valuable 
insights into the nature of contemporary economic, political and ideological power 
relations. In particular, it is useful for understanding how the discursive marginalisation 
of women and ethnic minorities translates into material disadvantage for these groups. 67 
However, Marxian homogenisation theories largely fail to acknowledge the possibility of 
diverse responses to globalising trends. Populations worldwide are not powerless to resist 
globalisation; recent religious fundamentalist and ethnic-nationalist movements in diverse 
national contexts exemplify alternative responses to globalisation. Moreover, theories of 
global convergence rest, in part, on the premise that the consumption of globally available 
commodities, including mass mediated texts, leads to the homogenisation of subjectivity. 
However, adopting external cultural or structural/organisational elements does not, in and 
of itself, comprehensively change the societies, cultures or individuals who adopt them. 
A growing number of theorists reject the thesis that globalisation leads to the 
homogenisation of world cultures, institutions, and social processes. 68 Friedman, for one, 
critiques current theories of cultural homogenisation, or cultural imperialism, and 
67 See, in particular, Wallerstein (1991). 
68 See Appadurai (1990), Friedman (1990, 1994a, 1994b), Hall (1992), Pieterse 
(1995), Robertson (1990, 1992, 1995) and Smith (1990). 
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suggests instead that the world system has always been characterised by cycles of first the 
strengthening and then the weakening of a core culture, what he calls the `hegemon' 
(Friedman 1994a). The current phase of globalisation, he argues, is characterised by the 
decline of the Western hegemon and the rise of new cultural movements including, 
among others, identity politics based on language, ethnicity and global political issues 
such as human rights and the environment; religious diversification involving both new 
religious cults and a return to religious fundamentalism; and so-called Balkanisation, the 
division of once politically integrated nation-states into progressively smaller nation-
states. 
Friedman suggests that this dramatic fragmentation of collective identities is 
leading to 'the weakening of former national identities and the emergence of new 
identities . . . based on "primordial loyalties," ethnicity, "race," local community, 
language and other culturally concrete forms' (1994a: 86). While Friedman admits that 
such radical changes may instil a sense of fear in individuals, fear of increased violence, 
fear of global pandemics, fear of global environmental catastrophes, he argues that the 
overall effect of hegemon disintegration is a 'flowering of culture,' a liberation of 
identities previously repressed by the dominance of the core (1994a: 233-53). Although I 
agree with Friedman regarding the complex and uneven outcomes of globalisation, his 
discussion of identity fragmentation and liberation is premised on the notion of an overly-
stabilised or 'true' identity which is, by turns, suppressed, broken down and set free. 
The pluralisation of identities and the associated phenomenon of cultural pastiche 
are similarly strong themes in the writing of theorists who view hybridisation as the 
principal outcome of globalisation. In the literatures of globalisation, postmodernism and 
cultural studies, 'hybridisation' refers to the blending of disparate cultural elements to 
create new and innovative cultural forms. Hybridisation theorists suggest that 
globalisation leads not to cultural homogeneity but to increased cultural eclecticism (see 
Pieterse 1995; Smith 1990). However, the notion of hybridisation is problematic in a 
numbefof ways. The term 'hybridisation' implies the existence of original, pure or 
'authentic' cultural forms; it carries with it uncritical assumptions that surface material 
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transformations translate into deeper cultural transformations; and it elides power 
relations between core and peripheral cultures through the celebratory rhetoric of 
voluntary appropriation. More importantly, however, the concept of hybridisation 
obscures the reality that all contemporary cultures are, to a certain extent, the product of 
intercultural transactions. 69 
In addition to examining cultural diversification and hybridisation, some 
globalisation theorists point to the tension between localism and globalism, between 
particularism and universalism, sameness and difference, as further evidence that 
globalisation does not lead to cultural homogenisation. 70 Robertson (1995) examines the 
inherent articulation between the local and the global in his discussion of so-called 
`glocalisation,' the inherent connection between globalism and localism. He argues that 
the global and the local do not represent opposing forces, and that it is impossible to 
separate the two, in the same way it is impossible to entirely separate macro-level from 
micro-level phenomena. He therefore rejects the notion that globalisation can be simply 
described as either homogenising or pluralising. 
In sum, then, globalisation is most usefully conceptualised as an 'on-going 
articulation between global and local processes' (Friedman 1994a: 12). The local is 
shaped by the global, even as the global is shaped by the local. As Waters (1995) has 
noted, this is part of the Janus-faced nature of globalisation: it both unifies and 
diversifies economic, political and cultural realms worldwide; it is both outward-looking 
and future-oriented, endlessly seeking the new and exotic, and increasingly concerned 
with local 'traditions,' cultural roots and 'authenticity.' Globalisation is neither 
unidirectional nor uniform. It transforms political, economic and cultural relations in 
diverse and complex ways. 
69 Iwabuchi (1998), Parry (1994), Pieterse (1995) and Thomas (1994) discuss the 
limitations of 'hybridisation' theories in greater detail. 
70 See for example Appadurai (1990) on the tensions between different kinds of 
'global flows' (of people, finance, technology and so on). 
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Globalisation affects different people in different ways. 
As noted above, the consequences of globalisation are uneven. Scholars have suggested 
that globalisation has differential effects on individuals and collectivities, depending on 
such factors as geographic location/country of origin, class location, ethnicity and 
gender. 71 In this thesis I am particularly interested in the effects of globalisation on 
women and ethnic minorities. 
Some feminist theorists argue that women are disproportionately disadvantaged by 
globalisation. 72 They suggest that as more countries are drawn into capitalist relations, 
more women are trebly exploited: first as workers in often underpaid and insecure 
positions; second, as mothers and wives working, unpaid, to reproduce and maintain the 
labour force; and third, as the primary household consumers targeted by advertisers. 
While globalisation affects women in different social locations differently, most 
empirical evidence suggests that it disproportionately disadvantages poor women in the 
Third World. In addition to increased economic exploitation, these women often suffer 
increased sexual exploitation and violence under conditions of globalisation. As women 
in developing nations take jobs in the factories of multinational corporations, they often 
face sexual harassment in their workplaces and increased violence in their homes 
(Zimmer-Tamakoshi 2001). As the disparity in wealth between First and Third World 
nations increases, a growing number of women move from poorer to richer nations to 
work as domestic servants and sex workers, again often making them targets of 
exploitation (Pettman 1996). Furthermore, cheaper and more convenient international 
travel has facilitated the growth of so-called sextourism, particularly in South East Asia, 
where local sex workers cater to affluent foreign tourists (Muroi and Sasaki 1997; Richter 
1989). 
71 For discussion of the differential effects of globalisation, including issues of 
colonialism, international relations and 'development' programs, see Enloe (1990), 
Kofman and Youngs (1996), Massey (1994), Mies (1998) and Wallerstein and 
Ballibar (1991). 
72 See especially Brettell and Sergent (2001: 507-511), Enloe (1990), Kofman and 
Youngs (1996) and Mies (1998). 
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While this empirical evidence suggests that poor women in the Third World have 
faced increased exploitation under globalised conditions, some researchers have 
documented the ways globalisation has lead to increased status for women in the Third 
World. For instance, Lockwood (2001) and Wilson-Moore (2001) report improvements 
to the status of women in Third World countries when globalising market reforms are not 
accompanied by the importation of Western patriarchal ideology. Furthermore, Krause 
(1996) argues that increasing global feminist alliances are leading to improvements in 
women's rights in many national contexts, in both more affluent and less affluent nations. 
Empirical evidence suggests, furthermore, that ethnic minorities in many national 
contexts are negatively affected by globalisation. Marxian theorists suggest that 
globalised capitalism relies on the cheap labour of marginalised social groups 
(Wallerstein 1991). These include not only women but ethnic Others; that is both the 
Others to the capitalist industrialised North (namely, the peoples of the so-called Third 
World), and nations' internal Others, including refugees, 'guest workers,' low-caste 
'untouchables,' and indigenous peoples, among other marginalised minorities. Evidence 
suggests that under globalising conditions ethnic Others are increasingly exploited as 
workers and consumers. Furthermore, as globalisation destabilises long-standing systems 
of production, newly disenfranchised groups frequently target ethnic Others as the 
imagined cause of their waning economic and political power (White 1998). 
Out of my review of the scholarship which documents such differential effects of 
globalisation, I developed an expectation that guided my interview process: I predicted 
that individuals in different social locations in Australia and Japan would experience and 
respond to globalisation differently. I began conducting interviews and focus groups with 
the expectation that those social groups who were more economically and politically 
threatened by globalising changes would construct more negative accounts of 
globalisation than those who stood to benefit from globalisation. For example, I 
anticipated that primary producers whose commodity prices have dropped substantially 
under globalisation and factory workers in declining industrial sectors would view 
globalisation less positively than individuals whose livelihoods depended on increased 
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globalisation, or entailed the promotion of globalisation. However, as evidence presented 
in Chapter Seven will show, my expectations were not wholly supported by the empirical 
data. The data do indicate, however, that participants recognise the complexities and 
contradictions of globalisation and its diverse effects on their lives. 
Australian multiculturalism is a set of authorised discourses aimed at managing 
internal ethnic diversity in a context of increasing globalisation. 
In recent years globalisation has featured prominently in Australian state discourses in 
relation to cultural, economic and political issues. These discourses have centred, in large 
part, around multiculturalism. In Australian state discourses, multiculturalism has been 
conceptualised, variously, as 'a term which describes the cultural and ethnic diversity of 
contemporary Australia;' a policy which 'seeks to ensure that diversity is a positive force 
in our society;' and a policy which 'manages the consequences of this diversity in the 
interests of the individual and society as a whole' (Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs 1998). The very imprecision of this term has added to its political 
utility, by allowing different people to use it in different ways under different conditions. 
In the interests of analytical precision, however, I conceptualise multiculturalism as the 
ethnic diversification of the Australian population and the policies designed to manage 
that diversification. As such, I understand multiculturalism as one specific national 
response to recent globalising social changes. 
Australia has experienced dramatic ethnic diversification since World War II. Prior 
to the war, the so-called 'White Australia' policy effectively prevented 'non-white,' non-
English-speaking migrants from permanently settling in Australia. In the decades 
following the end of World War II, however, Australian immigration policy was 
substantially revised. With the memory of Hitler's 'final solution' fresh in their minds, 
many Australian policy makers grew uncomfortable with overtones of Aryan supremacy 
in the discourse of 'White Australia' (White 1981: 157-61). A new policy was sought, a 
policy which eschewed 'race'-based discrimination, but which nonetheless promised to 
protect the nation from being inundated with 'non-white' (particularly Asian) migrants, a 
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deep-seated fear amongst 'white' Australians since the earliest days of colonisation, and 
one intensified by Japanese attacks on the Australian coast during World War II. 
Beginning in the late 1940s and 1950s, Australia recruited 'white' migrants from 
Britain and northern Europe, in an attempt to shore up the national population and 
provide labour for large-scale public works and industrialisation projects. Later, when the 
flow of these northern European migrants slowed to a trickle, migrants were recruited 
from southern Europe and eventually Turkey, Syria and Lebanon (Lack and Templeton 
1995: 74-75). Policy makers reassured the 'white' English-speaking population that, 
under a policy of assimilation, these ethnically diverse migrants would blend seamlessly 
into 'white' Australian society. 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, there was a growing awareness that 
migrants were not assimilating as flawlessly as government rhetoric suggested. Social 
scientists highlighted the problems of migrant poverty and lack of access to social 
services, and urged a reconsideration of assimilationist policies. 73 In the early 1970s, 
services for migrants were expanded, and in 1973, the language of assimilation was 
dropped in favour of the term 'multiculturalism,' borrowed from Canada (Lack and 
Templeton 1995: 90). While early multicultural policies stressed the pleasures of ethnic 
diversity, the food, festivals and art of migrant communities, by the late 1970s the state 
officially recognised the need for expanded government programs to assist migrants with 
the material challenges they faced (Lack and Templeton 1995: 91). Successive 
governments focused multicultural discourses and policies on both preserving a diversity 
of 'cultural identities' in Australia and promoting 'social justice,' equity and political 
engagement for all Australians. By the early 1990s, however, growing public criticism of 
multiculturalism prompted the Keating government to identify another goal of 
multiculturalism, the promotion of so-called 'productive diversity,' the effective, and 
economically profitable, utilisation of the skills of Australia's diverse population (Office 
of Multicultural Affairs 1988). 
73 See for instance Jupp (1966) and Martin (1972, 1978). 
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Starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s, multicultural policy had come under fire 
from a number of quarters. In response to increased Asian immigration, stemming from 
the Indochinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s, political conservatives decried the 
`Asianisation' of Australia. Geoffrey Blainey, perhaps the most high-profile critic of 
Asian immigration, argued in his widely-discussed All for Australia (1984), that Asian 
immigration was socially disruptive because of irreconcilable cultural differences 
between 'Asians' and 'Australians' (both largely conceived to be homogeneous groups), 
and because Asian migrants increased the competition for increasingly scarce jobs. As 
global economic restructuring led to widespread deindustrialisation and rising 
unemployment in Australia in the late 1980s and 1990s, other conservative critics of 
multicultural policy echoed Blainey's arguments. Such rhetoric was rekindled in the mid-
1990s when Pauline Hanson's One Nation party branded immigration (particularly Asian 
immigration) a cultural and economic threat to Australian society. 
However, critics of multicultural policy have not been drawn exclusively from the 
political right. Some left-leaning intellectuals have critiqued multicultural policy as an 
ideological tool which obscures class-based inequalities and divides the working class 
into less powerful ethnic sub-groups. According to such critiques, multiculturalism 
'mystifies the structural sources of oppression by suggesting that, for example, an Italian 
industrialist and an Italian steelworker have more in common with each other than a 
Greek steelworker and an Italian steelworker' (Sawer 1990: 27). Likewise, such critics 
have suggested that the discourses and policies of multiculturalism serve as cost-effective 
distractions from structural inequalities based on class, gender and ethnicity which could 
only effectively be addressed through costly state intervention. In other words, 
multiculturalism provides policy makers and powerful elites with an inexpensive symbol 
of their own generosity and magnanimous tolerance, and absolves them of responsibility 
for social inequalities from which they benefit (Betts 1993; Hage 1998; Thakur 1994). 
Furthermore, recent critics of multiculturalism argue that there is an inherent 
contradiction in such policies: that is, multiculturalists cannot uphold the core value of 
tolerance for all without also tolerating bastions of intolerance, such as neo-Nazi groups. 
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Fish (1997) for instance, argues that ultimately, multiculturalism can be only a shallow 
commitment to surface diversity. He describes 'the multiculturalism of ethnic 
restaurants, weekend festivals, and high profile flirtations with the other. . . characterised 
by its superficial or cosmetic relationship to the objects of its affection,' what he calls 
'boutique multiculturalism' (1997: 78). That multiculturalism has faced criticism from 
both the political right and the political left is indicative of both the instability of the 
concept and the perceived scope of multicultural programs. 
I conceptualise discourses of multiculturalism as strategies for managing internal 
ethnic diversity in a context of increasing globalisation. Significantly, authorised 
discourses of multiculturalism reinforce 'white' dominance in Australia in two ways. 
They institutionalise categories of difference (both by dichotomising 'us' and 'them' and 
by institutionalising practices which sustain ethnic inequalities); and they position 
'whites' as the governors of the nation, those with the right, the responsibility and the 
power to decide who to tolerate and who to reject. 74 At the same time, however, 
discourses of multiculturalism reflect and generate challenges to 'white' domination, 
challenges which reshape gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity. 
Japanese internationalisation is a set of authorised discourses designed to facilitate 
exchanges between Japan and 'the outside world' in a context of globalisation. 
In Japan, recent state responses to globalisation have focused largely on kokusaika 
(internationalisation), broadly defined as the opening up of Japan to foreign people, 
commodities and ways of life, and the programs which regulate these changes. While 
both Australian multiculturalism and Japanese internationalisation are responses to 
globalisation, Australian multiculturalism is primarily inwardly-focused, concentrating on 
domestic affairs, while Japanese internationalisation is largely outwardly-focused, 
concentrating on economic, political and cultural engagement beyond its national borders. 
It should be stressed, however, that 'domestic' and 'international' issues are not wholly 
74 See Hage's (1998) discussion of 'evil white nationalists' (those who want to 
exclude certain groups from the national community on the basis of their 
`race/ethnicity), and 'good white nationalists' (those who celebrate ethnic diversity, 
yet in so doing reinforce the notion of white supremacy). 
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distinct. As argued earlier, there is an inherent articulation between the 
global/international and the local/national. Additionally, the outcomes of policies of 
Australian multiculturalism and Japanese internationalisation have not always neatly 
corresponded with the stated aims of those policies. 
As with multiculturalism, understandings of Japanese internationalisation are both 
vague and varied. Internationalisation has been defined, variously, as 'social phenomena 
which take place as a result of international exchange;' the expansion of the movement 
across national boundaries of goods, capital, information, people, and culture;' an attempt 
to 'introduce international elements to a country or people with the least friction with 
their identity;' a process of opening Japan's heart to the outside world;' and 'the process 
of becoming accepted by the rest of the world' (Ehara 1992; Sugiyama 1992). 
Befu (1983: 232-33) notes that although it is difficult to determine just when the 
term kokusaika (internationalisation) first appeared in the Japanese vernacular, it became 
more visible in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although related terms, such as 
gurobaruka (globalisation) and dochakuka (indigenisation or glocalisation) have been in 
circulation alongside kokusaika, none encompasses the wide range of social phenomena 
implied by kokusaika. While gurobaruka refers almost exclusively to the worldwide 
standardisation of systems of management and manufacture, and dochakuka refers to the 
niche-marketing of commodities for increasingly differentiated markets around the world, 
kokusaika encompasses the diverse economic, political and cultural changes associated 
with globalisation as I have defined it. 
Japan has long engaged in international diplomatic and trade relations (McCormack 
1996); however, it was after the nation's period of self-imposed isolation, the so-called 
sakoku of 1639 to 1868, that Japan's level of international engagement increased 
dramatically. Since the Meiji era (1868-1912), the state has had varied approaches to 
international engagement, each with its own all-embracing slogan. These ranged from 
'civilisation and enlightenment' (bunmei kaika) and 'Westernisation' (seiyooka) in the 
Meiji era, to the 'Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere' (daitooa kyooeiken) before and 
during World War II, 'democratisation' (minshuka) in the 1950s, 'modernisation' 
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(kindaika) of the 1960s, and, finally, 'internationalisation' (kokusaika) from the 1970s 
onward.75 In 1984, then Prime Minister Nakasone declared Japan an 'international state' 
(kokusai kokka) (Itoh 1998); and, since that time, 'internationalisation' has become a 
cherished slogan of state, business and academic elites, as well as the popular media. 
As Ogata (1992: 64) has pointed out, internationalisation has come to be seen by 
many as a 'panacea' for the economic, political and cultural conflicts which have arisen 
under conditions of accelerating globalisation. In the mid-1990s, for instance, then 
Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto identified internationalisation as a key to raising 
Japan's regional and global political profile, to enriching the nation's educational system, 
to stimulating Japanese culture, and, more generally, to ensuring Japan's 'prosperity and 
security' in the 21st century (Hashimoto 1996). 
However, critics of Japanese internationalisation suggest that it fuels nationalist 
sentiment. Japan's increased global economic engagement in the decades since World 
War II has bolstered national confidence and national pride, but, as Befu (1983) argues, it 
has also challenged long-standing notions of Japanese national identity. He suggests that 
discourses of Japanese uniqueness represent a response to these challenges to Japanese 
identity. He argues, therefore, that internationalisation has led to increased national 
chauvinism, so that 'the very processes of internationalisation which are supposedly 
making Japanese more cosmopolitan have the unexpected effect of making Japanese 
more nationalistic. . . . Internationalisation promotes "anti-internationalisation" (Befu 
1983: 241). 
I conceive of internationalisation as a set of authorised discourses designed to 
facilitate exchanges between Japan (constructed as an essentialised whole) and 'the 
outside world' (a largely undifferentiated Other) in a context of increasing globalisation. 
Like Australian multiculturalism, Japanese internationalisation has somewhat 
contradictory outcomes. On the one hand, it facilitates contact with non-Japanese people, 
commodities and ideas, contact which is perceived by some Japanese as a threat to 
75 See Befil (1993), Hook and Weiner (1992), Itoh (1998), Katou (1992) and Mannari 
and Befu (1993). 
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'traditional' ways of life and to Japanese national identity. 76 On the other hand, 
discourses of internationalisation are inherently discourses of 'us' and 'them' ('wareware 
Nihonjin' and mukoo no kata), which reinforce ethnicised and gendered discourses of 
Japanese national identity. 
I derive five key dimensions of Australian and Japanese national identity from my 
reading of authorised discourses. 
As detailed below, I employ five key analytical categories in my analysis of discourses of 
national identity in Australia and Japan. I derived these analytical categories from both 
my reading of the authorised discourses addressed in this chapter, and from the mass 
mediated and folk discourses I address in subsequent chapters. I am not suggesting that 
folk and mass mediated discourses are determined by authorised discourses, or vice versa; 
however, there is considerable overlap between these discourses of national identity. This 
overlap suggests that authorised discourses establish the terms of reference used in on-
going negotiations of national identity in Australia and Japan. 
Starting with Hall's (1992: 293) description of narratives of nation, as `set[s] of 
stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and rituals 
which stand for or represent the shared experiences. . . which give meaning to the nation' 
(emphasis added), I have identified five key dimensions of mass mediated and folk 
discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan. These dimensions are as follows: 
social relationships and social ethics; material and symbolic culture; the environment; 
leisure practices and everyday practices; and the national character and national 
archetypes. 
Social relations and social ethics are an important focus of authorised discourses 
of national identity in Australia and Japan, from scholarly writings and political 
discourses about Australian egalitarianism to Nihonjinron explications of the Japanese 
principle of `groupism.' Social relationships and social ethics are also a recurrent theme 
in folk and mass mediated discourses of national identity. I define social relationships 
76 Ms. Honda's comments in Chapter One exemplify such perceptions. 
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and social ethics as the modes of social organisation and broad patterns of social 
interaction constructed as 'typical' of the national community, and the underlying ethical 
principles which inform social action in the national community. Specifically, these 
include references to the following: relations between family members, coworkers or 
friends; long-standing rules of social interaction; and more recent social ethics, such as 
multiculturalism in Australia or internationalisation in Japan. 
Folk and mass mediated discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan also 
centre on material and symbolic culture. Although the term 'culture' is a highly 
contested term in the social sciences, I define material and symbolic culture as the 
manufactured or modified objects customarily used or consumed by the national 
populace; the language, dialect or other linguistic practices or forms distinctive to the 
national populace; and nationally recognised art forms and artists. Specifically, these 
include the following: references to the 'typical' foods and clothing of the populace, 
such as meat pies and Akubra hats in Australia or sushi and kimono in Japan, and to 
national flags and currencies; distinctive linguistic forms such as `G'day' in Australia or 
the three writing systems of Japanese language; and both contemporary and historical art 
forms and the artists who create(d) them, such as the poetry of Andrew Barton (Banjo) 
Paterson and the music of John Farnham in Australia, or calligraphy, tea ceremony and 
the popular singing group SMAP in Japan. Authorised discourses of national identity in 
Australia and Japan also centre, in part, on material and symbolic culture. Examples can 
be found in the staging of Australianness and Japaneseness in the opening ceremonies of 
the 2000 Sydney Olympics and the 1998 Nagano Olympics. In these authorised 
discourses of nation, the costumes, art forms and artists of the two nations featured 
prominently, including Akubra hats and Dri'zabone coats in Australia, hachimaki 
(headbands), hapi (short cotton jackets) and mawashi (loincloths) in Japan, and 
prominent musicians in both countries. 
Australianness and Japaneseness are also evoked through references to the 
environment, the natural and built spaces and features of those spaces (such as flora and 
fauna) which serve as affective symbols of the nation; references to the spatial boundaries 
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which serve as markers of identity boundaries; and references to the ways natural and 
built spaces shape human action and forms of social organisation. A growing number of 
scholars examine the links between space, place and identity. 77 As Thomas (1999: xvii) 
has observed, 'Space is central to studies of all human societies, as it is in space that we 
are tied into the life world of both present and past.' Likewise, mass mediated and folk 
discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan frequently centre on distinctive 
landscapes and landmarks, such as Bondi Beach and the outback in Australia, and 
Hokkaido's Tokachi Plains and Osaka Castle in Japan; on images of distinctive flora and 
fauna, such as kangaroos and koalas in Australia, and cherry blossoms in Japan; and on 
the ways Australia's harsh climate and Japan's small size have shaped the character of 
their respective peoples. 
National identity is further evoked in Australian and Japanese mass mediated and 
folk discourses through references to distinctive leisure practices and everyday 
practices. 78 The connection between consumption practices, including leisure practices, 
and identity has a long history in the social scientific literature. As Veblen (1970) noted, 
leisure practices have been key to the shaping of modern individual and collective 
identities. Leisure pursuits, from mundane domestic practices such as television viewing, 
to larger scale public events and spectacles, such as sport contests, are markers of 
membership in a particular community, class, even nation. Australian discourses of 
national identity include references to such leisure practices as surfing, swimming, 
bushwalking, playing Australian Rules football and cricket, and having barbecues. 
Japanese discourses include references to leisure activities such as learning kendo and 
ikebana, going to hot springs or public baths, and playing golf, baseball, pachinko (best 
described as a cross between pinball and a slot machine), and fami-con (home computer 
games). Additionally, both Australian and Japanese discourses of national identity 
77 See, for example, Agnew and Duncan (1989), Cohen (1982), Morley and Robins 
(1995), Shields (1991) and Thomas (1999). 
78 Due to differences between mass mediated and folk discourses, and the methods 
used to analyse them, I apply the analytical category of 'leisure practices' to mass 
mediated discourses, and 'everyday practices' to folk discourses. My reasons for 
doing so are explained in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
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include references to the paid or unpaid labour, and the long-standing ritual behaviours 
(or 'customs') said to be common throughout the nation. References to such practices, 
along with references to leisure practices, are referred to as 'everyday practices' in 
Chapters Five and Six. 
Finally, discourses of national identity frequently include references to the 
national character and national archetypes. 79 Kapferer (1996: 41) has described 
national archetypes as the 'personages in whom character traits which are thought to be 
central in the generation of [the national] society, and of history itself are gathered up and 
concentrated.' National character, likewise, refers to the presumed personality or 
character traits of the national citizenry. Specifically, the ANZAC, Crocodile Dundee and 
the 'Aussie battler' (the hard-working, usually working class, Australian) feature 
prominently in Australian folk and mass mediated discourses of national identity; and the 
kimono-clad wife and mother and the salaryman' (a salaried, and usually overworked, 
male employee) appear in Japanese folk and mass mediated discourses of national 
identity. Likewise, the recent Olympics in Sydney and Nagano provide examples of the 
use of national archetypes in authorised discourses of national identity in Australia and 
Japan. Two powerful symbols of national identity in these opening ceremonies were the 
'Man from Snowy River' in Australian and the sumo wrestler in Japan, who served to 
convey, respectively, the frontier spirit and dogged determination of Australians, and the 
discipline, the 'tradition' and quiet strength of the Japanese. 
In the chapters which follow, the above analytical categories are used as 
constructs to provide a fuller understanding of gendered and ethnicised mass mediated 
and folk discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan. Each of these analytical 
categories represents one way discourses of national identity are structured. However, it 
is worthwhile noting that neither the mass mediated texts nor the research participants 
79 I have used the category of 'national character and national archetypes' only in my 
analysis of folk discourses of national identity. My reasons for doing so are explained 
in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
80 'The Man from Snowy River' character comes from the Banjo Paterson poem of 
the same name, and has been the basis of a feature film and an Australian television 
series. 
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themselves explicitly identified such categories. Rather, the dimensions of national 
identity discussed here represent my ordering of these discourses. 
Summary of Analytical Framework 
In this and the preceding chapters I have reviewed a range of authorised discourses of 
national identity and globalisation, and developed from them the analytical framework I 
apply to my subsequent analysis of mass mediated and folk discourses of national identity 
in Australia and Japan. For the sake of clarity, I conclude with a summary of that 
analytical framework. 
First, I have argued that just as nations are, in part, constituted through practices of 
representation, national identities are discursively constructed. Discourses of national 
identity are, inherently, stories of 'us' and 'them,' and as such are practices of inclusion 
and exclusion. Hegemonic discourses of national identity are inscribed with, and 
reinscribe, ideology. Thus, these discourses may be used in the exercise of power to 
sustain relations of domination. However, counter-narratives may be used to challenge 
current power relations. 
Specifically, in widely circulating discourses, Australian and Japanese national 
identity are discursively gendered and ethnicised in ways which mirror and maintain 
social inequalities. This marginalisation of women and ethnic minorities in narratives of 
nation both reflects social hierarchies, and legitimates and thus reinforces the material 
disadvantage of these groups. At the same time, such discourses and the social structures 
they help reproduce are not static or incontestable. Counter-narratives challenge and 
potentially reshape both widely circulating discourses and the material conditions they 
mirror and help maintain. 
My insistence on the contestability of these discourses grows out of my reading of 
diverse scholarly literatures which stress the significance of discursive process to the 
formation of national identities. Barthes (1972) argues that national identities are 
constituted through mythic interpellation. Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) suggest that 
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people constantly invent and re-invent national 'traditions' by drawing selectively on 
historical resources in the light of current events. Yeatman (1990) argues that national 
social orders are constituted largely through discursive practices which translate into 
material practices. Hage (1998) discusses the fluid and negotiated character of the ethnic 
categories that are central to national imaginaries. And Said (1978) explores the self-
Other dialectic as it applies to national identities: there can be no national 'self' without a 
national 'Other.' Following these authors, I argue that national identities are negotiated, 
contestable and fluid. The fluidity of discourses of national identity suggests that while 
widely circulating discourses may naturalise and help sustain current hierarchies of 
power, counter narratives have the potential to reflect and contribute to changes in power 
relations. 
In order to examine the place of globalisation in constructions of national identity, 
I have discussed the nature of globalisation more generally. I have argued that 
globalisation is transforming economic, political and cultural relations worldwide, but not 
in uniform or predictable ways. Depending on the particular context, globalisation may 
lead to homogenisation or diversification, it may push toward innovation or toward 
perceived 'tradition.' Australian multiculturalism and Japanese internationalisation 
represent two specific national responses to globalising social changes, responses that in 
some instances challenge and in some instances reinforce particular forms of the 
discursive gendering and ethnicisation of these nations. 
Drawing on my engagement with authorised discourses of national identity and 
my analysis of the folk and mass mediated discourses of national identity in Australia and 
Japan, I have identified five key dimensions of national identity. References to social 
relations and social ethics, material and symbolic culture, the environment, leisure 
practices and everyday practices, and the national character and national archetypes are 
found throughout the overlapping authorised, mass mediated and folk discourses of 
national identity analysed here. 
The analytical framework outlined above guides my interpretations of the 
empirical data presented in subsequent chapters. In Chapters Four through Six I 
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empirically examine the particular ways gendered and ethnicised national identities are 
constituted through mass mediated and folk discourses in Australia and Japan. 
Furthermore, I explore the complex ways these discourses reflect, reinforce and challenge 
the marginalisation women and ethnic minorities. 
Finally, in Chapter Seven I examine the place of globalising processes in 
Australian and Japanese participants' discourses of national identity. I have argued that 
the destabilisation of individual and national identities suggested by globalisation 
theorists is premised on a problematic notion of unified and fixed identities. In this 
chapter, therefore, the focus of inquiry shifts from the question of whether national 
identities are being undermined by globalisation, to how participants experience and 
perceive globalisation in relation to national identity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GENDERED AND ETHNICISED NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MASS MEDIATED 
DISCOURSES: CONTENT ANALYSIS AND AUDIENCE RESPONSES  
As I have already argued, discourses of national identity are negotiated in a variety of 
contexts, ranging from face-to-face interactions to political rhetoric, scholarly research, 
and mass mediated texts. I begin my analysis of Australian and Japanese discourses of 
gendered and ethnicised national identity with an examination of television 
advertisements, because, as noted in Chapter Two, advertisements provide aestheticised 
articulations of social ideals and values, and thus serve as a rich source of narratives of 
nation. 
At the heart of this enterprise is the first of my research questions: how are 
gendered and ethnicised national identities constituted? In the first part of this chapter, I 
present a content analysis of a sample of 966 Australian and Japanese television 
advertisements, coding for the gender and ethnicity of principal characters, the nature and 
setting of the activities in which the characters are engaged, and representations of 
national identity. In the second part of the chapter, I discuss audience responses to a 
selection of advertisements shown to Australian and Japanese focus groups. Specifically, 
I analyse responses to questionnaires in which focus group participants were asked to 
judge the `Australianness' or `Japaneseness' of the advertisements. Finally, I note the 
context in which these constructions of national identity are generated in Australia and 
Japan. 
Content Analysis 
Sample and coding categories 
The sample encompasses a total of 373 Australian advertisements, and 593 Japanese 
advertisements. The Australian sample consists of all the advertisements appearing on 
two regional Tasmanian stations, WIN TV (8:00 AM to midnight on October 1, 1996) 
and Southern Cross Television (8:00 AM to midnight on January 23, 1997). The 
Japanese sample consists of all the advertisements aired on two regional Hokkaido 
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stations, HBC (8:00 AM to midnight on April 20, 1995) and STY (8:00 AM to midnight 
on July 13, 1995). Both the Australian and Japanese samples include one spring and one 
summer broadcast day, approximately three months apart, with both samples containing a 
broadcast day in a week leading up to a national holiday. 
I narrowed the sample to those advertisements which include at least one 
foregrounded adult male or female. 81 I also excluded advertisements containing only 
children, animated characters, and/or characters whose gender could not be discerned, as 
well as station and movie promotions, the former because they present difficulties in 
terms of gender classifications, and the latter because they are more akin to full-length 
television programs than to advertisements. The resulting sample included 250 
Australian advertisements and 466 Japanese advertisements. After several rounds of 
coding, as described below, I then further narrowed the sample to those advertisements 
which I judged to make appeals to national identity. This left a sample of 114 Australian 
advertisements and 185 Japanese advertisements. 
As noted in Chapter Three, I have identified several recurrent themes in mass 
mediated discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan, themes centring on social 
relationships and social ethics, material and symbolic culture, the environment, and 
leisure practices. In applying these analytical categories to my sample of television 
advertisements, I have not assumed a simple one-to-one correspondence between signs 
and their intended meanings, for advertisements are polysemic, with complex 
interrelations between the signs employed. Rather I consider the overall discursive 
effects of the advertisements, what Goffman (1979) has termed the 'gestalt,' to be more 
central to the generation of meaning; therefore each advertisement (rather than individual 
signs within each advertisement) is treated as a unit of analysis. It should be noted that 
advertisements can, and frequently do, make use of multiple appeals to national identity. 
An advertisement presenting a surfer at Bondi Beach, for example, makes appeals to 
Australianness based on both leisure practices and the environment, just as an 
81 For the purpose of this analysis, loregrounded' characters are characters which 
feature prominently. Therefore, advertisements showing only crowd scenes with no 
prominent characters were excluded. 
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advertisement featuring a kimono-clad woman viewing cherry blossoms appeals to 
Japaneseness on the basis of both material culture and the environment. In cases where 
the subtleties of representation made particular advertisements more difficult to code, I 
sought the advice of Australian and Japanese viewers whose interpretations guided the 
final coding. 
General patterns in the representation of national identities 
Although Australian and Japanese advertisers use similar conventions to evoke a sense of 
national belonging, there are differences in the frequency with which these conventions 
are employed (Figure 4.1). In the sample of Australian advertisements, Australianness 
was most often represented through images of leisure and the environment. This is 
consistent with those authorised discourses, discussed earlier, which have constructed 
Australians as easy-going, leisure-loving people. Images of the environment were also 
much more common in the Australian sample than in the Japanese sample, reflecting the 
symbolic salience of the physical environment in the Australian national imaginary. 
In the Japanese sample, Japaneseness was most often represented through images 
of social relations and social ethics, suggesting a widespread perception that Japanese 
social cohesiveness is a distinguishing national feature. Just as `groupism,"community,' 
'duties' and 'dependence' are recurring themes in the authorised discourses of the 
Nihonjinron (Dale 1986), social relatedness is a central theme in mass mediated 
discourses of national identity. 
Figure 4.1 Patterns in the Representation of National Identity 
in Japanese and Australian Television Advertisements 
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Gendered discourses of national identity 
The overal paterns of representation described above suggest which conventions are 
most central to mass mediated discourses of Japaneseness and Australianness. The next 
task of this chapter is to examine the extent to which these discourses are gendered and 
ethnicised. To this end, advertisements were coded by the gender and ethnicity of the 
carrier of national identity. The 'carrier' is defined as the central person engaged with the 
analytical categories noted above: the person situated in a certain physical environment; 
the person involved in distinctive leisure activities; the historical figure; the person 
practising 'traditional' arts or occupations; the person wearing a distinctive national 
costume or using distinctive linguistic forms; the person associated with selected 
artefacts, such as the national flag; or the person who engages in particular social relations 
or enacts certain social ethics. 
Overal, the results of the analysis demonstrate that in the sample of television 
advertisements, men are more likely than women to be the cariers of Australianness, 
82 As noted above, advertisements frequently use more than one kind of appeal to 
national identity. Advertisements were first coded for the kinds of appeals they 
utilised. Then al instances of each coding category (environment, leisure, and so on) 
were talied. Out of 185 Japanese advertisements, there were 215 appeals to national 
identity. Out of 114 Australian advertisements, there were 148 appeals to national 
identity. 
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while women are more likely than men to be the carriers of Japaneseness (Figure 4.2). 
There is also a conspicuous difference between the Australian and Japanese data in the 
number of advertisements in which national identity is carried by both male and female 
characters. The smaller number of Japanese advertisements in which both men and 
women are carriers of national identity is consistent with the more highly differentiated 
social realms of males and females in Japan. 
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What these numbers do not reveal, however, is the nature of these 
representations. Women in the Japanese sample are about three times more likely than 
men to embody Japaneseness through domestic activities, with, for example, kimono-clad 
housewives teaching their daughters how to cook, or preparing meals for husbands 
returning from the office. Men, on the other hand, are about three times more likely to 
embody Japaneseness through their leisure activities, such as playing golf or pachinko, 
learning kendo, or practising karate. Furthermore, men embodying Japaneseness are 
almost twice as likely to be shown engaged in paid labour as are women embodying 
Japaneseness (Figure 4.3). 
83 Percentages are provided for the following: 'Male,' advertisements in which the 
national identity was carried by only foregrounded adult males; 'Female,' 
advertisements in which the national identity was carried by only foregrounded adult 
females; and 'Both,' advertisements in which national identity was carried by both 
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Furthermore, men in the advertisements are more likely than women (by a ratio of 
3:2) to embody national identity in contemporary Japanese settings, while women are 
more likely than men (by a ratio of 5:4) to embody Japaneseness in a 'traditional' setting 
(Figure 4.4). So, while men are portrayed, for example, as company executives, baseball 
players, and rock stars, women are more typically portrayed as kimono-clad brides, 
geisha, or teachers of tea ceremony. 
Figure 4.4 Japaneseness by Gender and Setting 
In sum, in the sample of Japanese advertisements, women are represented in ways 
that emphasise their unpaid domestic labour, their passivity and their subservience to 
others. In addition, the frequent positioning of women in 'traditional' and domestic 
settings rather than contemporary and public settings elides their active contributions to 
contemporary public life. Such representations both mirror patriarchal power relations in 
Japan, and reinforce them. 
The Australian advertisements also show marked gender differences in the ways 
men and women embody national identity (Figure 4.5). Similar to trends found in the 
Japanese sample, Australian women in the sample of advertisements are more than four 
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domestic roles. Women are shown at home, for example, teaching young children to 
read, or preparing snacks for their children returning home from school. Also like the 
Japanese sample, Australian men are much more likely to demonstrate their 
Australianness through their leisure activities than women, whom they outnumber four to 
one as they surf, cycle, or share a beer with their 'mates.' They also outnumber women 
two to one in representations of paid labour. 
Figure 4.5 Australianness by Gender and Nature of Activity 
Men 
Women 
Unlike the Japanese sample, however, the Australian sample shows men 
outnumbering women in representations of both contemporary culture/society (by a ratio 
of 3: 1) and 'traditional' culture/society (by a ratio of 12:1) (Figure 4.6). In contemporary 
settings, Australian men are shown in roles such as Rotarians, cricket stars, and surf iron-
men, and in 'traditional' settings they frequently wear Akubras and work as farmers and 
stockmen. This notable dearth of women in images of both 'traditional' and 
contemporary Australian culture is consistent with the historical underrepresentation of 
women in authorised national discourses until recent decades. 
Figure 4.6 Australianness by Gender and Setting 
To recapitulate the patterns of representation in the Australian sample, women are 
represented in ways that emphasise their domestic roles and elide their contributions to 
the public realm. In addition, they are less visible than men both in contemporary settings 
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and in 'traditional' settings. Such representations both reflect and reinforce a pattern of 
male dominance in Australian society. 
In sum, men are more likely to be carriers of national identity in Australian 
advertisements, while women are more likely to be the carriers of national identity in 
Japanese advertisements. Furthermore, men dominate in representations of Australian 
leisure activities, the most common convention for conveying Australianness, while 
women, through their domestic activities, dominate in representations of Japanese social 
relations, the most common convention for representing Japaneseness. In other words, 
the national identities constructed in the television advertisements of Australia and Japan 
are clearly gendered national identities. However, it would be overly simplistic to 
suggest that Australian national identity is 'masculine' while Japanese national identity is 
'feminine.' This false dichotomy masks an important similarity between Australian and 
Japanese discourses of national identity: both reflect and reinforce a long-standing gender 
order in which women are constructed as largely domestic and passive, while men are 
constructed as largely public and active. However, while Japanese representations of 
gendered national identity generally confirm some feminist theorists' arguments that 
women are strongly associated with the past and with national 'traditions,' Australian 
representations do not conform to this pattern. 
The analysis of general representational patterns here should not be understood to 
deny the great diversity of images present in the advertisements. In both Australian and 
Japanese samples a small number of advertisements presented gender role 'reversals,' in 
which women were engaged in paid labour or leisure while their male partners engaged in 
domestic tasks. Such representations may reflect and potentially contribute to changing 
gender roles in these two settings; however, they may also reveal tensions over, and 
resistance to, such changes. 
Ethnicised discourses of national identity 
Content analysis of Australian and Japanese television advertisements reveals that mass 
mediated discourses of national identity in these two contexts are not only gendered but 
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also ethnicised. As noted in previous chapters, the notion of 'white' proprietorship in 
Australia and the notion of monoracialism in Japan have been central to discourses of 
national identity in these two settings. Therefore, it is not surprising that of Australian 
television advertisements with at least one adult character (n=250), the vast majority (81 
percent) of advertisements had only 'white' characters; and of Japanese television 
advertisements with at least one adult character (n=466), the vast majority (83 percent) of 
advertisements featured only 'Japanese' characters. 
I place the terms 'white' and 'Japanese' in quotation marks to highlight that 
these are character types or roles. I make no conclusions about the actual ethnic 
background of the actors, only about the apparent ethnicity of the characters they play. 
Furthermore, I make no claims about how closely television advertisements mirror the 
ethnic composition of the national populations of Australia and Japan. Because the 
categories of 'white' in Australia and 'Japanese' in Japan are fluid and relative, it is 
impossible to indicate what percentages of the respective national populations belong to 
these groups. In Chapter Three, I explained that in Australia, 'white' is a fluid and 
relative category. 'White' is not an either-or category; one person may be considered 
'more white' than another, just as one person may be considered 'more Australian' than 
another, depending not only on their appearance, but their religion, the kind of language 
they speak, their style of dress, or the sports they play. Likewise, 'Japanese' is a shifting 
category which includes, depending on the context, all Japanese citizens, non-citizens 
who are the descendants of expatriate Japanese (so-called nisei and sansei), citizens or 
non-citizens who have only one Japanese parent (so-called haafu), and/or some ethnic 
minorities in Japan. For the purposes of this content analysis, if the ethnic 'roles' of the 
characters were not discernible (through such cues as physical features, clothing, and 
language use), the advertisement was excluded from analysis. 
The percentage of advertisements with only 'white' or 'Japanese' characters is 
even higher when the sample of advertisements is narrowed to those with images of 
national identity. Of advertisements with representations of Australianness (n=114), 84 
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percent featured only 'white' characters, while of advertisements with representations of 
Japaneseness (n=185), 94 percent featured only 'Japanese' characters. 
Furthermore, in the majority of advertisements featuring ethnic Others, 84 these 
characters generally do not participate in the everyday settings, activities or social 
relations most frequently associated with representations of Australianness and 
Japaneseness. For example, relatively few Australian advertisements with ethnic Other 
characters showed these characters engaged in everyday work, domestic or leisure 
settings; only 17 percent of these advertisements cast ethnic Others as 'ordinary' 
Australians, for example, as bankers, family members or holiday-makers. Instead, the 
majority of ethnic Others in the advertisements served primarily as objects of spectacle, 
for example as entertainers such as singers, dancers and actors (27 percent), or as 
professional athletes (21 percent). A further 15 percent of advertisements featuring ethnic 
Other characters cast them as relatively low-status service personnel, including cooks and 
hotel staff. Moreover, another eight percent of these advertisements showed ethnic 
Others, usually in Third World nations, as recipients of Australian charitable assistance. 
The representation of ethnic Others in the television advertisements of Japan is 
remarkably similar to the representation of ethnic Others in Australian advertisements 
(Figure 4.7). Few Japanese advertisements featuring ethnic Others showed them in 
everyday work, domestic or leisure settings in Japan. For example, in only 18 percent of 
advertisements with ethnic Others were these Others cast as friends, neighbours, family 
members, coworkers or teachers in Japanese social settings. Instead, 24 percent of 
Japanese advertisements with ethnic Others featured foreign celebrities and entertainers. 
A further 10 percent of these advertisements featured foreign professional athletes, most 
of whom play on Japanese professional baseball and soccer teams; and another nine 
percent of these advertisements showed ethnic Others producing goods or providing 
services for Japanese consumption. Of the remaining advertisements with ethnic Others, 
84 In the Australian advertisements, most 'ethnic Others' are 'Asian' or 'aboriginal' 
characters. In the Japanese advertisements, most 'ethnic Others' are 'white;' however, 



























another 24 percent feature only foreigners in foreign settings, such as a group of 'whites' 
dining at a Parisian restaurant, or a 'white' British couple driving through the English 
countryside, images apparently designed to give the advertised products an air of 
exoticism. 














Content analysis: conclusions and caveats 
The above content analysis suggests that advertised images of Australianness and 
Japaneseness mirror social hierarchies in which women and ethnic Others are 
subordinated, marginalised, and often rendered invisible. The data above suggest that 
male characters dominate in representations of Australianness, and even though women 
are numerically more prominent in representations of Japaneseness, they are, nonetheless, 
portrayed in largely subordinate social positions. Furthermore, as might be expected, the 
data suggest that representations of national identity in Australian and Japanese television 
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advertisements are ethnicised in relatively straight-forward ways, with ethnic minorities 
conspicuously marginalised in representations of the national imagined community. 
The content analysis of advertisements provides valuable insights into mass 
mediated discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan; it provides, in other 
words, insights into discourse as product. However, for an understanding of discourse as 
process, it is necessary to examine the interplay of text and audience. 
Audience Responses 
As I have stressed from the beginning, discourses of national identity are not simply 
narratives imposed on the masses by an economic, political or intellectual elite; 
discourses of national identity are negotiated and dynamic. Audiences actively 
interpret and critique mass mediated narratives of nation. In the last part of this 
chapter, I will examine Australian and Japanese responses to these mass mediated 
discourses of national identity. 
In order to gauge audience responses to discourses of national identity in 
television advertisements, and in order to start participants thinking about issues of 
national identity, I screened a selection of advertisements in Australian and Japanese 
focus groups and asked participants to rate the advertisements on how 'Australian' or 
'Japanese' they were. Focus groups ranged from three to eleven participants of the 
same occupational status and age bracket.85 Participants watched thirteen 
advertisements from their own countries. I selected the advertisements for the gender 
and ethnicity of the principal characters, and for the advertisement 'type' (Figure 4.8). 
I selected advertisements of these 'types' because my content analysis suggested that 
these contained key conventions in the representation of national identity. 
85 See Chapter Two for parameters of the sample. 
Figure 4.8 Definitions of Advertisement 'Types' Screened in Focus Groups86 








Advertisements with predominantly 'traditional' and 
sentimental imagery, used to evoke the cherished ways of life in 
days gone by. 
Advertisements with 'traditional' or historical images used for 
humorous effect. 
Advertisements which combine 'traditional' and contemporary 
images for humorous effect. 
Advertisements in which characters step outside the customary 
social roles for individuals of their gender, age, ethnicity, or 
occupational status. 
Advertisements in which characters are engaged in 
contemporary leisure pursuits. 
Advertisements which feature ethnic Others and/or evoke the 
contemporary ethics of Australian multiculturalism or Japanese 
internationalisation. 
Advertisements which do not contain any discernible images of 
Australiarmess or Japaneseness. 
Humorous mixture of 
old and new: 
Changing social roles: 
Participants rated the advertisements on a Likert scale of 1 (Not at all 
Australian/Japanese') to 5 (`Very Australian/Japanese'). Calculating the means of the 
scores reveals that in both the Australian and Japanese samples, advertisements with 
nostalgic images were perceived by participants to be the most Australian or Japanese 
(Figure 4.9).87 
86 For a detailed description of the advertisements screened in focus groups, see 
Appendix Three. 
87 I make no claims regarding the statistical significance of the differences between 
the scores. Rather, I present them here as a rough ranking of the `Australianness' and 
`Japaneseness' of the advertisements as perceived by participants. 
Figure 4.9 Audience Response Survey: 
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In the Australian survey results, the three advertisements with the highest mean 
scores for `Australiarmess' all consist of predominantly nostalgic images. However, those 
nostalgic advertisements with some, or all, male characters were considered more 
'Australian' than those nostalgic advertisements with only female characters. This is part 
of a wider trend, in which most advertisements with only female characters are perceived 
to be less Australian than those advertisements with some or all male characters. The 
only exceptions to this trend are advertisements in which a male character is present but is 
engaged in non-gender-stereotypical behaviour (in this case, planning and cooking the 
evening meal for his female partner), or when ethnic minority characters are also present 
in an advertisement with a 'white' male. These cases suggest that 'reversed' gender roles 
and 'non-white' ethnicity diminish the Australianness established by the 'white' male 
presence. Representations of leisure in the advertisements provide a telling example. As 
noted in the first part of this chapter, images of leisure practices are key to mass mediated 
discourses of Australian national identity. However, while advertisements featuring male 
characters engaged in leisure pursuits were abundant in the total advertisement sample, 
and were given relatively high marks for their `Australianness,' advertisements featuring 
female characters engaged in leisure were very scarce in the sample, and the 
advertisement shown to focus groups was rated second to the lowest for its 
`Australianness.' 
In terms of ethnicity, the four advertisements considered most Australian (those 
advertisements which received a mean score of 4.0 or above), were peopled by only 
'white' characters, while three out of the four advertisements considered least Australian 
contained ethnic Other characters. Considering the results of the content analysis, it is not 
surprising that advertisements featuring ethnic Others were perceived to be less 
Australian than those featuring only 'whites.' However, one advertisement featuring 
ethnic Others ranked in the top five most Australian advertisements, with a mean score of 
3.64. It is worthwhile analysing this advertisement in greater detail. 
In this advertisement for lamb, a 'white' Australian father presides over the 
Sunday roast lamb meal, an event constructed as Australian 'tradition.' At the head of the 
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table, he anticipates with pleasure the meal to come; however, when his wife sets out the 
main dish and announces that it is 'tandoori lamb,' he feigns displeasure at such exotic 
fare. Then, with a chime of sitar music, the camera pans back to reveal his grown 'white' 
daughter, her 'Indian' husband and their children. The whole family laughs, and the 
slogan reads, 'Lamb. The Multicultural Meal.' The advertisement both marks the 
'Indian' man and the 'mixed' children as ethnic Others, but admits them into the 
Australian family and its cherished Sunday ritual. In other words, in the spirit of 
Australian multiculturalism, the advertisement both acknowledges ethnic difference and 
embraces it. This display of the multicultural ethic in a 'white' domestic setting may 
account for the relatively high mean score of the ad. Of the other three advertisements 
featuring ethnic Others, the advertisement ranked tenth portrayed interactions between 
'Asians' in an 'Asian' restaurant; the advertisement ranked eleventh portrayed an 'Asian' 
man playing golf, seemingly alone; and the advertisement rated least Australian featured a: 
'Thai' mother and daughter speaking Thai in a Thai household. These three 
advertisements mark the characters as ethnic Others, without clearly evoking an ethic of 
multicultural inclusivity. 
The Japanese survey results show that advertisements with nostalgic images 
consistently rate high on `Japaneseness.' In a trend similar to the Australian results, 
nostalgic advertisements with male principal characters were considered more Japanese 
than those with female characters. At first glance, this seems to contradict findings from 
the content analysis which suggested that `Japaneseness' in the advertisements was most 
commonly embodied by female characters. However, from at least one point of view 
these conclusions remain valid in light of audience responses. For although viewers 
considered the nostalgic advertisements with male characters more 'Japanese' than the 
nostalgic advertisements with female characters, the fact remains that in the sample of 
advertisements examined, the vast majority of nostalgic advertisements featured female 
characters. Thus, when audience survey results suggest that nostalgic images are most 
strongly associated with `Japaneseness' and content analysis demonstrates that the 
majority of nostalgic images are associated with female characters, it is still reasonable to 
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conclude that in the advertisements of Japan, `Japaneseness' is most often embodied by 
female characters. 
In terms of ethnicity, as noted earlier in the chapter, relatively few advertisements 
featured ethnic Others; and of the advertisements shown to focus groups, the two 
featuring ethnic Others ranked eleventh and last in terms of their perceived 
`Japaneseness.' Interestingly, the principal characters of the advertisement rated least 
Japanese were, in fact, Japanese. The advertisement featured two Japanese teenaged boys 
dressed in American inner-city fashion, 'rapping' about the soft drink Sprite. However, 
the young men sang in Kansai dialect, which differs substantially from the Japanese 
spoken in Hokkaido. This combination of dialect, clothing style and music style perhaps 
accounts for the intriguing fact that many Japanese viewers believed that these young men 
were singing in English. Furthermore, this may explain the perception that this was the 
least Japanese advertisement in the sample shown to focus groups. 
Perceptions of the `Australianness' and `Japaneseness' of the advertisements 
varied little with the age, sex and occupation of the participants. Figure 4.10 illustrates 
the similarity of perceptions of `Australianness' and `Japaneseness' for top-ranked and 
bottom-ranked advertisements among participants of different ages, sexes and 
occupations. These similarities are consistent across all the advertisements in the sample. 
In the semi-structured discussion which followed the screening of the advertisements, 
however, some differences do emerge, differences which are discussed in detail in 
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Figure 4.10 Audience Response Survey: Mean `Australianness' and qapaneseness' 
of Advertisements by Age, Sex and Occupation of Participants 
Contexts of mass mediated discourses of national identity and audience responses 
A discussion of audience responses to any sample of advertisements would be incomplete 
without a consideration of the contexts of the production and reception of these texts. 
Although advertisements are a rich source of narratives of nation, the central purpose of 
advertisements is not to discursively construct the nation, but to encourage an audience to 
88 Data for Australian teachers are unavailable because, due to scheduling 
complications, I conducted in-depth interviews rather than focus groups with 
Australian teachers. 
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buy particular products. Advertisements are not free-floating cultural texts; they are 
anchored in the economics of consumption. 
In terms of this thesis, the nature of the products and services advertised 
undoubtedly shaped participants' perceptions of the `Australianness' or `Japaneseness' of 
the advertisements. It is likely that certain products were viewed as more 'Australian' or 
more 'Japanese' because of their perceived links with the national culture. However, it is 
not possible to determine the degree to which participants evaluated the advertisements 
based on the product itself or based on the presentation of the product through words and 
images. Figure 4.11 details the products or services promoted in the advertisements 
shown to Australian and Japanese focus groups. Advertisements are listed in rank order, 
from those participants judged most 'Australian'/'Japanese' to those judged least 
'Australian'!' Japanese.' 
Figure 4.11 Product or Service Advertised in Order of the Perceived 




Product or Service 
Advertised 
1 Paint 
2 Cricket video 
3 Water tanks 
4 Beer 
5 Lamb 
6 Breakfast cereal 
7 Books 
8 Soft drink 
9 Gravy mix 
10 Bank 
11 Car company 
12 Shampoo 
13 Thai curry sauce 
`Japaneseness' 
Rank 
Product or Service 
Advertised 
1 Knives 
2 Instant noodles 
3 Canned tea 
4 Travel agency 
5 Liquid antacid 
6 Hotel 
7 Vegetable oil 
8 Antacid tablets 
9 Chewing gum 
10 Toilet cleaner 
11 Sweet bean jam 
12 Beer 
13 Soft drink 
In four of out of five of the advertisements rated most 'Australian,' the advertised 
products themselves are strongly associated with widely circulating discourses of national 
identity. While cricket and beer evoke (masculine) Australian leisure practices, water 
tanks and lamb evoke Australia's rural agricultural heritage. Among the top-ranked 
advertisements, only the first, an advertisement for paint, did not advertise a distinctly 
Australian product or service. Its high perceived Australianness is explained by the 
presentation of the product, rather than the product itself. The advertisers used images of 
a rural (and largely 'white' male) Australia and a voice-over narrative in the style of a 
Banjo Patterson poem to construct the product as Australian. By linking their product to 
such discourses of national identity, the advertisers equate the product with the 
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dependability and ruggedness of Australian archetypes such as the Man from Snowy 
River. In fact, participants in most social locations explicitly discussed the way the 
advertisement evoked Banjo Paterson and/or the heroic characters he created. 
At the other end of the spectrum, three of the four advertisements ranked least 
Australian advertised products perceived by participants to be 'foreign.' In the case of the 
lowest-ranked advertisement, for 'Thai curry sauce,' audience perceptions were likely 
shaped by the presentation of the product itself as an 'authentically' foreign product. In 
response to the other low-ranking advertisements, participants suggested that these were 
not 'Australian' because the products were manufactured by foreign companies such as 
Ford and Procter and Gamble. 89 Of the lowest-ranked one third of advertisements, only 
the advertisement ranked tenth advertised a product or service marked in some way as 
'Australian,' an advertisement for the National Australia Bank. Although participants 
commented on the Australianness of the institution itself, and on the values of hard work 
and family life portrayed in the advertisement, they gave the advertisement a low 
Australianness score overall. This low score is best explained by the ethnicity of the 
characters featured in the advertisement, an 'Asian' Australian family speaking their 
native language in the kitchen of their 'Asian' restaurant. In the case of this 
advertisement, it appears that the perceived Australiarmess of the advertised product and 
the social ethics conveyed in the advertisement, are diminished by the 'non-white' 
ethnicity of the characters. The presence of 'Asians' disrupts the ideology of 'white' 
proprietorship of the nation. 
In the Japanese audience response surveys, the three advertisements rated most 
Japanese advertised products closely linked with Japan's material culture: hand-crafted 
knives, which participants associated with Japan's world-renowned swords; noodles, 
which feature prominently in the nation's cuisine; and tea, especially the green tea 
advertised, which many participants identified as uniquely Japanese. The other 
advertisement ranked in the top third in terms of Japaneseness advertised a travel agency, 
89 I make no assertions about the actual ownership of these corporations. However, 
the comments of many participants suggested a widespread perception that these are 
foreign-owned corporations. 
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not a distinctly Japanese product. Rather, the high score given to this advertisement is 
explained by the way the company was presented through 'traditional' symbols of 
Japaneseness, such as cherry blossoms, a paper fan (uchiwa) and cotton kimono (yukata). 
The connection between products and the perceived Japaneseness of the 
advertisements is less obvious in the bottom third of the ranking. I have already 
discussed the perceived foreignness of the characters in the lowest-ranked ad. It is likely 
that the perceived foreignness of the product itself, the soft drink Sprite, shaped 
participants' perceptions of the advertisement. Unlike Sprite, the toilet cleaner advertised 
in the tenth-ranked advertisement, is not an obviously foreign product. For instance, 
while the name 'Sprite' is written on the product and in the advertisement in Roman 
letters, the name of the toilet cleaner is written in Japanese script. Furthermore, 
participants commented that the characters in the advertisement were 'typical' Japanese in 
many ways. The low perceived Japaneseness of the advertisement is best explained, then, 
by its portrayal of non-gender-stereotypical behaviour, a man cleaning the household 
toilet. Such an image disrupts notions of 'traditional' Japanese patriarchy, which 
participants in most social locations identified as a strong organisational principle of 
Japanese society. 
Advertisements for sweet bean jam (an) and Sapporo brand beer also scored low 
on Japaneseness. Since sweet bean jam is a distinctly Japanese confection, and Sapporo 
Beer is not only a Japanese product, but a product associated with Hokkaido, 90 the low 
perceived Japaneseness of these advertisements is best explained by the presentation of 
these products. For instance, the advertisement for sweet bean jam featured a 'white' 
English teacher whose presence challenged the notion of an ethnically homogeneous 
nation. Despite the perceived Japaneseness of the product, the presence of a 'foreigner' 
rendered the advertisement less Japanese in the eyes of participants. In fact, some 
participants commented that the 'traditional' image of the product and the image of the 
'white' foreigner 'clashed.' 
90 The city of Sapporo is the prefectural capital of Hokkaido. 
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The case of the Sapporo Beer advertisement is more complex. The advertisement 
featured an intense 'Japanese' man practising golf while a smiling 'Japanese' woman 
watched. A content analysis of the advertisement reveals strong appeals to national 
identity based on leisure practices, long-standing gender roles, and the name of the 
product itself, a Japanese place name. In fact, focus group participants frequently singled 
out the male character as a 'typical Japanese man.' An explanation for the low perceived 
Japaneseness of the advertisement lies in the tensions between everyday experiences of 
Japanese participants and widely circulating discourses of national identity. That is, 
although many participants asserted that the advertisement was a realistic portrayal of 
(male) Japanese life and the (male) Japanese character, they associated Japaneseness more 
with the 'traditional' symbols of the nation, such as cherry blossoms or kimono, portrayed 
in the top-ranked advertisements. 
The above discussion highlights the complex material and discursive practices 
which shape perceptions of advertisements. The primary aim of advertisements is to sell 
products, and advertisers frequently employ images of national 'tradition,' history or pride 
in order to increase the appeal of their products. However, the discourses of national 
identity generated in such advertisements are read in diverse ways by audiences, who 
sometimes accept, sometimes reject, and sometimes read against the grain of such 
constructions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
To recapitulate the findings of this chapter, I have argued that national identities are 
constituted, in part, through mass mediated discourses of nation, and that in Australia and 
Japan these discourses are profoundly gendered and ethnicised in the following ways. My 
content analysis of television advertisements reveals that in these mass mediated 
discourses of national identity, representations of `Australianness' are primarily embodied 
by 'white' male characters, while representations of `Japaneseness' are primarily 
embodied by ethnically 'Japanese' women. In both samples, women are constructed as 
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passive and domestic, and are underrepresented in portrayals of contemporary public life; 
and ethnic minorities are constructed as essentialised, exotic and/or inferior Others, or 
simply rendered invisible. Such representations are inscribed with and reinscribe both 
patriarchal ideology and the ideologies of 'white' proprietorship in Australia and ethnic 
'Japanese' proprietorship in Japan. However, a small number of advertisements 
presented challenges to these ideologies by portraying gender role reversals or the 
inclusion of ethnic others in the national imagined community. 
While audience responses to a selection of advertisements generally reconfirm the 
conclusions of my content analysis, they also suggest that audiences read these 
representations in complex ways. For instance, while content analysis demonstrates that 
representations of Australian national identity are overwhelmingly 'white,' audience 
responses reveal that ethnic minorities may be perceived as Australian if they are shown 
in distinctly 'white' Australian social settings, such as the family Sunday dinner. 
Furthermore, while content analysis demonstrates that representations of Japanese 
national identity are dominated by ethnically 'Japanese' characters, audience responses 
reveal that even Japanese-speaking 'Japanese' characters may be perceived as foreign 
(gaikokuteki) if they fail to conform to linguistic and other behavioural norms. 
Furthermore, while content analysis indicates that Japaneseness is more often embodied 
by women than men, the audience response research shows complex perceptions of such 
gendered discourses. That is, while 'nostalgic' advertisements with male characters were 
rated more 'Japanese' than 'nostalgic' advertisements with female characters, men less 
often appear in these 'nostalgic' representations; rather, it is women who generally 
embody this 'traditional' Japaneseness. 
The audience response surveys also yielded some unexpected results. Contrary to 
my expectations, among Australian and Japanese participants respectively, responses to 
the advertisements were relatively homogeneous. Also contrary to my expectations, the 
advertisements I included as 'controls,' those which I thought contained no images of 
`Australianness' or `Japaneseness' received higher scores than expected, particularly in 
the Japanese sample, where the 'neutral' advertisement for antacid tablets ranked number 
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eight out of thirteen. In discussions that followed the screening of the advertisements, a 
number of Japanese participants voiced the opinion that Japanese people regularly take 
antacid medications because the strong pressure to conform to social norms results in 
digestive problems. As one business woman explained, 'Japanese people cannot say what 
they really think; and that causes pain in their stomaches.' Before these comments were 
made in focus group discussions, I was unaware that certain health problems could be 
perceived as an outcome of Japanese social norms. This surprising revelation illustrates 
the importance of balancing content analysis with audience response research in the study 
of national identities: because national identities are collectively constructed, content 
analysis alone cannot reveal the complexities and the fluidity of such constructions. 
In this chapter I have suggested that symbols of national identity are frequently 
employed to market both domestic and globalised product lines to consumers in Australia 
and Japan. Furthermore, advertised images of Australian multiculturalism and Japanese 
internationalisation both acknowledge globalising social changes and evoke national 
identity in these two settings. Audience responses to such representations reveal a 
recognition of overlapping between mass mediated and authorised discourses of national 
identity in Australia and Japan. 
The content analysis and audience response research presented in this chapter 
raise further questions about the links between gendered and ethnicised national identities 
and globalisation in Australia in Japan. Because mass mediated texts provide only a 
snapshot of widely circulating discourses of national identity, it is essential to examine 
the complex ways Australians and Japanese embrace, reject and/or reinterpret such widely 
circulating discourses. In the next two chapters, therefore, I examine the dynamic 
construction of folk discourses of national identity in these two settings by analysing data 
from in-depth interviews and focus groups with Australian and Japanese participants. 
Furthermore, while the analysis of television advertisements hints at ambiguous and even 
contradictory constructions of Australian multiculturalism and Japanese 
internationalisation, what remains is to examine folk understandings of, and responses to, 
these phenomena, a task I undertake in Chapter Seven. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
FOLK DISCOURSES OF AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
In Chapter Four I analysed the construction of gendered and ethnicised national identities 
in the television advertisements of Japan and Australia. While textual analyses and 
audience response surveys are Valuable in that they provide one window onto the link 
between gender, ethnicity and national identity, more complex and more subtle 
understandings of national identity are found in folk discourses, face-to-face 
conversations in Australia and Japan. Therefore, in this chapter and the one which 
follows, I examine the discursive repertoires that Australian and Japanese participants use 
to talk about national identity. I argue in this chapter that for Australian participants, the 
'imagined community' has concrete features; it is both gendered and ethnicised in the 
popular imagination in ways which reflect, reinforce and contest current social 
hierarchies. 
Dimensions of National Identity 
In the previous chapter I argued that in the television advertisements of Japan and 
Australia, representations of national identity centre around four basic themes: the 
environment, material and symbolic culture, social relationships and social ethics, and 
leisure practices. I began my analysis of the transcript data with these same coding 
categories; however, after an initial coding of the transcripts, I modified these categories 
to better reflect the recurring themes in participants' articulations of national identity. 
Social relations and social ethics, material and symbolic culture, and the environment, 
still figured prominently in these discussions; however, leisure alone was not a prominent 
theme. Therefore, I modified my coding categories to incorporate everyday practice, 
which includes references not only to leisure practices, but also to paid or unpaid labour, 
and to long-standing ritual behaviours or customs, which participants suggested were 
common throughout the nation. While there is some overlap between 'everyday practice' 
as an analytical category and 'material and symbolic culture,' I employ these categories 
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because they best reflect the ways these topics were raised by participants. Another 
recurring theme in the transcript data, for which I did not code in my analysis of mass 
mediated discourses of national identity, was the national character, the supposed 
personality traits of the national populace, and the specific individuals or types of 
individuals (archetypes) thought to exemplify these shared traits. While the content of 
the national character was certainly implied in some of the mass mediated texts I 
analysed, it was only made explicit in folk constructions of national identity in Australia 
and Japan. 
Gendered and Ethnicised Dimensions of Australian National Identity 
In the following section, I chart the broad contours of discourses of Australian national 
identity as discussed in focus groups and in-depth interviews. This analysis is undertaken 
with the dual aim of rendering explicit the gendered and ethnicised nature of such 
discourses, and examining the ways people use such discourses in the process of 
symbolically ordering their social worlds. I concentrate on the widely circulating 
discourses of national identity which emerge from Australian transcript data; however, it 
should be noted that such discourses are inherently unstable and fluid, and are routinely 
interpreted and contested by participants in a variety of ways. Therefore, I also explore 
the complex ways some participants challenge widely circulating discourses of national 
identity. 
National archetypes and the national character 
Nowhere is the gendered and ethnicised nature of the imagined community seen more 
clearly than in participants' descriptions of national archetypes, for such archetypes are 
inherently embodied. Perhaps most striking in the Australian transcript data is the sheer 
number and variety of masculine archetypes offered up by participants as exemplars of 
Australianness. These archetypes were drawn from arenas as diverse as labour, the fine 
arts, sport and leisure; from rural and urban settings and past and contemporary settings; 
and they ranged from figures of pride to figures of fun; from famous individuals to 
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personal acquaintances; and from specific men to generalised masculine stereotypes. 
Crocodile Dundee, Don Bradman, the swagman, the ANZAC, the larrikin, the 'man on 
the land,' and even the ocker, the yobbo and the bludger were recurring exemplars of 
Australianness in folk discourses of national identity.9I 
Feminine archetypes, on the other hand, were virtualy absent from participants' 
discussions of Australian national identity, an absence which some participants 
acknowledged explicitly. In the folowing exchange, excerpted in the Introduction to this 
thesis, Roger, a school teacher, reflected on the masculinity of Australian archetypes. 
Interviewer: What can you tel me about Australians? What are 
Australians like? 
Roger: Wel, it's a very hard thing to put a finger on, in a way . . . 
To an extent it is the stereotypical ideas that come out. And 
very often they seem to be sort of like the male stereotype 
Australian rather than anyone having sort of a stereotype of 
a female Australian. And so it is . . . ideas about the beer 
drinking and that sort of very gregarious type character, or 
the outback type image, or the sun-bronzed beach life-saver 
type of image. 
Interviewer: Could you. . . is there such a thing as a stereotypical 
Australian woman? 
Roger: 	 I don't think so. . . I think a lot of our Australian sort of 
ideas of identity, whether they are just stereotypes or not, 
tend to be sort of male rather than gender-neutral or female 
specificaly. 
Likewise, Brenda, a smal business owner, and Lisa and Paula, both school teachers, 
explicitly noted that the 'typical' Australian is a male Australian. However, al three 
women suggested that the national imagery should include women as wel. 
91 Although most readers wil be familiar with Crocodile Dundee, the fictional 
frontiersman of the Australian outback, other national male archetypes may require 
further explanation. Don Bradman was a leading figure in Australian cricket; ockers 
and yobbos are coarse and simple 'rednecks,' usualy opinionated and usualy heavy 
drinkers; and bludgers are people (usualy men) who choose to draw unemployment 
benefits rather than work for a living. The swagman, ANZACS and the larrikin were 
explained in Chapter Three. It should be noted that while Don Bradman featured in 
one of the advertisements shown to focus groups, which may account for frequent 
references to him in focus group discussions, other sportsmen not shown in the 
advertisements were also frequently cited as exemplars of Australianness. 
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Focus group discussions of one particular advertisement reveal that Australian 
participants, both men and women, young and old, typically constructed only 
essentialised discourses of womanhood in their accounts of national identity. The 
advertisement for a line of children's books features soft-focus close-up footage of a 
'white' Australian mother teaching her two young children to read. I expected 
participants to perceive this familial scene as particularly Australian. Instead, a focus 
group of high school girls remarked that it 'wasn't anything;' male public servants 
suggested that it 'could have just as easily been overseas;' older male farmers noted it 
'could have been England or anywhere;' and a female business owner remarked that it 
'didn't do anything for me. . . . it was just family life.' Such comments reveal the taken-
for-granted and naturalised character of women's domestic role. In other words, women 
everywhere are wives and mothers; wives and mothers are so universal they cannot be 
considered particularly 'Australian.' Curiously, however, male figures such as the 
sportsman, which are by no means unique to Australia, were still cited by participants as 
particularly Australian, suggesting that the masculine is privileged over the feminine in 
the framing of Australian national archetypes. 
Discussions of the national character reveal a similar privileging of male over 
female in Australian discourses of national identity. However, while the national 
archetypes described above are usually explicitly gendered (Crocodile Dundee, for 
example, is unambiguously male), discussions of the national character are only implicitly 
gendered. It is therefore necessary to read against the grain to reveal this gendering. To 
provide a rough sketch of the national character as it emerged from Australian focus 
groups and interviews, participants noted that Australians are happy-go-lucky, relaxed, 
humorous, tough, outdoorsy, hard-working and self-deprecating. 92 Such characteristics 
correspond neatly to several of the male archetypes described above, the larrikin, the 
ANZAC, the sportsman, the 'man on the land.' 
92 The extent to which any of these 'character' traits was stressed in participants' 
accounts of national identity was dependent upon the conversational context. Thus, 
Australians are described as 'relaxed' and 'easy-going' in one context, but 'hard-
working' and 'tough' in another. 
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Furthermore, many of these character traits would seldom be used to describe 
women; nor would they be seen as appropriate character traits for a woman. Reading 
against the grain, the 'happy-go-lucky' or 'relaxed' woman is refigured as 'easy,' -`loose,' 
flighty or slatternly, failing to monitor her sexuality and her appearance to expected 
standards. If she raises her voice in would-be larrikinism, she is not 'humorous' but 
rather 'brash;' if she is 'tough' she is also 'hard,' lacking feminine sentimentality. On the 
other hand, while 'outdoorsy' is not necessarily used in a pejorative sense when it is 
applied to Australian women, participants strongly associated the 'outdoors' with male 
sport. Likewise, while women, as well as men, may be admired for their strong work 
ethic, in the Australian transcript data participants clearly saw 'the worker' as male, as I 
will discuss below. Of the key national character traits cited by participants, only self-
deprecation, it would seem, is equally applicable to both men and women. 
In the discussions between Australian participants, therefore, it would seem both 
the national character and national archetypes are either explicitly or implicitly gendered 
in the masculine. This may reflect the historical reality that from the beginning of 
European colonisation of Australia, the colonial population was disproportionately male, 
a pattern that continued until Federation. What is more, such discourses are also 
implicitly ethnicised. In discussions with Australian participants, the ethnicised imagined 
community is most clearly seen in the contrasts drawn between three groups: 'white' 
Australians (often referred to as 'average' or 'normal' Australians), 93 'non-white' 
migrants (usually referred to as 'ethnics') and aboriginal Australians. While, as noted 
above, 'real' Australians were said to be relaxed, self-deprecating and hard-working, 
participants painted a very different picture of (usually 'non-white') migrants and 
aboriginal Australians. 
Both female high school students and male farmers, for example, noted that in 
contrast to 'relaxed' Australians, migrants are 'stressed,' serious' and 'busy.' Sixteen 
93 As in Chapter Four, I use the term 'white' rather than other common expressions 
such as 'Anglo-,"Anglo-Saxon,' or 'Anglo-Celtic.' I also adopt my participants' 
term, 'ethnics' instead of the more politically current 'non-English-speaking-
background migrants.' The terms 'white' and 'ethnics' make explicit the issue of 
ethnicity, which is obscured by these other terms. 
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year-old Ann contrasted the slow-paced, authenticaly Australian rural lifestyle with the 
faster pace of Australian city life, a diference she atributed to the influence of migrants. 
'In some places [in big Australian cities] people are realy busy and stuff like that. It's 
probably because in some countries they were realy busy, and then they. .. came over 
here, and made the rest of the people like that.' Likewise, a group of male farmers 
explicitly contrasted relaxed, self-deprecating 'Anglo-Saxon' Australians with serious, 
arrogant 'white' and 'non-white' migrants. 
Jery: 	 Like we're prety easy-going people. We don't take 
ourselves too seriously, which is good. But some people 
come in and they stil do take themselves prety seriously. 
Europeans tend to- 
Robert: 	 The Europeans tend to be prety serious and ful-on. The 
Dutch and-wel, not so ful-on, but they are prety serious. 
And arogant. 
Jery: 	 And the Danes are prety serious. 
Robert: 	 Yeah. And the Swedes. 
Richard: 	 Yeah, and the Danish and- 
Jery: 	 And the Asians are like that too. We are about the only 
relaxed ones amongst them al. 
Interviewer: So, when you say 'we,' who do you mean? 
Jery: 	 Wel, we would cal ourselves, probably, the Anglo-Saxon 
descendants. 
Similarly, female farmers contrasted the Australian work ethic, which 'ethnics' 
were said to share, with aboriginal Australian atitudes toward work. 
Martha: 	 The ethnics wil get on because they have to. I mean that's 
the-almost the rule, I mean, for any migrant, if you go to a 
foreign country. That's why the aboriginals, they've not got 
that in them. They're here. They're at home. They haven't 
got that need to- 
Anne: 	 Wel, their culture is so different, isn't it. It isn't geared to 
what we would cal hard work. 
112 
Martha: 	 That's right. 
Anne: 	 It's a totaly different culture. Because they were nomads. 
And it's hard to hold down a business if you're a nomad. 
Dot: 	 That's right. . . . They've got this in-ground nomadic thing in 
their blood. And they can't--often they can't setle down. 
And it's a great tragedy. 
Such examples neatly reveal perceived differences between authenticaly 'Australian' 
behaviour and values and the behaviour and values of 'ethnics' and aboriginal 
Australians. Interview and focus group discussions also abounded with more subtle 
suggestions that 'white' Australians are the truest and the best Australians. Farmers, 
business owners, employees and high school students al implicitly made a distinction 
between 'ethnic' or aboriginal Australians and 'average,' normal' or 'ordinary' (' white') 
Australians. As Brian, an employee in his forties, remarked, 'If you have [ethnic] pockets 
like that, say, in Sydney, where you have got Vietnamese communities and probably the 
average Australian is too scared to go in there after dark, you know, that's not the 
Australian way of life.' Average' Australians here are clearly not Vietnamese-
Australians, but, implicitly, 'white' Australians who fear becoming targets of violence if 
they enter the Asianised space of a predominantly Vietnamese suburb. 
Participants' comments also reveal a sense of 'white' proprietorship. This 
assumed proprietorship surfaced in such commonplace turns of phrase as 'our coloured 
people' and 'our aboriginals' which appeared regularly throughout focus groups and 
interviews with Australian participants. 
We've got our coloured people here, so what are we going to do with 
them? [Irene, a retiree]; 
[In New Zealand, the Maori people] cause a lot of trouble for everyone 
else. . . [They] sort of kick up like our aboriginals [Amanda, a farmer]; 
I find it realy annoying that in ads they wil have an American Negro . . 
instead of using our aboriginal people [Rebecca, a business owner]. 
Such comments position 'white' Australians as governors of the national space, with both 
the right and the responsibility to rule the Others within. 
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Similarly, Martha, an older farmer, expressed concern over the loss of 'aboriginal 
culture:' 
I just don't know what to think about the aboriginals. . . because they 
seem to be going down the scale instead of up the scale.. . . They're not 
refining their own culture. And I think we're partly to blame for it. We 
went to a display of aboriginal culture. . . like they had aboriginal 
drawings, and they were letting them do it, and weren't advising them to 
use their own ochres. They were using poster paints and all that kind of 
thing. . . . And that, to me, was very, very degrading for them. 
Martha's comments construct indigenous Australians as a totalised, essentialised Other, 
an historical (or prehistoric) people frozen in time, and living outside of 'white' 
Australian time and space. She voiced concern about what she perceived to be the 
declining authenticity of aboriginal cultural practices, and suggested that 'we' ('white' 
Australians) must take some responsibility for this decline because we 'let' them use non-
traditional materials. White Australians are positioned here with the power to judge, to 
advise, to allow aboriginal Australians to act in particular ways. 
While the national archetypes described above are clearly gendered and 
ethnicised, many Australian participants critiqued the 'cliched' nature of such discourses 
of national identity. When I asked Brenda, a small business owner, to describe a typical 
Australian, she remarked that the popular image of the 'man on the land' is inaccurate, 
both because it excludes women and because most Australians now live in the city. 
Interestingly, however, often, even after explicitly challenging the veracity of such 
national clichés, some participants still used such gendered and ethnicised discourses in 
the process of interpreting their social worlds. Although Brenda rejected gendered 
archetypes, she also offered her father as an exemplar of Australianness because, she 
explained, he is 'a bit of a Crocodile Dundee. . . the typical tough guy.' Brenda's 
comments reveal an intersection between abstract, widely circulating discourses of 
national identity and personal experiences of Australianness, for, while participants 
frequently reject popular clichés as overly simplistic, they nonetheless use such typologies 
in their accounts of the national imagined community and the individuals who constitute 
it. However, it was not possible to determine whether participants engage in similar 
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kinds of symbolic ordering in their everyday lives, or whether they used such orderings 
primarily as a way of presenting their experiences and perceptions to a foreign researcher 
investigating their national identity. 
Participants' comments also frequently reveal a tension between abstract and 
experienced national identity. Lisa, a teacher, talked extensively about the sporting and 
drinking rituals of young Australian men, and the culture of male dominance that 
underpins such rituals. Throughout our interview, Lisa drew on the concept of male 
dominance to interpret significant events and circumstances in her social world: why her 
school had resisted hiring her; why female teachers earn, on average, less than male 
teachers; why women fail to get elected or reach positions of prominence in local politics 
(in which she would like to participate some day); why so many women in the local 
community are victims of domestic violence; and why so many young rural men, 
including some of her former students, die from suicide and alcohol-related accidents. I 
asked her whether she considered male dominance to be a part of Australian identity. She 
answered, 'I think it is part of what we might imagine is somewhat the Australian 
identity, but I don't think a lot of people are really like that. I mean a lot of people /know 
are not like that. A lot of my children's friends certainly aren't.' Lisa's comments reveal 
that both discourses of national identity and everyday experiences are contradictory and 
relative. Lisa has observed and experienced male dominance, and is aware of images of 
male dominance in discourses of Australianness; however, her comments suggest that 
there is too much diversity and complexity in Australian social relations to characterise 
them under such all-encompassing terms as 'male dominance.' 
Rather than highlighting the tensions or intersections between cliched and 
experienced Australianness, some participants' comments indicate a fit between the 
inherent ambivalence of national clichés, and their own uncertain location within the 
imagined national community. Dominic, a thirty-something council worker who 
migrated from southern Europe to Australia as a child, suggested that there is no such 
thing as an authentically Australian culture; rather there is just 'something that Australia 
has marketed as culture.' Noting current concerns about the so-called Asianisation or 
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Americanisation of Australian culture, he suggested, 'Maybe we are going through 
withdrawal symptoms of the myth that we created. . . [but] I just don't think we are going 
to lose something that we didn't have to start with.' Dominic perceived a grain of truth in 
the national clichés, however, and suggested that the 'essence' of Australianness can be 
found in rural communities among 'the cockies' [farmers].94 Dominic's ambivalence 
about the clichés of national identity—they are both true and not true, genuine and 
fictitious—mirrors the ambivalence of his position as a migrant Australian. He 
explained, 'Like to me, I feel Australian and I feel [Greek], and I feel neither. Often 
people ask, like in [Greece] they ask when I go there, and people ask me here too, "What 
do you call yourself, Australian or [Greek]?" And it's like, fuck, you know. Both? 
Neither? I find borders really blurry.' 95 
In sum, then, in Australian focus group and interview data, national identity is 
strongly centred on 'white' male archetypes and characteristics. Participants construct 
discourses of ethnic proprietorship and masculine proprietorship, a kind of naturalised 
'white' male supremacy. While many participants suggested that such widely circulating 
images of the gendered and ethnicised national community are clichés, they still used 
such images in their articulations of national identity. This should not be interpreted as 
evidence that widely circulating discourses of national identity are inescapable or 
unassailable; if they were, participants would be unlikely to challenge them at all. Rather, 
this suggests that participants contribute to multiple and competing discourses of national 
identity, some of which mirror participants' experiences, and some of which are in 
tension with their experiences. A return to what participants call the 'clichés' of national 
identity may also reveal something about the nature of fieldwork as an embodied process. 
That is, one possible explanation is that participants framed their own experiences and 
94 The Australian usage of `cockies' to mean 'farmers' originated during a period of 
heavy land settlement when white farmers were allowed to select and settle land 
previously leased from the Crown by graziers. Since the selectors often picked the 
best land, the graziers saw the selectors as being as destructive as a flock of cockatoos 
('cockies') who would peck away the best of the crop. 
95 In order to protect Dominic's anonymity, I have changed his country of origin. 
However, he is of southern European descent. 
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perceptions in these national 'clichés' for my benefit. Because discourses of national 
identity are dialogic, the characteristics (and perceptions) of all participants shape those 
discourses. Just as my own perceptions of participants shaped the way I presented myself 
to them, it is likely that their perceptions of me as a foreign researcher shaped the ways 
they presented their views and experiences to me. Likewise, their perceptions of my 
research agenda, may have encouraged them to speak, in a sense, on behalf of all 
Australians, and thus to draw on broad generalisations, or what they identified as 
'clichés,' in their constructions of national identity. 
Social relations and social ethics 
A gendered and ethnicised imagined community likewise emerges out of participants' 
discussions of Australian social relations and social ethics. One of the strongest themes 
to emerge is the principle of egalitarianism, and the related concepts of 'a fair go,' the 
work ethic, `mateship' and tolerance. 
Participants from all walks of life suggested that one of the key characteristics of 
Australian society is its egalitarianism. As Louise, a farmer who migrated from the 
United Kingdom, put it, in Australia 'Everyone's on the same level.' However, 
participants' accounts of this equality focused almost exclusively on class equality and a 
broadly conceived equality of opportunity, the so-called 'fair go,' while overlooking other 
kinds of inequality, such as that based on gender or ethnicity. The principle of 'a fair go,' 
the opportunity to achieve to the best of one's abilities regardless of one's social 
background, is mentioned consistently by participants as a core value of Australian 
society. As one female teacher noted, 
Deep down most Australians have this attitude about a fair go. And their 
attitude is if people want to come and live here, fine, give them a fair go, 
see what they're like, accept people on their own merits. And I honestly 
think most Australians don't think too much about skin colour and things 
like that as long as the person is a good bloke, and easy to get on with and 
has something to offer and to contribute [Lisa]. 
What this excerpt reveals, however, is the implicit gendering of egalitarianism. 
Equality of opportunity is for the 'good bloke' whose easy-going manner and hard work 
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will win him acceptance among his (male) peers. In a popular expression of Australian 
egalitarianism, several participants observed that 'Jack is as good as his master' 
(emphasis added). Under the principle of egalitarianism, in other words, the male worker 
is equal to his (usually male) employer, and should therefore have equal opportunities to 
achieve. It is, in fact, the work ethic, another core Australian value noted by participants, 
that makes Jack as good as his master. Since most participants imagined the work force 
to be male, women were virtually absent from the discourse of egalitarianism and 'a fair 
go.' 
Non-white' migrants, on the other hand, were seen by some participants as a 
threat to Australian egalitarianism. One female business owner, for instance, used the 
notion of 'a fair go' not only to demarcate the differences between ('white') 'Australians' 
and ('non-white') 'ethnic people,' but also to explain and tacitly support so-called 'racist' 
behaviour. 
I think part of the Australian identity is a fair go, and I think with family 
and friends on the mainland, they are not given a fair go in relation to 
ethnic minorities that come over here. And I think that is what gets 
Australians' goats. And that is why I feel a lot of them are racist, because 
they are not being given a fair go in comparison to these, to the ethnic 
people. Because they get given, like the Vietnamese are given this, that, 
and the other. And people that are in the same economic stratum, 
Australians, don't get those same opportunities. . . . And that inflames 
racism, rather than the fact that their skin is a different colour [Georgia]. 
Such comments reveal that when 'a fair go' seems to be threatened by the perceived 
preferential treatment of ('non-white') migrants, what some consider racism, others 
consider a defence of purportedly core values of Australian society. 
While the notions of egalitarianism, 'a fair go' and, to some extent, the work ethic 
are clearly gendered and ethnicised in Australian participants' discussions, it is difficult to 
deconstruct another core value found consistently in the transcripts, `mateship.' As noted 
in Chapter Three, Australian intellectuals including linguists, historians and feminists 
have argued that `mateship' describes only bonds between (usually 'white') males. While 
many participants demonstrated an awareness of recent debates regarding the inclusion of 
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`mateship' in the proposed Constitutional Preamble, most asserted that `mateship' refers 
to an ethos of togetherness and mutual aid, regardless of gender. A male business owner 
described `mateship' as simply 'comradeship and helping out' [Conrad]; a female farmer 
suggested that `mateship' refers to the fact that Australians 'like it better in a gang' [Dot]; 
and retired women and male and female employees suggested that `mateship' means 
'helping out' a friend, or even another nation, in need. As Paula, a teacher and 
granddaughter of southern European migrants, explained, 
I don't think it [mateship] is an exclusively male thing. "Mate" is often 
used as a more male term, I gather, but "mateship" is between males and 
females. It's just an overall term describing our attitude to each other.. . . 
It's a term generally used in Australia, and it's from part of our heritage. 
And it's generally seen as something we value.' 
The implicit masculinity of 'mate' is impossible to deny; the question, however, is 
whether the principle of mateship is one which excludes women from the national 
imagined community. Australian female participants clearly included themselves in 
narratives of 'helping out' neighbours and friends in times of trouble. One business 
woman, for example, recounted her own experiences of helping fellow business people 
after a flood. However, like other female participants, she did not explicitly suggest that 
her own actions constituted `mateship.' Female participants only included themselves in 
the discourse of mateship implicitly, by defining `mateship' as an ethos of mutual aid, 
and, at some point in the interview, recounting the ways they have helped others. That 
women implicitly include themselves in the discourse of mateship, however, does not 
mean that the term no longer carries masculinist and exclusionist connotations. It may, in 
fact, show that through their long familiarity with many such 'masculine generics,' 
women have become adept at reading themselves into the masculine collective. 
Related to the notions of mateship and egalitarianism is the notion of 'tolerance' 
or 'acceptance' of others that participants most often associated with the Australian 
principle of multiculturalism. For some participants, this principle of acceptance seemed 
to be a personal and lived reality; for others, it seemed to exist only in the abstract, an 
accepted moral principle which nonetheless did not inform their everyday practice. These 
two different responses to the principle of acceptance are neatly captured by the narratives 
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of two participants: Dominic, a migrant from southern Europe, with a career in social 
work and community services; and Leanne, the Australian-born daughter of migrants 
from northern Europe, with career experiences in the military and in private business. 
Both participants were in their thirties. 
For Dominic, the principle of multicultural acceptance appeared to be a part of his 
lived experience, a powerful part of his attachment to the nation, his sense of belonging to 
the national imagined community: 
To me, it's part of the essence of this country. On a personal level, it is 
one of the things that really draws me to living in Australia. It's the 
difference in cultures, the fact that there are so many people from different 
countries living here quite harmoniously. You know, there are glitches 
here and there, but it is generally not too bad. And there is acceptance of 
that. 
Leanne, on the other hand, appeared to accept multicultural tolerance in principle, 
while it did not inform her social action or attitudes. Leanne began our interview by 
telling me the reason she enjoys living in Tasmania is the absence of Asians. She 
recounted her experiences living in and around Sydney where street signs were written in 
Asian languages and Asian-Australians spoke their native languages in public places, a 
practice which offended her. She noted, however, that in her childhood home, she and 
her family preserved the language, diet and customs of her parents' native country. When 
I asked her whether it is possible to preserve one's ethnic heritage and still be a 'real 
Australian,' she answered matter-of-factly, 'Yes, definitely. Definitely. That's what 
being Australian is, isn't it? Being able to accept other people.' She later suggested that 
Asians constitute 'another species,' and she recalled with apparent pride an incident in 
which she grabbed a 'little Asian' man `by the scruff of the collar' and shouted 
obscenities at him for not allowing an elderly 'white' woman to board a train ahead of 
him. 'They have respect for their own elders,' she explained, '[but] they had no respect 
for an elderly white person.' 
In her account of the incident, Leanne evoked the ideology of 'white' 
proprietorship over the nation. First she described the man as 'little,' emphasising his 
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lack of power or significance in the imagined national community. She then attributed 
the actions of one particular man to the essentialised category of 'Asians,' who she 
suggested do not respect 'whites.' In other words, she constructed 'Asians' as both weak 
and in need of discipline, and she claimed for herself, as a 'white' the right and duty to 
monitor their behaviour and sanction them when she deems it necessary. 
Other participants complicated the discourse of 'white' proprietorship by drawing 
parallels between the subordination of ('white') women and the subordination of ethnic 
minorities in Australia. Rose, a 'white' business owner, reflected on her own family life, 




I think women are more accepting of others. I am just 
thinking of the women in my family and the men, and I 
think the women are more accepting and less critical of 
other races. 
Why do you think that is? 
Because women can relate to being under authority, and in a 
lesser position in society. Being down-trodden. . . . So you 
can really see, you can understand, how women in different 
cultures would feel. 
Rose's assumption that Other women are as 'down-trodden' and 'under authority' as 
('white') Australian women suggests that she perceives patriarchy to be universal, even 
inevitable. Even more interesting is the way she exposes the power relations 
underpinning notions of multicultural 'tolerance.' She suggests that such 'tolerance' is 
largely the acceptance of one marginal group (migrants or 'other races') by another 
marginal group, women. 
There is a tension here between the principle of egalitarianism (or 'acceptance' or 
multicultural tolerance) and the practice of patriarchy, a tension between a stated value of 
Australian society and its actual mode of social organisation. This tension between 
egalitarianism and patriarchy is a prominent feature of the Australian transcript data. 
Interestingly, most groups of participants suggested both that Australia is a land of 
equality for all, and that women in Australia face serious disadvantage relative to men. A 
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broad cross-section of participants noted that women earn less money than men for equal 
work; they are not promoted as readily; they shoulder the majority of housework and 
childcare duties; they are not taken seriously in politics; their sporting achievements are 
largely ignored; and they suffer physical abuse at the hands of the men in their lives. 
While participants generally agreed on the effects of patriarchy, however, opinion 
was divided on the origins of Australian patriarchal social relations. Four possible 
explanations were offered by participants: that patriarchy is part of the nation's rural, 
convict and/or sporting heritage; that patriarchy is, in part, a backlash against the rapid 
economic and social changes of recent years; that Australian patriarchy is partly a result 
of (`non-white') migrants importing extreme forms of patriarchy into the nation; and that 
patriarchy primarily exists in women's minds, and it can therefore be overcome if women 
change the way they think. Some participants also suggested that patriarchy has grown 
out of some combination of these factors. 
The historical or 'traditional' nature of Australian patriarchy was noted by both 
male and female participants, younger and older. While Paula, the teacher quoted earlier, 
suggested that male dominance in Australia has developed, in part, around the national 
'religion' of football, Henry, an older farmer, suggested that it has developed out of the 
gender division of labour of Australian farming families, where it is necessary for men to 
work the land and women to take charge of housework and child care. Rather than 
mentioning specific historical circumstances, however, most participants, simply 
suggested that patriarchy is an historical inevitability in Australia. 'It comes from our 
past,' Paula observed. Likewise, bringing up female victims of domestic violence, Roger, 
also a teacher, noted, 'They just accept it. It's part of their way of life. [They think] "I'm 
female. It's part of my lot in life." 
Some participants, however, suggested that Australian patriarchy is either much 
more recent in origin, or that it is a long-standing practice that has intensified recently. 
Lisa, a female teacher who spoke at length about her own encounters with sexism and sex 
discrimination, explained the violent nature of patriarchy in her local community. 
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Wel, there's a lot of violence down here in homes. A lot of homes are 
stil very male dominated. . . . I think we're in a very rapid period of 
change at the moment, in schools, and in society and everything. And 
that's half the reason why some of these communities. . . why some of the 
old things might be even more exaggerated at the moment, because people 
are kind of clinging on, keeping the boundaries. I mean, men feel 
threatened down here, some of them. So they over-react. You know? 
And that is just one example I know that has happened, where some of the 
local men have felt very threatened by the fact that their wives might be 
making a few moves to do things slightly differently and that. And they 
over-react to pul them back into line. . . . Sometimes with violence. 
Likewise, Roger, the male teacher who spoke explicitly about the masculine 
gendering of Australian archetypes, reflected on his own encounters with migrants to 
suggest that male dominance in Australia has only intensified over time, with the influx 
of migrants from even more strongly patriarchal societies. He recaled an incident in his 
university days when he became interested in dating a young woman from a ('non-white') 
migrant family. The two never went on a date, however, for when she accepted his 
invitation, she 'got into al sorts of trouble' with her parents, who wanted her to marry 
someone else. He concluded the folowing from his experience: 
I guess historicaly we have tended to be a fairly patriarchal society, but I 
guess we brought European ideas with us, particularly English ideas in 
terms of sort of the man being the worker and so on, and the wife being at 
home. . . . But I guess on the other hand a lot of our societies, in fact, are 
more patriarchal. . . . A lot of ethnic groups that have come into Australia 
are more patriarchal than Australian society is. Therefore, if anything, 
they would have had a negative influence. 
While Roger and Lisa sought explanations for patriarchy in contemporary 
Australian social circumstances, some female participants suggested that patriarchy is 
largely a state of mind. If women refused to accept a lower social position and the extra 
burdens that entails, they argued, gender equality would become a reality. Paula, for 
example, explained that despite her intelectual understanding of principles of gender 
equality, she unconsciously accepts patriarchal ideology. 
Paula: 	 With regard to females in society, yes we have changed. I 
stil think we have a litle way to go. 
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Interviewer: What do you mean? 
Paula: Well, with regard to getting equality, yes, and not being 
discriminated against. People just don't think that's a 
problem any more. And we just take it for granted that we 
do have equal rights. But statistics don't really indicate that. 
And it's still quite hard sometimes to break the mould. 
Even personally, you know, you sometimes feel the house 
looks-- "Oh, I better have the kitchen looking clean, because 
someone will think I'm not very good. If visitors come, 
they'll think I'm terrible in the house." And it's not just my 
responsibility, it's my partner's responsibility as well. But 
you do tend to take it all on yourself Even though your 
brain tells you you shouldn't have to, something, something, 
probably history or socially something, tells you it's your 
responsibility. 
While the above discussion of social relations and social ethics reveals the 
complex ways gender and ethnicity crosscut participants' discourses of egalitarianism, a 
fair go, mateship, the work ethic, multicultural tolerance and patriarchy, the effects of 
such discourses are worth stressing. Discourses of egalitarianism (including notions of a 
fair go, mateship and tolerance), have dual effects. First, they naturalise the dominance of 
privileged groups. That is, if disadvantaged groups face hardships due to their own 
failure to compete on an even playing field, and those in power have earned their 
positions of privilege, current social hierarchies are justified. Secondly, such discourses 
of egalitarianism suggest that even marginalised groups can attain not only equality but 
positions of privilege if they work hard enough. This promise of future rewards 
legitimates current power relations by encouraging compliance with the current system of 
expected performance, recognition and advancement. 
The effects of these discourses are not merely theoretical speculation. 
Participants' own words suggest that discourses of egalitarianism are used to legitimate 
certain forms of inequality. When I asked Roger, the teacher quoted several times above, 
whether there are certain core values that Australians share, he responded, 'The mateship, 
the fair go type attitude, that everyone sort of deserves a chance to have a job, or those 
sorts of ideas. And, well, fair enough, if they blow it, and they are an idiot and they don't 
take chances and so on, then they deserve what they get, so to speak.' Just as Roger used 
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the ideal of egalitarianism to justify why certain people 'deserve what they get,' Paula's 
explanation of patriarchy, above, naturalised her own oppression as a woman. She noted 
that women 'have a little way to go' but she suggested that something inside their heads is 
holding them back. In the logic of Paula's argument, women are responsible for their 
own oppression, for patriarchy is located in a woman's state of mind; only by changing 
the way she thinks will she achieve equality. 
At the same time, the fact that participants identify patriarchal social relations as 
problematic constitutes a challenge to masculinist discourses of national identity. 
Interestingly, the most vocal critics of patriarchy were the public school teachers I 
interviewed. This is significant in that, as employees of the state, they could be expected 
to echo state concerns to some extent. Their comparatively high awareness of, and 
critiques of, patriarchy are consistent with state policies designed to increase gender 
equity in education. 
Everyday practice 
In discussions of Australian national identity, participants talk not only about the more 
abstract dimensions of national identity, such as the national character or social relations 
and social ethics, but also about concrete everyday practices, such as work and leisure 
practices. Like the dimensions of national identity discussed above, discourses of 
everyday practice are also strongly gendered and ethnicised. 
I have already discussed the centrality of the work ethic in participants' 
perceptions of the character and core values of Australians. What emerges clearly from 
participants' narratives about everyday Australian practice is that the 'typical' Australian 
is perceived to be a 'worker,' and the worker is perceived by most participants to be a 
man. When asked to describe an 'average' or 'typical' Australian, participants in a wide 
variety of social locations talked about 'the working man,' the 'man who works the land,' 
the 'man who works with his hands,' the 'old bloke working alone,' the 'self employed 
man,' the 'guy in a workshop,' the 'bloke going off to work every morning to support his 
family,' or any number of variations on such masculine symbolic types. 
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Many female participants did not passively accept their discursive exclusion from 
the imagined working community of Australia, however. Female farmers, in particular, 
were vocal about the contributions women make to Australia's labour force and 
communal life. Louise, an older migrant farmer from the U.K., praised rural Australian 
women for the active part they play on their farms and in their communities. She 
suggested that, compared to British women, Australian women have had to endure 
harsher environmental and social conditions, and this has made them hearty and 
resourceful workers and community leaders. Likewise, younger female agriculturalists 
contested popular perceptions that only men are farmers. 
Helen: 	 I was reading some papers last night. Twenty percent of urban 
children in schools don't believe that farmers are necessary. 
. . . Five percent, only five percent of children in urban areas 
realised that women could be farmers. I mean we're starting 
to get into realy bad areas here! [laughing] And twenty-five 
percent is another statistic. . . . Twenty-five percent of the 
rural workforce in the world are women, and they do eighty 
percent of the work. 
Mary Ann: It's not 'manual labour.' It's sort of `wo-manual labour!' 
[laughing] 
While many participants, both male and female, recognised that Australian 
women are increasingly engaged in paid labour, this was often seen as a source of 
national moral decline. Edward, for instance, is a business owner who professed strong 
fundamentalist Christian convictions and demonstrated an interest in Marxist and fascist 
politics. On the afternoon I interviewed him, he was reading a colection of writings by 
Hitler and Mussolini. Commenting on the changing nature of family life, Edward noted, 
'If both husband and wife work, then they haven't got time to come home and cook those 
delicious meals, traditional meals. Preparation, two hours. I mean, that's gone, gone out 
the door. But when that goes, so is that way of life gone.' In his explication of this lost 
way of life, he suggested that contemporary social changes have resulted in increasing 
numbers of drug users, unmaried mothers, gays and lesbians, environmental activists, 
and welfare recipients, al of whom he regarded as the antithesis of 'real' Australians. 
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Other participants echoed some of these themes, although in less forceful terms. 
A group of retired women, for example, suggested that because families are more 
materialistic now, 'because they want everything,' more mothers are working outside the 
home and leaving their children unattended or attended by strangers. They suggested that 
this lack of maternal attention is partially to blame for rising crime rates. An older male 
farmer suggested that the government is complicit in this decline of the family and the 
consequent decline of the nation, through the provision of public child care. He noted, 
But then there's the Commonwealth government breaking up families, 
though. . . . They are looking after our children in creches, that type of 
thing. You know? They are trying to rear our children, and they are trying 
to educate them, and they are trying to not find a job for them because they 
pay them unemployment benefits, so--you know? The Commonwealth 
government is taking the children from us [Jack]. 
While women's paid labour is clearly viewed by many participants as worthy of 
remark, as exceptional and even cataclysmic in its consequences, women's unpaid 
domestic labour is largely seen as natural and unproblematic. As noted above, when 
focus groups watched an advertisement showing a woman minding her children, they 
commented that 'it wasn't anything,' it 'could have been. . . anywhere,' it was 'just 
family life,' totally unremarkable and natural. However, when participants watched an 
advertisement showing gender role reversal, with a man thinking about cooking dinner for 
a woman, both men and women, young and old, responded with laughter and expressions 
of disbelief. As one female public servant remarked, 'Australian men cook?!' 
In sum, what emerges from participants' discussions of Australian working 
practice is that 'real' Australians are workers, and workers are male; furthermore, 
women's paid labour is seen by many participants as unusual and threatening, leading to 
the moral decline of the nation, while women's unpaid domestic labour is seen by most 
participants as natural and normal. At the same time, some female participants strongly 
protest their exclusion from images of Australian working life; they revise widely 
circulating images and insert themselves into discourses of national identity. In any case, 
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it is clear that accounts of Australian national identity are bound up with discourses of 
working practice, and such discourses are strongly gendered. 
Just as the working practices of the nation are gendered in the popular 
imagination, they are also ethnicised. As discussed above, 'white' Australian participants 
frequently use the trope of the 'work ethic' to differentiate between 'white' and aboriginal 
Australians. 'White' (male) Australians are defined as 'workers,' and therefore as 'real' 
Australians, while aboriginal Australians are defined as non-productive members of 
society, as welfare recipients, and therefore not true Australians. As Ann, a high school 
student, remarked, 'aboriginals are actually the native Australians. But no one thinks of 
them as actual, as an Australian person.' Ethnics,' on the other hand, are said to be hard 
working, a trait which makes them both an asset and a threat to the national imagined 
community. 
There is a high degree of consensus among participants that the migrants who 
came to Australia in the wake of World War II made a positive contribution to Australian 
society, particularly through their labour on large public works schemes. These migrants 
are respected, in part, because they are seen to have lived and worked together peacefully 
and then to have dispersed discreetly into wider Australian society. Some more recent 
migrants are respected for similar reasons. Hugh, a retiree, described the local Greek 
shop owners: 'They are always open, always obliging. They work hard.' And Leanne, 
the business owner quoted earlier, noted, 'The only Asian people we have here run the 
Chinese shop. But you never see them. Yeah, you never see them. They're only ever in 
the kitchen, as'they should be [laughing]: Such migrants are welcomed, in other words, 
as compliant and obliging labourers, but only in so far as they are either contained, in 
post-war migrant labour projects or in their modern day corner shops and restaurant 
kitchens, or isolated from other 'ethnics' and assimilated into 'white' Australian society. 
When 'ethnic' workers group together, establishing their own business districts, many 
'white' Australian participants view this as 'swamping' a suburb and 'getting out of 
hand.' Leanne and her husband and business partner, Nick, explained that this is the case 
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in Cabramata, a suburb of Sydney sometimes caled `Vietnamata' for its high 
concentration of Vietnamese-Australian residents.96 
Nick: 	 Okay, you've got to go to Cabramata in Sydney. 
Leanne: 	 You've got to go. Please. 
Nick: 	 And you won't get served in a shop, right. 
Leanne: 	 If you want some more research, go and live near there for 
six months. 
Nick: 	 Because you're Australian. Wel, you don't speak the 
language. You don't speak Vietnamese, right? 
Leanne: 	 You don't get service. 
Interviewer: So, you won't be served? 
Nick: 	 You won't be served. You can't read the street signs 
because al the signs have been changed into- 
Leanne: 	 And how our country can alow that, I have no idea. 
Nick: 	 But they're not wiling to disperse and do what they did in 
the 50s and 60s. 
Recent migrants are also frequently seen as a threat to ('white' male) Australian 
employment. Voicing a sentiment fairly common among participants, Clem, a retiree, 
suggested that the government needs to cut the number of migrants to Australia in order 
to reduce the unemployment rate. `They can't be bringing people out here when they 
can't find enough work and that for our own blokes here.' This competition for jobs 
between `white' and `ethnic' Australians is cited by many participants as a source of 
racism. Australian working practices, the true Australian work ethic, in other words, is 
seen to be threatened by an influx of migrant labourers; and in the face of such a threat, 
r`acism,' or the rejection of `ethnics,' is seen by some as inevitable although usualy 
undesirable. As Ruth, a young farmer who is married to a migrant from northern Europe, 
explained, 
96 In the 1991 Census, 50,000 Vietnamese resided in Cabramata (Bureau of 






It always amazes me that people are far less tolerant to 
people of Asian backgrounds, or people who look different 
to the European. It's very easy to assimilate if you've got a 
European background. But a couple of my children actually 
shocked me by the way they talk about Asians. 
Really? 
Yeah, it's that, you know, it's the feeling that they're taking 
our jobs and they shouldn't be here and they should be sent 
home. And they really do, they can be quite racist against-- 
but it seems only to be against the Asians. . . . And I think 
there's an underlying fear that, you know, [as] more and 
more come [laughing]--there will be higher unemployment. 
Oh, so it's employment. 
It's a worry of the employment, because it's harder and 
harder to get jobs. And they just feel, you know, they 
shouldn't allow more immigrants in, I suppose. So let's go 
back to the White Australia policy that we used to have. 
And it's surprising how many people do agree with Pauline 
Hanson, even though I think she's a bit radical, myself. 
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It is worthwhile to note that many participants make similar comments, linking 
immigration to unemployment. 97 Like Ruth, however, most are careful to distance 
themselves from the views of Pauline Hanson's One Nation party, a party largely branded 
'racist' in the Australian media. 
Just as Australian working practice is gendered and ethnicised in Australian 
participants' discussions of national identity, so leisure practices are also strongly 
gendered and,,to some degree, ethnicised. Among participants in all social locations, 
sport and the consumption of alcohol are cited as defining characteristics of Australian 
national identity. Male participants, in particular, link sport and alcohol together in their 
descriptions of Australianness. When asked what Australians are like, a male public 
servant responded, 'They like their sport; they like their beer' [Roy]. Likewise, a male 
employee answered, 'We do enjoy our leisure time, our sports. Everybody loves football 
97 Such comments are reminiscent of previous authorised discourses of White 
Australia, suggesting that political and economic issues were and continue to be 
entangled with 'white' perceptions of, and policies regulating, 'ethnic' Australians. 
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and cricket and golf and bowls. And we like the odd beer' [Daryl]. When asked if 
Australians share any core values, a male business owner remarked, 'There is a big ethic 
of sport, and the love of sport. . . or the Aussie "come and sit down and have a beer with 
me, mate" [Conrad]. In addition, both sport and beer consumption are constructed as 
largely male activities. 
For example, while a group of male public servants ofered up a long list of sports 
figures as exemplars of Australianness, figures including cricketers Don Bradman, Shane 
Warne and Tasmanian David Boon, tennis champion Rod Laver, and boxers Kostya 
Tszyu and Aussie Joe Bugner, they mentioned only one sportswoman, a gymnast they 
identified only as 'the litle Vietnamese girl.' They qualified her inclusion, however, by 
noting that gymnastics is 'not recognised as being a traditional Australian sport' [Ted]. 
Interestingly, while the female gymnast's ethnic Otherness was emphasised, Russian-born 
Tszyu and Hungarian-born Bugner were both nonproblematicaly included in the list of 
'Australian' sporting greats. It seems their masculinity (not only their sex, but the 
perceived virility of their sport) and/or their perceived 'whiteness' (as opposed to the 
gymnast's `Asianness') moderate their Otherness, and alow them to be included as 
exemplars of Australianness. 
Just as sport is gendered in folk discourses of national identity, so is alcohol 
consumption. While many female participants admited to enjoying beer, beer drinking 
as a pastime was seen by both male and female participants as a masculine activity. Lisa, 
a teacher who demonstrated an interest in issues of gender equity, explained the links 
between sport, drinking and masculinity in Australia. 
Lisa: 	 And I suppose sport is in there too, very much part of our 
identity. 
Interviewer: Is it? 
Lisa: 	 Especialy for males, it is. They al play footy, cricket, 
whatever. And you're not realy a proper man unless you 
are playing something, especialy something rough. 
Interviewer: So, chess doesn't count? [laughing] 
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Lisa: 	 No. . . It can't be just a wussy game. And I mean, there are 
rites of passage down here with the footy club and the 
cricket club, and the younger members actualy having to 
drink themselves bloto a couple of times after the game on 
Saturday night to prove they're one of the boys. 
What is clear, then, is that folk discourses of Australian national identity centre, in 
part, on leisure practices, and that these practices are largely male leisure practices. In 
fact, when asked to describe a typical Australian, one young woman noted that they have 
'big guts' (from excessive beer consumption). When asked if this applied to both men 
and women, she answered, 'No, just the men' [Susie, an employee]. In her imagination, 
then, not only is the national body male, but it has been profoundly shaped by male 
leisure practice, beer drinking. 
In addition to being gendered, participants described national leisure practices as 
ethnicised, to some extent. Many participants noted, for instance, that migrants can 
become 'true blue Aussies' through sport. Daryl, an employee, explained how the 
children of migrants can be accepted into the national community through their 
participation in sport. 'Their kids go to Australian schools, and they learn to be 
Australians. And yes, they sort of play footbal and cricket, and after a generation or two, 
they get asimulated [sic] to our way of life.'98 
Not everyone was pleased about the increasing participation of migrants in sport, 
however. A group of retired men equated greater numbers of migrant sportsmen with 
escalating on-field violence, and the decline of Australian sportsmanship. Likewise, a 
female public servant suggested that 'ethnic' sports like soccer are displacing 
authenticaly Australian sports such as footbal. 
A distinctive feature of the trope of everyday practice is the way in which 
participants used accounts of work and leisure practices to locate themselves within the 
national imagined community. Clearly to some participants, the proof of their 
98 While the participant may have intended to say 'assimilated,' his neologism 'a-
simulated' is intriguing for its suggestion that migrant ways of life come to resemble, 
or 'simulate' (white) Australian ways of life. The implication is that these 'simulated' 
ways of life are not genuinely 'Australian.' 
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Australianness was in their everyday practices. Both male and female farmers suggested, 
for instance, that Australianness is typified by farmers, with the unstated logic being, 'The 
typical Australian is a farmer; I am a farmer; therefore I am a typical Australian.' 
Business men made similar claims about business men and workers as 'typical' 
Australians. Likewise, many participants professed a love of sport while suggesting that 
sport is a central part of Australian national identity (with the implied logic 'Australians 
love sport; I love sport; therefore I am an Australian'). Similar references were made to 
social drinking, particularly by male participants, who seemed to take pride in the 
Australian 'pub culture.' 
Such comments reveal an intersection of widely circulating images of 
Australiarmess and the lived experiences of participants. However, sometimes 
participants' comments reveal a tension between the two, tensions that are not surprising 
given the processual and negotiated nature of discourses of national identity. One female 
participant noted, for instance, that Australians love sport, but later admitted that she does 
not. Another woman suggested that Australians are great beer drinkers, but then admitted 
that it is only men who usually drink. 
That some participants repeated widely circulating images of Australianness 
which conflict with their own lived experiences is revealing in two ways. First, it 
suggests that folk discourses are inextricably entangled with mass Mediated and 
authorised discourses, and that the discursive effects of these narratives of nation are so 
pervasive that they seem to override some participants' own lived experiences. Secondly, 
such tensions suggest another effect of widely circulating discourses of national identity. 
These discourses may serve as a way for marginalised groups, including women, to 
explain their own marginality, with the unstated logic of, 'Australians love sport/drinking; 
I do not love sport/drinking; therefore Jam not (fully) Australian.' 
Material and symbolic culture 
Discourses of national identity among Australian participants also centred on the national 
material and symbolic culture. Participants talked about the manufactured or modified 
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objects customarily used or consumed by the national community, including clothing and 
food and drink, among other things. They discussed the language, dialect or other 
linguistic practices or forms distinctive to the national community, including, for 
example, slang expressions and features of accent. And they mentioned nationally 
recognised art forms and the artists who create them, including, among others, Banjo 
Patterson and Henry Lawson and their poetry, and Tasmanian Richard Flarmagan and his 
novels. Categories of gender and ethnicity cross-cut such discussions of the national 
material and symbolic culture both explicitly and implicitly. 
When asked to describe a typical Australian, many participants painted a picture 
of distinctive national costumes and the gendered (male) bodies which bear them. The 
most popular images of the national costume centre on men in singlets, shorts and thongs, 
or men in Akubra hats and Dri'zabone coats. 99 Participants ranging from high school 
girls and boys to male public servants, female business owners and female farmers 
suggested that the typical Australian is a `bloke in a singlet and stubbies.' In another 
variation on this masculine symbolic type, one female employee described how she 
imagines the typical Australian: 
Well, if you put someone, say, in an Akubra hat, everyone knows that's 
Australian. And a Dri'zabone coat. And anything to do with the outback 
as well, I think. And if you put--it was like with, what was that movie? 
Crocodile Dundee. To me, that is so Australian. . . . Or who's that man? 
What's that show? The Australian Outback Adventures. Something like 
that [Carrie]. 
Such images of national identity focus exclusively on working class and largely rural 
('white') males, evoking the archetypical swagman, ocker or larrikin discussed earlier, 
and excluding women and non-working-class urban dwellers. 
99 Akubra hats and Dri'zabone coats are Australian brands associated in popular 
culture with rugged outdoorsmen. Both featured prominently in the staging of 
Australian national identity in the 2000 Sydney Olympics opening ceremony. Singlets 
(tank-tops) and `stubbies' (toughly constructed shorts) are likewise associated with 
sheep shearing and manual labour. Thongs (or 'flip-flop' sandals) are associated with 
the beach, a salient symbol of Australianness even in the cooler climate of Tasmania 
where a `beach lifestyle' has not developed. 
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While discussions of the national dress reveal the gendered nature of the imagined 
national community most explicitly, it is in participants' frequent comments on the 
national diet that an ethnicised national identity emerges. Participants in all social 
locations suggested that the national diet is a defining feature of Australian identity. 
'Meat and three veg,"meat pies and sauce' and 'the Sunday roast lunch' are associated in 
participants' accounts with 'tradition,' with history and with an authentically Australian 
way of life. 100 Participants explicitly contrasted this purportedly typical or 'traditional' 
Australian diet with an 'ethnic' or 'multicultural' diet. 
Some participants positively valued Australia's new culinary diversity, not only 
for its perceived nutritional benefits and its more varied flavours, but also as evidence of 
'white' Australia's multicultural tolerance, a source of pride in most participants' 
accounts. Some participants, however, saw 'ethnic' foods as an invasion of the national 
way of life, a force which compromises both the national culture and the bodies of the 
('white') citizenry. As Leanne explained: 
We are being Asianised . . . Even in restaurants--and I can't eat Asian 
food. It's too rich for me. . . it's too spicy-rich, like Thai food and that. I 
can't eat it. In one end, out the other, stomach cramps, the whole thing. 
So I go, I have to go to restaurants where they serve, how can I say? A 
European-Australian type menu--meat and potatoes. Yes, I am an Aussie. 
Leanne went on to voice her frustration at often being unable to find authentic Australian 
food in restaurants, as an increasing number of establishments incorporate Asian dishes 
• into their menus. Her fear of this 'Asianisation' of the nation, therefore, coincides with 
her fear that Asian food makes her ill. In other words, introducing Otherness into the 
body through 'ethnic' food results in a dis-eased state. 
Just as food was a powerful marker of Australianness and Otherness, language 
served as a salient symbol of national identity among participants. Participants suggested 
that the Australian accent reflects the national character; it is 'laid back', relaxed, open, 
100 Many of these discourses are also gendered, for the preparation of such 
'traditional' food is viewed by participants as women's work. As noted earlier, some 
participants suggest that the 'traditional' Australian diet is under threat as more 
women enter into paid labour. 
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and unpretentious. This 'voice' of the nation was strongly associated with home, with 
familiar social worlds. One female farmer noted, 'It's so nice when you come back from 
overseas and you just hear the voice, the Australian voice, you know. . . It's great' [Mary 
Anne]. Her male coleague agreed, 'It's the biggest relief when you've been gone some 
time and you haven't heard an Australian accent or a New Zealand accent, and you finaly 
hear one' [Jerry]. 
The foreign languages spoken by Australian migrants, on the other hand, were 
viewed by many participants as 'babble,' disturbing because 'Australians' cannot 
understand them. As a group of high school girls explained: 
Meg: 	 [People] don't like it when they can't understand what 
somebody is saying. 
Ann: 	 Yeah, that annoys me real bad. 
Meg: 	 That's what annoys most people. Like you get off in town and 
you hear some Asians speaking in their language and you 
think, 'Wow. That's annoying.' And then they look at you, 
and you think, 'Are they talking about me?' 
Ann: 	 And then they laugh. 
Meg: 	 And. . . if they are about your age. . . you just assume they 
know English. So it annoys you even more to know they can 
speak English but they are choosing to speak their language in 
front of you. Because that makes you even more suspicious _ that they're talking about you. 	 _ 
What is notable here is the underlying assumption that Australian public spaces are 
English-language spaces, spaces in which Anglophone Australian culture is not only 
privileged, but is seen as the only appropriate option. Again the ideology of 'white' 
proprietorship is in evidence here. Many 'white' participants are personaly offended by 
seeing and hearing Other languages in spaces which are defined as ('white') Anglophone 
Australian spaces. Comments such as those by the high school girls above suggest a 
sense of proprietorship over the nation, a right or a responsibility to police the Others who 
reside in (' white') Australian spaces. 
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For most participants, English language is so inextricably bound up with 
Australian national identity that it is argued that migrants cannot be Australian unless they 
speak English, or 'speak Australian' as several participants put it. However, even English 
language ability cannot guarantee a migrant's acceptance into the national imagined 
community, for their Otherness is invariably exposed through the remnants of their native 
tongue. As Brenda, a business owner, noted, 'You tend to think of people with accents as 
not being Australian.' 
Finally, discourses of Australian national identity also centre on nationally 
recognised aesthetic forms and the artists who produce them. Such discourses are 
gendered in that among the many artists mentioned by participants, female artists are 
conspicuously absent. This reveals another articulation between folk and authorised 
discourses of national identity. As noted in Chapter Three, while Australian women have 
always actively contributed to the nation's aesthetic culture (as well as its economic and 
political life), until recent decades their contributions were rarely acknowledged in 
official national histories and artistic canons. 
Not only are imaginings of the national aesthetic culture gendered, however; they 
are also profoundly ethnicised. In participants' narratives, the Otherness of 'ethnics' and 
aboriginal Australians is linked strongly with the paintings, dances, festivals, films and 
other artistic products of these groups. Such aesthetic forms are positively valued by 
almost all participants. As one business owner explained, 
I often envy other cultures when they have Italian week or Greek week or 
whatever. And they have their costumes and their dances. I really envy 
that. We've got nothing like that. . . . You know, their tradition, it goes 
back for so many hundreds and hundreds of years. But we are only, white 
Australia is only 200. You know. . . we've got to look at the aboriginal 
people, the things that they value. You know if the aboriginal people were 
the majority in Australia, there would be that sort of costuming and 
everything [Rebecca]. 
Similarly, one teacher described what he considers the positive aspects of multicultural 
diversity. 
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Just the accepting of other people's cultures and beliefs, and that people 
can come here and practise, you know, their religion or their, you know, 
pursue their culture, but within our own culture. And to share it with 
other people, and for other people to be accepting and open to those sorts 
of things. To try their food, to watch their dances, to view their films, let 
them speak their language and respect them for that. . . . It add[s] a lot of 
colour [Phillip]. 
What is of interest in these two excerpts is both the commodification of cultural 
difference and the way 'white,' ethnic' and aboriginal Australians are positioned vis-à-
vis such commodities. In the above comments, cultural diversity is reduced to a number 
of packaged aesthetic commodity forms--costumes, festivals, dances--with 'whites' 
positioned as consuming subjects, and 'ethnics' and aboriginal Australians positioned 
either as producers, or as objects of consumption themselves. Again, 'whites' ler these 
Others speak their native languages, and grant them permission to produce their 
distinctive cultural forms, but only 'within our own ['white] culture.' However, if these 
Others engage in such cultural practices for their own purposes, many participants 
suggested that at best, this is not in the true spirit of multiculturalism, and at worst it is 
offensive to the wider Australian community (as in the case of language discussed above, 
or public religious practices, such as the veiling of Muslim women). When 'ethnic' 
Others engage in such practices for themselves, rather than for the consumption of 'white' 
Australians, 'whites' no longer control or 'allow' such activities, resulting in a threat to 
their presumed governing power. 
In sum, then, in interview and focus group discussions, participants explain 
Australian national identity partly in terms of national material and symbolic culture. 
Descriptions of Australian material culture, language and aesthetic products and 
producers, are both gendered and ethnicised, privileging the 'white' masculine over the 
'ethnic,' aboriginal or feminine. Such discourses, in other words, serve to legitimate and 
naturalise 'white,' masculine proprietorship over the national, particularly public, space. 
The environment 
Finally, in interview and focus group discussions of Australianness, references to the 
physical environment cross-cut all other dimensions of national identity. Participants' 
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comments suggest that notions of physical space, the physical environment, are an 
important part of the way people think about both individual and national identity. In the 
transcript data, the environment serves as an afective symbol of national belonging, as a 
force believed to shape social action, and as a marker of identity boundaries. In these 
later two, the distinction between the environment and ethnicity is blurred, as 'racial' 
Otherness and spatial Otherness intersect. 
In participants' naratives, the physical environment is gendered insomuch as 
certain spaces are delineated as masculine while others are seen to be feminine. It is the 
hot, dry spaces of the outback which emerge from participants' comments as the most 
powerful affective symbols of Australianness. As a farming couple remarked: 
Ruth: 	 When you think of Australia, you think of the outback and the 
farmers, the sheep farmers and the catle farmers. 
Dave: 	 Yeah, and when they say 'outback,' you think 'Oh yeah. This 
is real Australia. Out back.' 
These rural areas are strongly associated in participants' accounts with 'tradition,' 
with an authenticaly Australian way of life, and with masculinity. I have already 
examined such masculine national archetypes as the `swagman,' the 'man on the land' 
and Crocodile Dundee, al of whom are firmly located in the rural spaces of Australia. 
Participants suggested, however, that the connections between rurality and masculinity 
are not merely discursive; in the lives of participants, especialy female participants, rural 
Australian spaces are experienced as masculine spaces. 
Al of the teachers interviewed, and many public servants and farmers, discussed 
the links between rural isolation and male dominance, as manifested in domestic 
violence, women's exclusion from positions of power, sexism in the work place, and 
girls' limited educational and career opportunities. Sexual inequality was seen by most of 
these participants to be socialy backward, a sign that rural areas lag 'behind the times.' 
Starting from the metropole and moving outwards in space, therefore, is like moving 
backwards in time: backwards toward both valued social 'traditions,' such as close-knit 
families and cohesive communities, and toward the negatively evaluated practices of 
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racism and sexism. 101 As Lisa explained, it is the very isolation of her rural community 
which accounts for what she considers the retrograde attitudes of many of the people 
around her. 
The attitude [is] . . . 'We will go by our own traditions' . . . 'This is the 
way we do it'. . . And I think the actual physical barriers of the [Plains] 
sort of . . . I mean people didn't go out of [Plainsview] very much, because 
of those physical, the mountains, the barriers. . . . If they live down here, 
they don't go to town much. And so there is a kind of mental barrier that, 
'This is the way we do it here, and we are not going to worry about what 
people on the other side of the hill do. 
While the masculine rural spaces of Australia serve as potent affective symbols of 
national belonging, spaces associated with the feminine are seldom mentioned by 
participants in their discussions of national identity. That women are associated with 
domestic space is evident in the comments of both male and female participants, who 
suggest that child rearing and housework are largely women's responsibilities. As 
discussed above, participants suggest that this domestic role is common to women 
throughout the world; and because such feminine domestic spaces are, in a sense, 
universal, they do not serve as affective symbols of Australian national identity. 
In addition to serving as a symbol of national belonging, the environment is also 
used by participants to explain the Australian national character. Many participants 
expressed at least a vague sense that Australians have been shaped by their natural 
environment. In one fairly typical comment, Paula noted, '[Australians are] accepting 
and tolerant, fairly outgoing, physically outgoing. I think that's to do with the 
environment we are in. .. . We've had to make the most of the environment, the coastal 
environment and the inland and the desert and the pastoral. . . . That's all shaped who we 
are, as well.' Other participants provided more specific examples of the way Australian 
spaces have shaped the national character. As discussed earlier, Louise, an older farmer, 
suggested that because of Australia's harsh environment and vast spaces, Australians 
101 Such comments are undoubtedly coloured by Tasmania's geographic and 
economic marginality, as discussed later in this chapter. 
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(particularly Australian women) have become hard-working, inventive and community-
minded. 
Similarly, participants frequently used geography to explain, and even to some 
extent legitimate, 'white' Australian attitudes toward 'non-white' migrants. Participants 
including teachers, public servants, farmers and employees suggested that Australia's so-
called 'racism' is better understood as inexperience with, or ignorance of, other cultures, 
and that this lack of experience is a direct result of Australia's geographic isolation. As 
one male farmer explained, 'I think generally people are frightened of what they don't 
know. And Australia . . . being an island [with] very few people. . . when you get 
immigrants, and it doesn't matter if they are white, black or brindle, they stand out' 
[Henry]. 
In addition to using notions of space to explain aspects of the Australian national 
character, participants used sipace to talk about sub-national identities in Australia. Space 
thus serves as a marker of identity boundaries, and particularly as a marker of identity 
differences between city and country areas and between Tasmania and 'the mainland.' 
Participants in all social locations suggested that there are profound differences between 
the people, communities and overall cultures of urban and rural Australia. It is perhaps 
not surprising that among rural participants, urban ways of life are seen to be 'generic like 
airports' and somehow unauthentic, while rural ways of life are seen to be authentically 
Australian, with roots in the nation's primordial past. As Albert, an older farmer 
explained, 
There's two types of Australians. . . . There is more the city type, I 
suppose, and there is the country type. The city Australian, I think he 
probably wouldn't be that much different to anyone else around the world. 
. . . Well, cities tend to be fairly similar around the world, don't they... . 
Whereas in the country . . . things tend to remain, tend to remain much the 
same. So the differences there have been in the past are perpetuated, if 
anywhere, in the country. 
Urban spaces were even conceived by many rural participants to be akin to foreign 
lands, as the comments of these female business owners suggested: 
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Rebecca: 	 If you leave here and go to the mainland, just have a walk 
around Melbourne and it just-it honestly astounds me. 
Catherine: Wel if you fly into Sydney airport or Melbourne airport, you 
feel like you could have flown into Hong Kong or somewhere 
like- 
Rebecca: 	 Yes, but you come back to Tasmania and you don't--it's just-- 
you don't see it [the ethnic diversity]. 
Catherine: It's just Australia. 
Rebecca: 	 Yes, it's just Australia. 
The 'ethnic' spaces of Melbourne and Sydney, in other words, are perceived to be 
foreign, while the 'white' spaces of Tasmania are 'just Australia.' Such comments 
highlight the intersection of space and ethnicity, where ethnicity has the power to render 
domestic space foreign. Participants in al social locations associated the mainland, and 
particularly Sydney and Melbourne, with 'ethnics' (especialy Asian migrants) and, to 
some extent aboriginal Australians. A high school girl noted, for example, that in 
Melbourne, 'You find it hard to see an English person; everyone is Asian' [Ann]. A 
female farmer suggested that when she goes to Melbourne it is a chalenge to play 'Spot 
the Aussie' on the street [Amanda]. In other words, she has trouble finding any real 
('white') Australians. Likewise, a male farmer noted his surprise at finding so few 
farmers with 'English-sounding names' in his travels through northern Victoria, western 
New South Wales and northern Queensland [Bil]. 
Participants associated the foreignness of such 'ethnic' spaces with a sense of 
uneasiness or even danger. Meg, a high school student, noted that when she hears Asians 
speaking their native languages in public, it makes her feel, 'out of place.' In other 
words, when language and ethnicity transform her (' white') Australian social space into 
an Asian, or a foreign, space, she experiences a sense of socio-spatial dislocation. 
Similarly, Ted, a public servant, described the potential dangers of Cabramata 
Vietnamata'), in the folowing way: 
I mean, it's like the Vietnamata type of Scenario in Sydney where there is 
seen to be such big crime, a source of crime. Because here are al these 
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Vietnamese people, and they are obviously getting up to something 
together. And there's drugs and there are all sorts of things. And the 
perception for the rest of the community is that there are a lot of things 
going on in there that we don't know about. And that it is an obvious nest 
of vipers, or something like that [laughing]. 
Such ethnic typifications are often branded 'racist' however this is overly 
simplistic and of little use analytically. If categories of 'race' alone inform Ted's fear of 
this Vietnamese suburb, why then does he express admiration for a young Vietnamese-
Australian gymnast? The answer lies in the intersecting notions of space and 'race,' 
specifically in the distribution of 'racial' Others in an imagined 'white' space. The notion 
of 'white' proprietorship of the nation rests, in part, on discursive constructions of the 
nation as a 'white' space. When this illusion of 'whiteness' is disrupted by the presence of 
concentrations of 'non-whites,' these ethnic Others are perceived as a threat to 'white' 
proprietorship. They are then marginalised, not solely for their perceived 'race' but also 
for their distribution within the imagined 'white' space. 102 It is possible, therefore, for 
Ted to praise the achievements of a single Vietnamese-Australian, and even include her 
within his vision of Australianness, and yet to characterise Vietnamese-Australian 
neighbourhoods as dangerous, mysterious and un-Australian. 
Likewise, a number of participants expressed concern for a gradual loss of their 
('white') control over Australian spaces. Describing the situation in Sydney, Leanne, for 
instance, noted, 'It's not just the Asian people. My sister is now finding it with Greeks 
and those sort of people. Muslims are really--the Moslem people are just getting really 
out of hand up there.' Such comments suggest a perceived loss of ('white') control over 
ethnic Others; for 'out of hand' equates to out of ('white') control. 
These remarks form a neat contrast to participants' descriptions of a 
predominantly 'white' Tasmania, where 'non-white' migrants are more dispersed, and 
thus perceived to be less threatening, as this discussion with a group of male public 
servants suggests: 
102 This is consistent with Hage's (1998: 37-38) observations on 'categories of 






s 	 Wiliam: 
Ted: 
I think. . . probably down here, when I think about it.. 
there is probably more respect for some of the foreign 
people than there are for the locals. 
That's right. Maybe some of the ethnic community aren't 
criticised so much, because there are so few of them. 
Maybe. But I mean it is also, like [Mike] at the shop next 
door, his [Pakistani] wife, you know, you never hear anyone 
say a bad word about her. And they're sort of in the shop, 
you know, seven days a week. 
Like, Tasmania is generaly regarded as a very Anglo-Saxon 
community. But there was a large wave of ethnic migration 
for the Hydro.I03 
So, how are they treated by the community, migrants who 
have setled here? Are they a part of the community? 
Wel, I think in this area, they are accepted exceptionaly 
wel. 
I don't think the community regards them as anything 
diferent from the rest of the community. . . . It's probably 
different in the bigger cities, where you've got more 
enclaves, more sort of groupings. Particularly the ethnic 
communities, where it stands out. In a rural community like 
this, there is just somebody there, and somebody there. We 
are almost just a milieu of diferent origins. 
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Interviewer: Do you think in big cities, or on the mainland . . . would you 
think there would be more tolerance or less tolerance in a 
place like that? For migrants. Toward migrants. 
Ted: 	 I would say there would be less tolerance, because they 
would be seen as more of a threat. 
What is apparent in this exchange is that in spaces such as Tasmania which are 
stil imagined to be predominantly 'white,' race' is not perceived to be problematic. 
Participants suggested that it is only when ethnic Others cluster together in 'enclaves,' 
such as those thought to be found in Australia's urban centres, that they become a threat, 
implicitly a threat to 'white' control. What isn't clear from this exchange, however, is 
whether 'race' is actualy as unproblematic in this rural community as participants 
103 Migrant labourers were recruited during the construction of Tasmanian hydro-
electric facilities. 
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suggest. For, while Wiliam suggested that a local Pakistani woman must be accepted in 
the community because no one denigrates her, it is doubtful whether such an argument 
would be offered as proof that a 'white' member of the community was accepted. Such 
comments may reveal an underlying expectation that 'non-white' migrants wil naturaly 
be denigrated; when they are not, this signals their acceptance into the community. 
Even while participants suggested that 'ethnic' urban environments are dangerous, 
generic and not authenticaly Australian, they acknowledged that such urban areas are at 
the economic and cultural centre of Australian society, while Tasmania and other rural 
areas are on the periphery. As one high school boy remarked, 'I suppose Tasmanian 
people are a lot like [people in] regional New South Wales, because they are very isolated 
from civilisation, and so are we, in a way' [Colin]. Likewise, participants including 
public servants and farmers, discussed the perception that in order to be successful, one 
must be able to 'make it' on the mainland, as these public servants suggested: 
Cam: 	 I see a lot of people, as far as children growing up, and they go 
to the mainland, [and they say] 'Good on ya'!' Pat on the 
back. 'Go for it!' You know? And I notice that a lot from 
here, which is realy sad. Because there's just so many young 
people that do go. . . and people see it, from here, as 'making 
it on the mainland.' 
Audrey: 	 Yeah. 
Cam: 	 Make it in Sydney, make it in Melbourne, you've made it. 
And that's realy sad. 
Audrey: 	 Yeah, people see opportunities being outside Tasmania. 
Likewise, other participants suggested that Tasmania is 'backward,' second-rate,' 
'the armpit of the universe,' a space so marginal that it is occasionaly left off national 
maps. Public servants, business owners, employees, farmers and retired people al 
expressed anger and indignation at Tasmania's frequent omission from Australian maps. 
'Where are we? We don't exist?' Cam asked, then answered her own question, 'And we 
don't!' This symbolic obliteration of Tasmania only highlights its marginality. 
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While participants suggested that Tasmania's spatial location accounts, in part, for 
its marginal status within the nation, they also drew on notions of space to reclaim power 
from core urban locations. As noted above, participants often weaved together discourses 
of 'racial' Otherness and discourses of spatial Otherness, by defining mainland urban 
spaces as 'ethnic' and thus not genuinely Australian. In so doing, participants inverted 
notions of core and periphery: Tasmania becomes the Real, the embodiment of 
primordial ('white') Australianness, while mainland urban centres are refigured as mere 
corruptions of the original. Tasmania's marginality, in other words, is moderated through 
the intersecting discourses of space and 'race' which characterise the ideology of 'white' 
proprietorship. 
Discourses of National Identity: Sustaining and Challenging Social Hierarchies 
Thus far in this chapter, I have discussed five dimensions of Australian national identity, 
each of which is crosscut by notions of gender and ethnicity. My concern here, however, 
is not to determine whether such images are somehow correct or accurate representations 
of the nation, but rather to examine their effects. In order to understand the symbolic and 
material implications of such gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity, it is 
important to explicitly discuss how these discourses reflect and reinforce hierarchies of 
gender and ethnicity in Australia. It is equally important, however, to examine the ways 
participants actively challenge such discourses and the hierarchies of power which sustain 
and are sustained by them. 
It is clear from the transcript data that gendered discourses of national identity 
reflect many participants' own experiences of gender inequality in Australia. The 
dominance of masculine imagery in discourses of national identity—the dominance of 
male archetypes, of implicitly male values such as `mateship,' of male labour and leisure 
pursuits, of male artists, and masculine physical spaces—mirrors the everyday 
experiences of male dominance recounted by participants. The nature of these accounts 
vary, however, with the social locations (the age, gender and occupation) of participants. 
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As an occupational group, the teachers interviewed discussed gender inequality 
most explicitly. The male teachers interviewed expressed both an intellectual awareness 
of the impact of male dominance on the lives of their female students, and a desire for 
change. As Phillip noted, 'It's been one of the main goals that we've had as teachers at 
the school . . . to set a different agenda, because there's so much waste of talent of 
women and girls in [Plainsview]. They've just been held back.' The female teachers 
interviewed, however, demonstrated both an intellectual and an experiential 
understanding of issues of gender inequality. Lisa, for instance, explained how male 
dominance generally impedes the career prospects of women, and she specifically 
recounted how it has negatively impacted on her own career. Similarly, Paula expressed 
an intellectual understanding of principles of gender inequality in the home, but she also 
confessed that she still does most of the housework, fearing that if she does not, people 
will think she is 'not very good.' 
No clear patterns in experiences and understandings of male dominance emerge 
among the other occupational groups represented in the sample; however, there are clear 
trends by the age and gender of participants. Overall, the youngest participants (high 
school students) and the oldest participants (retirees) spoke very rarely of gender relations 
in Australia. Amongst this subset of participants, there was little discussion of male 
dominance in Australia, nor of the gendered nature of the most common archetypes of 
Australianness.f°4 That issues of gender inequality seem to lack salience among these 
participants may be the result of a more pressing source of inequality in their lives, age. 
In other words, youth and the elderly, who are already marginalised in Australian society 
and who are not yet, or no longer, participating in paid labour, may not perceive gender 
inequality to have a significant impact on their lives. 
In contrast to youth and the elderly, participants of working age referred to both 
patriarchal social relations in Australia, and to the gendered nature of Australian national 
104 However, one retired woman, Eloise, did recount an incident in which one of her 
female co-workers petitioned for women to receive equal pay. Eloise considered the 
woman to be a 'pretty silly bunny' who used profanity to 'show off' in front of the 
men in their work place. The woman was eventually fired, which Eloise considered a 
just outcome. 
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archetypes. While it is perhaps impossible to determine whether the greater salience of 
gender inequality is due to age, engagement in paid labour, or other factors, it is possible 
to observe that within this subset of participants, men and women demonstrated different 
experiences and understandings of gender inequality. While female business owners, 
female public servants, and female farmers explicitly criticised Australian gender 
inequality, male business owners, male public servants and male farmers either treated 
gender inequality as an unproblematic feature of Australian social life, or, in fact, actively 
engaged in patriarchal discourses and practices. Among one focus group of men, for 
example, the discussion of national identity was peppered with sexually explicit jokes, 
and with references to sexual conquests; and as these same participants discussed the fact 
that Australian men do very little housework, one man added, 'I'm not married yet. I 
haven't found one that's going to cook my tea.' The dominance of the masculine in 
discourses of national identity is inextricably linked to the masculine dominance 
experienced by both male and female participants in their everyday lives. 
Gendered discourses of national identity reinforce gender inequality in Australia 
primarily by legitimating the primacy of the masculine. While it would be naive to 
suggest that all individuals understand these widely circulating discourses of national 
identity in the same way, it is clear that the overwhelmingly masculine images of 
Australianness described in this and the previous chapter exclude women from, or at least 
marginalise them within, the narrative of nation. If the widely employed image of a 'real' 
Australian is a beer-drinking, sport-loving male farmer in the outback, how does the 
suburban housewife or the inner-city small business woman read herself into this 
narrative? As I have already suggested, some women appear to use such gendered 
discourses of nation to make sense of their own marginality within the nation. As noted 
earlier, if a woman accepts the notion that 'all Australians love sport' (and a number of 
female participants indeed make such statements), but she herself dislikes sport, she has a 
ready explanation for her marginality within the nation: her own failure to conform to the 
likes and dislikes, the values and practices of 'real' Australians. In this way, the relatively 
subtle gendering of discourses of national identity are ideologically much more powerful 
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than more blatant images of exclusion would be; for while exclusion or discrimination 
based on ascribed characteristics (such as gender and ethnicity) might be resisted in a 
climate of heightened awareness of universal equality and human rights, discrimination 
based on personal failings is likely to be seen as acceptable and consistent with the spirit 
of meritocracy. 
The gendered discourse of Australian 'egalitarianism' likewise reinforces the 
legitimacy of current gender hierarchies. For, as argued earlier, if everyone agrees that 
Australia is egalitarian, then the implication is that those in power have earned their 
privileged positions by competing on a even playing field, and those who lack social 
power are marginalised because they have failed to successfully compete. Women's 
marginality, again, can be easily attributed not to systematic, structured inequality, but to 
the personal failings of the individual. 
Just as gendered discourses of national identity reflect and reinforce gender 
hierarchies in Australia, so ethnicised discourses of national identity reflect and reinforce 
inequalities based on ethnicity. Using the same logic as above, if discourses of national 
identity suggest that the 'real' Australian is a 'white' English-speaking Australian, then 
those who are not 'white' and who do not speak English (or eat meat pies or play 
Australian Rules football), may define themselves and be defined by others as not fully 
Australian. Again, the discourse of egalitarianism reinforces the notion that those 
'ethnics' who are marginalised are not marginalised by virtue of their ethnicity, but rather 
because they have failed to adopt the values and practices of 'real' Australians, and to 
successfully compete with 'real' Australians on an even playing field. This notion clearly 
informs Georgia's view, quoted earlier, that it is not the colour of migrants' skin that 
provokes 'racism,' but rather the way they violate the principle of 'a fair go' by claiming 
special privileges from the state. 
Contestations 
Even while widely circulating discourses of national identity serve to legitimate and thus 
sustain current social hierarchies in which 'white' is privileged over 'non-white' and male 
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over female, participants also construct discourses of national identity which challenge 
these very hierarchies. While some of these contestations have already emerged from the 
discussion here, it is worth examining in greater detail the more elaborated counter-
narratives of nation which certain participants construct. These narratives should not be 
seen simply as fissures in the otherwise smooth surface of consensus, however, for they 
are a key component in the dialogic process of negotiating national identities. 
In the interview and focus group data, I have found both generalised contestations 
made by a large number of participants in a wide range of social locations, and more 
detailed, more reflexive, contestations raised by a small number of individuals in certain 
specific social locations. As a rule, participants voiced generalised contestations after 
first constructing narratives of nation that centre largely on the popular archetypes, values 
and practices described in this chapter. Almost as an afterthought, or an attempt to 
distance themselves from the narratives they helped construct, a large number of 
participants added such comments as: 
[But] you can't say that we have just one Australian way [Meg, a high 
school student]; 
But I don't think a lot of people are really like that [Lisa, a teacher]; 
[But] that's a myth. . . stereotypical type images [Roger, a teacher]; 
That's what everybody portrays as being Australian [Ted, a public 
servant]; 
That is an American's view of Australia [Rebecca, a business owner]; 
But this is surely the image that is being portrayed to us and of us on our 
TVs and films. . . . I believe it's a distorted impression [Charles, a 
business owner]; 
I don't think we can sort of say 'Australian national identity'. . . because it 
is so parochial [Henry, a farmer]. 
Although many participants raised such objections, they less often offered 
concrete alternatives to the cliched images around which they had structured their 
discourses of national identity. In fact, when Rebecca, quoted above, suggested that such 
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common stereotypes represent 'an American's view of Australia,' Georgia, one of her 
colleagues, responded, 'But even if that's right, that is the most Australian [you can get].' 
Clichés, in other words, were seen as the most appropriate way to talk about national 
identity. 
Georgia's statement says something about the discursive nature of national 
identity, and highlights the importance of analysing not only discursive products, but also 
discursive processes. National identities are discourses, collections of signs. Since the 
meaning of signs (words, pictures, and so on) are arbitrary, in order to engage in 
discourse, individuals must already have at least a working agreement about what such 
signs mean. Therefore, when people are asked to discuss national identity, they primarily 
draw on the cache of already agreed-upon signs which have constituted such discourses in 
the past. The generally high degree of consensus about national identity described in this 
chapter is therefore accounted for by the shared nature of the sign system from which 
discourses of national identity are constructed. In other words, hegemonic discourses of 
national identity establish the terms of reference for negotiations of national identity, the 
tropes marking agreement over what to disagree about. Counter-narratives, whether 
generalised or detailed, are possible because hegemony is never perfect or complete. 
It is worth reiterating that participants' use of widely circulating discourses of 
national identity may also represent the framing of their experiences in the language and 
imagery of authorised discourses of national identity, for the consumption of a foreign 
researcher. This highlights, again, the embodied nature of the research process. The data 
I derived from interviews and focus groups is undoubtedly shaped by participants' 
perceptions of me and my research agenda. 
In addition to the kinds of generalised contestations described above, some 
participants offered more detailed and more reflexive objections to dominant discourses 
of national identity. Three participants, in particular, formulated such contestations: 
Audrey and Dominic, both public servants; and Edward, a business owner. Because their 
arguments are both subtle and, in places, shifting, it is worthwhile quoting from them at 
some length. 
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That myth of the Australian outback . . . [has] been hyped to be that way 
. . . [but] the reality is not necessarily the perception. Like 'multicultural,' 
'Aussie battler,' mateship,' that type of thing is what Australians tend to 
perceive their national image as, whereas that's not necessarily the reality 
with the national image. . . . But that's what we want to portray, or we are 
portrayed as. . . . There's a national image, but I don't think that it's true 
for most people. . . . It's more of a media image than it is a true image. . . . 
[Maybe] the image we portray with that mateship and battling and stuff 
like that is because we're disconnected with the image of Britain. . . . Like 
none of us really identify with the British type of image.. . . And it's 
probably because we're all convicts [Audrey, 26 year old public servant]. 
The stereotypical Australian culture, I think, has never existed. . . . I 
haven't seen it. . . . [There's] the blokey, blokey Australian type. . . [and] 
the old bronzed-Aussie-on-the-beach sort of thing . . . [but] I have never 
seen much of that. You know, you see one or two people, but . . . [that's 
just] something that Australia has marketed as culture. . . . So I don't 
know. Maybe we're going through withdrawal symptoms of the myth that 
we created. . . . And it's like, I don't know, what are we really?. . . To me, 
it's different things to different people [Dominic, 36 year old public 
servant]. 
Another thing that I think must be said about Australians is that 
egalitarianism, or the idea of egalitarianism as an Australian trait is fairly 
silly, I think. Because Australians have a history of the boss and the 
worker. . . . And I think it is a great mistake to see Australia as an 
egalitarian society, because it's definitely not, and it's probably getting 
worse now. . . . And mugs like us with small businesses . . . are getting hit. 
So, yes, we see ourselves as the battlers, I think. Which is a true Aussie 
battler. . . . We've been through a school system that, like all school 
systems, really tends to censor what we take in.. . . So we have been fed 
with Lawson, you know, the great Australian poets, the great Australian 
writers. And they really wrote on the Australian sort of theme of the 
'battler' and 'out the bush,' and beating great odds and droughts, etcetera, 
etcetera. So, you know, most of our traditions and our mythologies in this 
country are based on the country, are based on the outback. . . . I think that 
our Australian image is warped, in a way. It's untrue. Because 
Australians. . . are city people more than any body else in the world, just 
about. They've got Sydney, Melbourne, all the population is there. But 
we have got this image of ourselves outback. . . . We have that love of the 
outback. I think all Australians love the outback [Edward, 55 year old 
businessman]. 
There are distinct differences between these three participants' narratives. Audrey 
and Dominic, for example, stressed the collective construction of national identity (it is 
'what we want to portray' or 'the myth we created'), while Edward suggested that it has 
been imposed from above (it is something 'we have been fed'). In fact, whether 
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consciously or not, Edward exemplified his own argument by self-identifying as a small-
businessman 'battler,' a strong theme in the authorised discourses of nation constructed 
by the Howard government. However, all of these narratives can be read as attempts to 
critique specific aspects of widely circulating discourses of Australian national identity, 
and to locate such discourses within a larger social or historical context, something which 
other participants did not explicitly do. 
In seeking an explanation for the more complex contestations of these particular 
individuals, I examine their social locations. By conventional sociological measures, no 
strong commonalities emerge. The three participants are all of working age, but only two 
share the same occupation; only one of the three attended university, while the other two 
completed secondary schooling; two are Australian-born, while one is a migrant; and two 
are male and one is female. It is more productive, therefore, to broaden the way social 
location is conceptualised, to consider another key variable, marginality. 
All of these individuals are positioned, to some degree, on the margins of their 
community. All three, for instance, moved to Plainsview within the last ten years, and all 
three suggested that newcomers to the area are not readily accepted by the established 
community. Furthermore, it is suggestive that of these participants, Audrey is a woman, 
Dominic is a migrant, and Edward is a man with what might be perceived as extremist 
religious and political views. In fact, Edward's marginality was particularly noticeable in 
the way he was physically isolated during a focus group discussion; he sat on one side of 
the table, while all of his colleagues sat on the opposite side. While these three 
individuals represent only a small subset of all the Australian participants, and while 
some individuals seem generally more reflexive than others, one conclusion is that those 
who are marginalised within widely circulating discourses of national identity by virtue of 
their sex, ethnicity or political and religious affiliations, are more likely to strongly 
contest such discourses. 
Interestingly, even while these three participants contested widely circulating 
discourses of national identity, they also continued to draw on them in their narratives of 
nation: Audrey evoked the nation's convict heritage; Dominic later suggested that the 
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`cockies' are the 'essence' of Australianness; and, even while debunking the 
'mythologies' of 'the battler' and 'the outback,' Edward claimed to be 'a true Aussie 
battler' who, along with all Australians, loves the outback. This is not to suggest that 
widely circulating discourses of national identity are inescapable or unassailable, or that 
they are imposed on the masses in a top-down fashion. Instead, this reveals two key 
characteristics of discourses of national identity: they consist of imbricated authorised, 
folk and mass mediated narratives of nation; and they are negotiated and processual, and 
therefore inherently unstable and contradictory. Thus counter-narratives of nation are not 
merely transitory and ineffective contestations; they have the potential to redirect the 
process of discursive negotiation, and therefore to alter the product of that negotiation, 
widely circulating discourses of national identity. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have argued that discourses of Australian national identity are 
constructed, in part, through folk discourses of nation, discourses which can be ordered 
according to five key themes: national archetypes and the national character; social 
relations and social ethics; everyday practice; material and symbolic culture; and the 
environment. Like authorised and mass mediated discourses of national identity, these 
folk discourses of Australian national identity are frequently gendered and ethnicised in 
ways that reflect and reproduce both patriarchal ideology and the ideology of 'white' 
proprietorship of the nation. Many research participants constructed the imagined 
community in ways that served to naturalise their own social position. Widely circulating 
'white' masculine discourses of national identity were used to explain or even legitimate 
both 'white' male privilege and the symbolic and material marginalisation of women and 
ethnic minorities in Australia. 
However, evidence presented here suggests that discourses of Australian national 
identity are malleable; they are constantly in-flux and are employed in complex ways by 
Australians as they make sense of their own locations within the national imagined 
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community and construct accounts of Australianness for the consumption of a foreign 
scholar. Those in marginalised groups, in particular, actively contest widely circulating 
discourses of national identity, and, in some cases construct more inclusive counter-
narratives of nation. 
The data presented in this chapter suggest a high degree of overlap between folk, 
mass mediated and authorised discourses of national identity. The same activities, 
archetypes, settings and ethics that feature in the state and academic texts and television 
advertisements analysed in earlier chapters, surface in folk discussions of national 
identity. However, this imbrication was frequently problematised by participants 
themselves. Many participants demonstrated an awareness of the ways mass mediated, 
political and academic discourses interact with folk discourses of national identity. They 
categorised widely circulating discourses of national identity as 'clichés' or 'myths,' and 
set them against their lived experiences to generate new pastiches and new juxtapositions 
relative to discourses of `Australianness.' 
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CHAPTER SIX 
FOLK DISCOURSES OF JAPANESE NATIONAL IDENTITY 
In the previous chapter, I examined gendered and ethnicised folk constructions of 
Australian national identity. In this chapter, I examine the ways national identity is 
constructed in Japanese participants' narratives of nation, first focusing on gendered 
discourses of nation and then on ethnicised constructions of Japaneseness. 105 As in the 
preceding chapter, my goal is not to determine whether such narratives are somehow 
'accurate' or not, but rather to examine both the ways participants accept, reject and 
refigure such discourses in the process of making sense of their social worlds, and the 
ways such discourses reflect, reinforce and challenge the subordination of women and 
ethnic minorities in Japan. 
Gendered Discourses of Japanese National Identity 
National archetypes and the national character 
While the Australian transcript data yielded a wealth of predominantly 'white' male 
national archetypes, in Japanese focus groups and interviews, participants drew on 
relatively few national archetypes to talk about national identity; and, furthermore, these 
archetypes reveal a complex relationship between gender and discourses of nation in _ 
Japan. 
The only four national archetypes Japanese participants consistently drew on were 
the samurai, the `salaryman' (a salaried male company worker), the implicitly male 
'traditional' artisan, and the kimono-clad woman. 1 °6 For instance, Ms. Doi, a high 
105 The discussion of ethnicised discourses of Japanese national identity is made more 
difficult by the conceptual slippage between the Japanese terms for 'race' and 
'ethnicity,' explained in greater detail below. Due to these complexities, I address 
gendered discourses and ethnicised discourses in separate sections of this chapter. 
106 Images of such archetypes appear in the selection of television advertisements 
shown to Japanese focus groups, which may go some way toward explaining why they 
appear so consistently throughout focus group transcripts. Individual interviewees 
who did not see the advertisements rarely drew on such archetypes in their discussions 
of Japaneseness. 
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school student, associated Japaneseness with the samurai because, 'The samurai is 
unique to Japan;' or as Mr. Ando, a business owner, put it, 'The samurai is at the top of 
Japanese culture.' Young male farmers and male business owners, on the other hand, 
suggested that Japan is a `salaryman society' (sarariman shakai), while a group of male 
teachers discussed 'the typical Japanese salaryman.' Meanwhile, Mr. Fujita, a high 
school student, associated the 'traditional' artisan with Japaneseness because 'He keeps 
the traditional crafts alive. . . the crafts passed down through the generations.' Perhaps 
because one advertisement shown to focus groups featured a male craftsman sharpening a 
knife, many participants also associated the male artisan archetype with sword-making 
and thus with the samurai. 
Finally, participants in all social locations noted the centrality of the kimono as a 
symbol of Japaneseness; as one teacher remarked, 'Japanese people love kimono. . . even 
though we don't wear kimono in everyday life' [Mr. Takahashi]. In contemporary Japan, 
while men very occasionally wear kimono, it is predominantly women who are associated 
with this distinctive garment and with the 'traditional' Japaneseness it represents. In 
pointing out the difficulties of describing Japanese national identity, Mr. Ando, a business 
owner, described a fantasy of Japaneseness in which 'tradition,' the kimono and 
subordinate femininity are bound together in the narrative of nation. 
It depends on how you judge `Japaneseness.' . . . There is an ideal form of 
'Japan,' or what we want Japan to be like. But there were traditions in the 
olden days that we have never experienced. . . . [For example,] Japanese 
men wish women to be neatly dressed, to bow respectfully, to wear 
kimono, and to wait for us at home. And we want things made by good 
craftsmen so they'll last for many generations. . . . [But] the question is 
whether we should judge these as `Japaneseness' or whether we should 
compare them with our present lifestyle. It makes a big difference. 
Such comments suggest that the 'ideal' imagined community is not only embodied in the 
gendered archetypes of the kimono-clad woman and the male artisan, but is also reflected 
in long-standing patriarchal social relations. However, Mr. Ando also highlighted the 
tensions between fantasy and reality, between discourses of nation and everyday practices. 
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Other participants also pointed out the cliched nature of discourses of national 
identity in Japan. Discussing an advertisement which featured a samurai, a teacher 
remarked, 'If American people made commercials with Japanese images, it would be like 
that' [Mr. Sato]. Likewise, male employees suggested that this advertisement was 'like a 
foreign film;' and Mr. Hosokawa, a young farmer, suggested that the samurai character 
seemed like 'a foreigner's image of a Japanese person.' A group of teachers similarly 
discussed such hackneyed images of Japaneseness, and concluded that, paradoxicaly, it is 
because such images are exotic even to Japanese people that they come to be seen as 
authenticaly Japanese. 
Ms. Wada: 	 If you look at ads. . . with kimono and chery blossoms, 
and so on, foreigners would think they were Japanesey 
[Nihon-ppoi], but Japanese people in general don't realy 
think that. 
Ms. Matsumoto: Like that knife ad, the 'craftsmanship' and the 'spirit.' 
Whose Japan is that? 
Ms. Wada: 	 [And the noodle ad with the samurai] is like a Kurosawa 
film, like Yojimbo. . . . I suppose they made this ad . . . 
because they think there are a lot of people in Japan who 
like Kurosawa films. But they may be wrong. 
Ms. Hayashi: 	 But the strangest one was the [knife] ad. . . . That's a 
world even Japanese people don't know. 
Ms. Matsumoto: Because we're not used to that [traditional Japanese 
culture], we think it's Japanesey. 
Ms. Wada furthermore suggested that such 'nostalgic' images of Japaneseness 
have become more common recently. She explained, 'These are realy tough times, so 
they [the advertisers ] try to make us feel somehow at ease' (hotosaseru tokoro wo 
nerateiru) through their use of such images. Similarly, a young male farmer remarked, 
If you say 'Japan' people think of traditional things such as kimono or 
samurai. . [When we see these kinds of images] we feel at ease (anshin 
suru), even though we are not dressed in kimono or wearing a sword with 
a chonmage hairstyle. When we see tatami, we feel at ease. . . . We feel 
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deeply relaxed, we feel at ease watching those images. When we see 
them, we feel 'This is Japan. This is where we are' [Mr. Hosokawa]. 107 
These participants suggested, in other words, that cliched images of 'traditional' Japan 
are comforting to Japanese people in these 'really tough times' (sugoku kibishiijidai). 
Both masculine and feminine national archetypes seem to assuage the anxieties of 
participants, and make them feel 'at ease.' 
Not only national archetypes are gendered both in the masculine and the 
feminine, however; discussions of the national character reveal both male and female 
imagery. Participants described a number of national character traits which apply equally 
to men and women. According to participants, Japanese people 'don't have much 
personality/individuality' (kosei) [high school girls]; they 'want to do the same thing 
everyone else does' [high school boys]; they are 'easily fooled' [female teachers] and 
'easily influenced' [male teachers]; they 'tend to act as a group' [female teachers] or 'do 
things in a group' [female public servants]; they 'don't express how they really feel' 
[male public servants] and they 'don't speak out' [female employees]. At least two 
commonly cited national characteristics, however, are implicitly gendered, hard work and 
patience/endurance (gaman). 
Among the participants interviewed, 'hard work' and working 'too hard' were 
strongly associated with the working world of the salaryman. Participants in a wide range 
of social locations evoked the image of the overworked (male) company employee in 
their narratives of nation. Participants suggested that such hard work is a national virtue, 
one of the characteristics which facilitated Japan's rapid economic development; 
however, participants were also critical of the national propensity to work 'too hard,' to 
the detriment of family and community. Ms. Higuchi, a woman who runs a small family 
business with her mother-in-law, noted, 
In Japan . . . it's good if you work hard.. . . I think this, and my husband 
thinks the same, that it's good for men to work. But they don't have much 
107 Chonmage is a top-knot hairstyle formerly worn by samurai, among others; and 
tatami is Japanese grass mat flooring. 
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time when they come home, time to see their children and to spend in their 
home life. . . . There are a lot of kids who don't know where their fathers 
are. It's 'What does Dad do? Where does Dad go?' That kind of thing. 
They can't talk to their fathers much. So these are lonely/dreary times 
(sabishii jidai), when children's hearts aren't nurtured. 
Ms. Higuchi suggested that this national (male) propensity toward overwork may 
account, in part, for the rise in school violence, the rise in violence committed by children 
against family members, and the decline in public morals more generally. Curiously, 
however, although Ms. Higuchi revealed that she has devoted approximately nine hours a 
day for the last twenty years to the family business, as well as maintaining a sizeable field 
of vegetables for family consumption and working as a day labourer on her brother's 
farm, she insisted that she has 'never worked.' It is possible her claim to have never 
worked reflects a desire to be, or to be perceived as, an affluent stay-at-home wife who • 
enjoys the so-called san-shoku-hirune-tsuki' (the 'three meals a day and an afternoon 
nap' lifestyle). Such a claim might also be seen as a strategy to distance herself from the 
kind of overwork she associates with social decline. However, what Ms. Higuchi's 
narrative clearly reveals is that while men's labour is understood as the 'work,' hard 
work' or even 'overwork' central to notions of Japanese national identity, women's 
labour, whether income-generating or not, is largely excluded from images of national 
working life. 
It is primarily women, however, who are associated with another national 
characteristic noted by participants, patience or endurance (gaman). Ms. Sasaki, a 
prominent young business owner, suggested early in our conversation that, 'It is a 
Japanese trait that people just endure, not saying what they really want to say.' While the 
gendering of this national trait is not clear from this statement, later in our discussion she 
remarked, 'I think men, in general, have decision-making ability; they can make 
responsible decisions faster. On the other hand women, in general, don't have this ability, 
but they can endure (gaman suru koto) difficult things better instead. So society is 
structured so that men have the decision-making role and women endure difficult things 
continuously.' Such comments suggest that the perceived national trait of endurance or 
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patience is, at least implicitly, gendered in the feminine. It seems to be associated, in 
particular, with the image of the long-suffering Japanese wife and mother, pervasive in 
mass mediated texts, perhaps most famously in the popular television series Oshin. 108 
Participants note that the female embodiment of this national trait is a source of pride for 
many women. As Ms. Sasaki explained, women who can endure are 'secretly very proud 
of themselves.' However, women's apparent pride in their ability to endure should not 
obscure the effects of such discourses. Discourses of women's endurance serve to 
naturalise the patriarchal social relations Ms. Sasaki described and seemingly accepted. 
So even as female participants used the notion of endurance to claim a place for 
themselves in visions of national identity, their vision reflected a social order that places 
them in a subordinate position. In this way, such claims both mirror and challenge widely 
circulating discourses of national identity that construct women as passive and men as 
active in the national imagined community. 
Women are not rendered invisible in participants' discussions of national 
archetypes and the national character, as is the case with such discussions in Australia. 
Rather, Japanese participants called on both masculine and feminine archetypes and 
character traits in their discussions of Japaneseness; the gendering of national identity was 
context dependent. Feminine imagery, including the kimono and endurance or patience, 
were most often evoked when participants discussed Japanese 'traditions.' Masculine 
images such as the salaryman, the artisan, hard work and overwork, surfaced most often 
when participants discussed Japanese industry (including craftsmanship) and economic 
development. The masculine archetype of the samurai occupied a temporally anomalous 
position in discourses of national identity. Participants associated the samurai with 
sword-making, and, implicitly, with Japanese industry, a source of pride in discussions of 
contemporary Japan; however, the samurai is also firmly located in the past. Participants 
did not explicitly link the samurai with Japan's martial history; and the fact that he was 
108 Oshin was a 1983 NHK mini-drama series that set records for viewership in Japan. 
The title character was a poor farm girl who was sold into servitude and endured a life 
of hardship and cruelty; however, she persevered and eventually became a successful 
business owner. The mini-drama (with daily 15-minute episodes) was eventually 
telecast to more than 50 countries worldwide. 
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often treated as a figure of fun may suggest that participants wished to distance 
themselves from Japan's military past. 
It may also be a reflection of the politics of cross-national research. Participants' 
comments were undoubtedly shaped by their perceptions of me as a foreign researcher, 
specifically as a citizen of two countries with whom their nation fought in World War II. 
That participants did not express pride in the samurai as a martial figure does not 
necessarily mean they did not feel such pride. Rather, their silences may indicate an 
awareness of the political sensitivity of such issues in Japan's international relations. 109 
Social relations and social ethics 
Participants' discussions of Japanese national identity also centred on the kinds of social 
relations and social ethics thought to characterise the national community. Most of these 
modes of social organisation and the principles which underpin them were not explicitly 
gendered in participants' narratives. Participants suggested, for example, that Japanese 
society is characterised by a disparity between honne and tatemae (true feelings and 
professed feelings), a tension between omote and ura (the surface/appearance and the 
inside/reality), and an emphasis on haji (shame), all of which apply equally to both men 
and women. The original Japanese terminology is significant here, for all of these 
expressions are set phrases, bordering on clichés, appearing in classic Japanese social 
scientific texts such as Doi Takeo's (1971) Amai no koozoo (The Anatomy of 
Dependence), Ruth Benedict's (1946) The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (widely read in 
translation in Japan), and Nakane Chie's (1967) Tate shakai no ningen kankei (Human 
Relations in Vertical Society). Participants' frequent use of these terms suggests that 
such authorised discourses of Japaneseness to some extent provide terms of reference for 
folk discourses of national identity. 
109 The continuing sensitivity about the events of World War II was highlighted in 
August, 2001 when Prime Minister Koizumi visited Yasukuni Shrine, a shrine 
commemorating Japan's war dead, including 14 executed war criminals. The visit 
attracted harsh criticism from the governments of China, and North and South Korea, 
as well as from Chinese and Korean residents in Japan. 
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Folk discourses of Japanese national identity are at least implicitly gendered. • 
With the exception of high school students, male and female participants in all social 
locations suggested that Japanese society is strongly characterised by patriarchal social 
relations, both in the domestic and public arenas. An awareness of male dominance was 
revealed by participants as they suggested that in Japan, 'men are on top' [male business 
owner], 'men tell women what to do' [male public servant], or 'there is no equality of the 
sexes' [female public servant]. A group of female business owners, including two 
younger women, Ms. Kuroda and Ms. Sasaki, and an older . woman, Ms. Tanaka, spoke at 












In our family. . . if we ate fish, Father had the belly part and 
the children ate the tail. 
In our family. . . men eat the upper [better] part and women 
eat the lower part. 
I take the best part right away! [laughing] 
In our family, I still serve my father/husband the biggest fish. 
Or the part near the head. We still do the same. 
It sounds like the relationship between men and women is 
really changing. 
Yes, it has changed. My mother used to be preparing 
breakfast when we woke up. And there used to be no hot 
water system, you know. So when my father wanted to wash 
his face, she made warm water in a washbowl and stood 
behind him holding a towel. While he was wiping his face, 
she put breakfast on the table . . . [and] when he had to leave, 
there were polished shoes at the door for him. 
At my friend's house, her husband goes to work very early in 
the morning, and she never wakes up early. So her husband 
wakes up alone, and prepares and eats his breakfast alone, 
and goes to work. 
Impossible! 
She doesn't have a job, but she says she would get sleepy 
during the day if she woke up that early. 
But she could have a nap during the day. 
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In this exchange the participants revealed not only the nature of domestic 
patriarchy in the past, but women's varied responses to patriarchal domestic arrangements 
in the present. While one young woman, Ms. Sasaki, actively resisted such male 
dominance CI always take the best part right away!'), her young colleague complied with 
it, and her older colleague seemed to actively support it by suggesting that it is a wife's 
duty to serve her husband. 
Other participants' comments suggested that the kind of domestic patriarchy 
described by the business owners above is perceived to be a key aspect of Japanese social 
relations. Many focus group participants' comments centred on an advertisement in 
which a man first asks his wife to clean the toilet, but then cleans it himself with the 
disposable toilet cleaning cloth advertised: 
I thought [that ad] was un-Japanese. It showed a husband and wife, and 
the husband did the housework, so it wasn't very Japanese [Mr. Hata, 
young public servant]; 
[That ad] was un-Japanese, because men of our age group don't clean the 
toilet.. . . They'll tell you if the toilet isn't clean, but they don't clean it 
themselves [Ms. Iwabuchi, older farmer]; 
At the beginning it was Japanesey, because the actor called to his wife to 
tell her the toilet wasn't clean. If it had ended there, it would have been 
Japanesey. But. . . he cleaned it himself [Ms. Hamabata, retiree]. 
Participants in a variety of social locations also suggested that sexism in the 
workplace is a key feature of Japanese society. Many male participants' comments 
focused on an advertisement featuring a young female office worker and her male boss. 
When her boss orders her in an off-handed way to take out the trash, she imagines putting 
him in the trash can; but she cheerfully complies with his request nonetheless. As several 
male participants observed: 
[That ad] reflects Japanese society, where female staff are used by their 
bosses just to take out the trash. . . . They use female staff as if they can 
only take charge of trivial routines, such as making tea. . . . That is the 
Japanese way [Mr. Takahashi, teacher]; 
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[That ad showed] the relations between a female office worker and her.  
[male] boss. . . . It showed the nature of offices in Japan. I thought it was 
Japanese, considering the role of female office workers [Mr. Miyake, 
employee]; 
For people in our generation, there is nothing wrong with that boss asking 
young workers, especially young female workers, to do what they want 
them to do, such as making tea. So I thought [that ad] was good, as it 
seemed Japanese to someone like me [Mr. Mori, retiree]. 
While male participants tended to paint a rather static picture of workplace gender 
relations, female participants suggested that the situation is changing, although in 
complex ways. Young female public servants, for example, suggested that while women 
are winning greater equality in their workplaces, they are still largely relegated to what is 
perceived as `women's work,' clerical support and service positions. As Ms. Osada, a 
council worker noted, 'I think Japan is a sexist country. But I guess men and women are 
going to have equal rights; it will just take many years.' Ms. Hamabata and Ms. Sawachi, 
older teachers who are active in the Japanese feminist movement, argued that in Japan, 
Confucianism is the primary source of women's oppression, as it gives men the power to 
define the value of women's labour. However, another teacher, Ms. Ueno, suggested that 
women themselves must bear some of the responsibility for their own subordinate 
positions in the workplace. Ms. Ueno is a senior teacher who is unmarried and in her late 
fifties. Few other women in the prefecture have reached her rank in the school system. 
She explained that although female teachers want to receive the same salaries as their 
male colleagues, some are unwilling to take on the same responsibilities. While she 
suggested that it is difficult for women to hold jobs when they also have family 
commitments, she disapproved of women who use their families as an excuse to shirk 
their work responsibilities. 
While participants disagreed as to the origins and direction of patriarchy in Japan, 
what is clear from the above examples is that participants, both male and female, young 
and old, saw patriarchy as an enduring feature of Japanese social relations, and, by 
extension, a key feature of Japanese national identity. The business women quoted above 
165 
neatly articulated this link between patriarchy and national identity, providing insight into 
the ideological function of such naratives of nation: 
Ms. Sasaki: I stil don't think that men and women are equal/the same 
(issho). 
Ms. Kuroda: Neither do I. 
Ms. Sasaki: I believe that men and women are different, so we can never 
be equal. We may have equal rights, but women's physical 
strength could never be the same as men's. And women 
menstruate and bear children, so we could never be the 
same. 
Ms. Tanaka: Even though people are taught in school that men and 
women are equal, when they become working members of 
society, [they find] it is stil a male dominated world. Japan 
is stil a man's society (otoko shakai), you know. 
Ms. Kuroda: But women are alowed to say a lot. Maybe. 
Ms. Tanaka: In the long history of Japan, women have always been below 
men, folowing men. Even though some women were more 
talented than men, they have been like that throughout our 
long history. . . . So even if a lot of women. . . became 
independent, women would not be alowed to demonstrate 
their ful abilities and reach high status positions, like 
politicians, like female ministers of state in America. 
Because housework and child care are stil considered 
women's work, so it's difficult for women to leave that 
work to get a position equal to men's. Because it is not 
socialy acceptable, or the society is not ready yet. 
Ms. Sasaki: 	 It is Japanese identity. 
Ms. Tanaka: Yes, it is. 
This exchange highlights the naturalisation of women's subordination via 
interrelated notions of biology, patriarchy and national identity. The subordination of 
women is perceived to be inevitable because patriarchy is said to be a feature of Japanese 
national identity; and patriarchy is perceived to be inevitable due to the biological 
differences between the sexes. In other words, this seemingly inextricable link between 
patriarchy and national identity is used by participants to both explain and to legitimate, 
or at least resign themselves to, the subordination of women in Japan. At the same time, 
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however, these women contest the inevitability of gender inequality. They suggest that 
the long-standing inequalities they describe are social constructs, not simply the result of 
'natural' differences between women and men. They talk about what society currently 
'allows,' what society currently 'accepts;' and they raise the possibility of social change 
when they note that Japanese society is simply 'not ready yet' for such changes. 
Everyday practice 
In addition to generalised notions of national archetypes, the national character and social 
relations, Japanese participants' narratives of nation centred on specific everyday 
practices including the work, leisure and 'customs' said to be typical throughout the 
national community. As with the dimensions of national identity already discussed, 
participants' discussions of everyday practice reveal a subtle gendering of the national 
imagined community. 
As noted above, Japanese participants cited 'hard work' and 'overwork' as 
features of Japanese identity; furthermore, they strongly associated 'work' with the world 
of the salaryman, while women's labour, both paid and unpaid, was largely excluded from 
discussions of national working life. Even while Japanese working practice was 
associated with the largely male domain of the office, however, many participants 
mentioned a recent increase in the number of working women. Although male 
participants rarely commented on the impact of these changing labour patterns, female 
participants interpreted them in a variety of ways. 
While a group of female public servants associated increased participation of 
women in the workforce with a general improvement in women's social position, younger 
and older female farmers made the more specific observation that an increase of women 
in paid labour is forcing more equitable division of domestic labour. Likewise, Ms. 
Osada, a long-serving council employee who remains unmarried in her mid-thirties 
contrary to her parents' wishes, noted the positive impact of these changing labour 
patterns. However, she acknowledged that as more women enter the workforce and stay 
in their jobs longer, many companies become 'confused' (tomadotteru). 
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The companies and organisations where these women continue to work 
for a long time are probably confused now . . . and wondering what to do. 
It used to be that women didn't work for long, because they quit when 
they got married. So there were always young female employees. There 
was a cycle that when the young female staff were hired, there were 
always other staff who quit to get married. But these days, women 
continue to work, and older female staff remain employed in the 
companies. . .. So they don't know how they should treat those female 
staff. 
While Ms. Osada did not suggest that these changing labour trends will have any 
dire or wide-spread social consequences, she demonstrated an awareness that her labour, 
and the labour of women like her, is viewed by those around her as both unusual and 
problematic. Such perceptions may have coloured her self-critical closing comments, 'I 
might have different ideas from others. . . . I am different. A bit weird.' 
Another participant, Ms. Ueno, the senior teacher quoted earlier, suggested that 
the increasing number of married women in the workforce has broader social 
implications. She associated the increased entry of wives and mothers into the workforce 
with increased materialism and general moral decline: 
Morals have deteriorated. It's probably rooted in rapid economic 
development (koodo-seichoo). Some people profited with the growth of 
Japan's economy, which allowed people to buy cars and houses, and that 
led to the nuclear family. When the nuclear family buys a house and pays 
a mortgage, housewives have to work outside the home, which restricts 
communication within the family. Children understand the need for extra 
money to pay the mortgage, but they don't communicate well, which can 
cause a gap between parents and children. Parents just give children 
money, but morals aren't taught in the family. So, I think the twenty-first 
century could bring insecure and dark times. 
Ms Ueno's comments reveal a perception that the domestic labour of wives and mothers 
is natural and proper and helps maintain social and moral order, while their paid labour is 
socially problematic. However, it is worth noting that she herself has followed a rather 
non-traditional life path, remaining unmarried, pursuing her career and reaching a rank 
usually occupied only by men. There is a tension, therefore, between her account of 
gendered national identity and her own life experiences. 
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Just as working practices inform Japanese participants' notions of national 
identity, so leisure practices also figure in their narratives of nation. Participants in all 
social locations associated the onsen (hot spring spa) with Japaneseness. 'The Japanese 
love the onsen.' [Mr. Sen, older public servant]; 'The onsen is unique to Japan' [Ms. 
Mita, employee]; 'The onsen is the king of leisure' [Mr. Ando, business owner]. Visiting 
the onsen is a popular leisure pursuit for men, women and families, and therefore cannot 
be considered a gendered leisure practice. However, the other leisure practices 
participants associated with national identity, golf and drinking (alcohol), are strongly 
gendered in the masculine. 
While, to some extent, both men and women play golf and drink alcohol in Japan, 
in participants' accounts of national identity, these leisure practices were strongly 
associated with the world of the salaryman. Male teachers, for instance, discussed the 
'Japanese salaryman style of golf,' and a male public servant estimated that eighty percent 
of the young male office workers around him play golf [Mr. Matsui]. A group of male 
employees more explicitly linked golf and drinking with the salaryman when they 
explained that for (male) Japanese company employees, after-hours social activities such 
as golf and drinking parties are considered part of one's obligation to one's colleagues: 
'Japanese people [men] working for companies usually can't refuse to go to a social 
gathering. The relationship with other members of the organisation goes beyond office 
hours. .. . In most cases, turning them down could have a negative effect on your job' 
[Mr. Miyake]. 
When most Japanese participants cited drinking as a feature of national identity, 
therefore, they referred to work-related (semi-)obligatory drinking among mainly male 
company employees. Participants' reactions to two similar advertisements confirmed that 
women are largely excluded from this national leisure practice. In one advertisement, a 
man practises golf alone and then drinks a beer; in the other, a woman enjoys an onsen 
bath alone and then drinks a beer. In response to the first advertisement, participants 
noted, 'What he is doing is Japanese, working hard, sweating and drinking' [Mr. Tsuya, 
young public servant]; he is 'a typical Japanese middle-aged man' [Mr. Takenaka, 
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employee]; he is 'a typical Japanese' [Ms. Sasaki, business owner]. In response to the 
second advertisement, however, participants noted, 'No Japanese woman would drink 
beer alone like that' [Ms. Tanaka, older business owner]; or, 'It was not realistic that a 
woman stayed alone at a hotel drinking beer' [Mr. Miyake, employee]. A group of older 
female farmers reacted even more strongly: 
Ms. Aiba: 	 In the olden days, women didn't drink beer like that. 
Ms. Iwabuchi: [In that ad] the woman drank beer. But when we were 
young we didn't do that. 
Ms. Aiba: 	 Women in my age group don't drink. 
Ms. Iwabuchi: There's nothing wrong with it for young people. 
Ms. Aiba: 
	
	 But when we watch images like that, it doesn't seem 
natural to us. We think, 'Oh dear, she is drinking beer!' 
Not al female participants accepted their exclusion from this national leisure 
practice, however. In response to her coleague's comment, above, that `No Japanese 
woman would drink beer alone like that,' Ms. Tanaka, another older female business 
owner, said, 'I thought the opposite. I think. . . this commercial showing a woman 
traveling alone and looking liberated reflects Japanese society now.' Likewise, a group 
of teachers responded positively to the advertised image of a woman drinking: 
Ms. Kondo: When I saw. . . the ad with the girl drinking beer I 
thought—wel, the usual Japanesey image is an old man 
[tossing back a beer]. [Everyone laughs and agrees.] 
But instead, this isn't realy Japanesey; it's just realistic 
(futsu no joken). 
Ms. Wada: 	 The age has changed to where women drink beer. 
Ms Matsumoto: 	 There are quite a few women in the beer gardens. 
Ms. Wada: 	 Recent beer ads use [actresses] Suzuki Kyoka and 
Esumi Makiki. Ads for strong beer. It's becoming an 
age when women drink beer. 
Ms. Hayashi: 	 When I first saw the ad where the woman is drinking 
beer, I thought, 'Wel done!' Before this, only men 
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usually appeared in this kind of ad, drinking and 
relaxing in those kind of places. 
In this exchange, the female participants contested their previous exclusion from the 
`Japanesey' image of beer drinking, and celebrated their inclusion in more recent 
representations of this national leisure practice. 
The above exchange also reveals tensions between lived experiences and widely 
circulating constructions of Japaneseness. As Ms. Kondo commented, the advertisement 
featuring a woman drinking beer, 'isn't Japanesey; it's just realistic.' In other words, 
although alcohol consumption by women is a fact of life in contemporary Japan, it does 
not feature in discourses of Japanese national identity, which construct women as 
'traditional,' demure and domestic, the antithesis of a young woman drinking alone in a 
hotel lounge. 
Participants' narratives of nation centred on one final dimension of everyday 
practice which I will call 'custom.' Custom' (what participants usually call shuukan or 
fuushuu) is taken here to refer to long-standing ritual social practice perceived to be 
common throughout the nation. 110 Participants frequently spoke of customs presumed to 
be unique to Japan, including removing shoes when entering buildings, sitting seiza 
(sitting upright on one's knees), and engaging in seasonal gift-giving. While these first 
two customs are not particularly gendered, 111 seasonal gift-giving carries both strong 
feminine and strong masculine associations. 
Participants in all social locations associated o-chuugen (mid-year gift-giving) and 
o-seibo (year-end gift-giving) with Japaneseness. As participants noted: 'The custom of 
gift exchange is Japanesey. When the season comes, we send o-chuugen and o-seibo' 
[Mr. Imai, older public servant]; [0-chuugen is] a custom unique to Japan, and people 
wouldn't do it overseas' [Ms. Mita, employee]; 'Our custom of giving gifts at o-bon [a 
110 I did not discuss such 'customs' in the Australian context, for while certain 
practices (such as beer-drinking or attending sporting events) could be considered 
'long-standing ritual social practice,' they are less compulsory than the Japanese 
practices described above. 
111 While it is more common for women to sit seiza, men also adopt this posture in 
certain social contexts. 
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mid-August festival] and the end of the year cannot be seen overseas.. . . It's our unique 
custom' [Ms. Hamabata, retiree]. 
Such seasonal gift-giving had strong feminine associations for many participants, 
partly because it belongs to the imagined realm of 'tradition,' the realm of gentility, 
refinement and kimono-clad women. As Mr. Tsuya, a young public servant observed, ' 0- 
chuugen ads usually show women dressed nicely in kimono to take gifts to people's 
houses.' Seasonal gift-giving was also associated with the feminine, however, because it 
is primarily a practice aimed at maintaining relationships between families, a practice 
commonly perceived to be the responsibility of women. As Ms. Sawachi, a retiree, noted, 
'Gift-giving would be a custom unique to Japan. . . especially because it is for the 
relationship between different families/households (ie). I believe people overseas 
exchange gifts between individuals, but we do it between families/households, or between 
bosses and subordinates.' She also noted that it is most common to give food as seasonal 
gifts, and added that 'Things related to food [are] still a woman's job.' 
As the above comments indicate, however, seasonal gift-giving takes place both 
between families and between employees and their bosses. This accounts, in part, for the 
strong masculine associations it held for some participants. Mr. Hosokawa, a young 
farmer, suggested that while seasonal gift-giving is on the decline among farming 
families, it is an important social obligation for the salaryman: 
I think people in the salaryman's world give good gifts to their bosses to 
make a better impression. I guess it's quite common to send good gifts to 
your boss to get a promotion. But because I'm not part of that world, I'm 
not sure what's really happening inside it. People like me who are self-
employed don't do this very much. And my parents also send gifts to 
relatively few people. I can't explain it very well, but I think this custom 
is related to the salaryman's world. 
Mr. Hosokawa's comments also hint at the kind of objections which other participants 
raised regarding seasonal gift-giving. A broad cross-section of participants noted that the 
custom is 'unnecessary,' uneconomical' or 'a waste of time and money.' Such 
objections highlight the tensions between 'tradition' and change, group orientation and 
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individualism, the masculine and the feminine which arise in the practise of such long-
standing customs. 
In sum, Japanese participants suggested that everyday practices including work 
and leisure practices and 'customs,' are important aspects of national identity. In folk 
discourses of national identity, such practices are gendered, although they are gendered in 
more subtle ways than similar discourses in Australia. While Australian discussions of 
everyday practice largely exclude women (and 'non-whites') and figure the nation as 
('white' and) masculine, Japanese discussions of everyday practice construct the nation as 
both masculine and feminine. In most of the folk accounts of national identity, women 
are constructed as domestic, passive and 'traditional,' while men are constructed as 
public, active and progressive. However some (mainly female) participants rejected such 
gender binaries and constructed what they considered more 'realistic' images of gendered 
national identity in contemporary Japan. 
Material and symbolic culture 
The most unequivocal gendering of discourses of Japanese national identity is found in 
participants' comments on the links between Japanesesness and national material and 
symbolic culture. The remarks of Mr. Fujita, a high school student, neatly capture a trend 
common among most participants. When asked what he thinks of when someone says 
`Japaneseness,' he answered, 'Kimono, things that have been around since olden days.' 
These 'things,' the manufactured or modified objects customarily used or consumed by 
the national community, were at the centre of many participants' narratives of nation; and 
among these objects, those with feminine and/or domestic associations were most often 
central to notions of Japaneseness. 
As discussed earlier, the kimono emerged as a key symbol of Japaneseness in most 
participants' discussions of national identity, and was strongly associated with the past, 
with 'tradition' and with femininity. What emerged from participants' discussions of 
material culture was that other objects carry similar associations. Most of the material 
objects participants associated with Japaneseness were drawn from the arenas of home- 
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making and childcare: the Japanese cooking knife, Japanese food (such as rice, miso, 
seaweed and noodles), green tea, Japanese cushions and grass mats, and children's toys 
such as the Japanese spinning top and kite. 112 Other frequently mentioned objects were 
also drawn from largely feminine pursuits and practices: the tea ceremony, the koto and 
koto music, and hina dolls. 113 Only a small number of objects associated with 
Japaneseness, including the sword and the shakuhachi (bamboo flute), were drawn from 
largely masculine pursuits. 
A number of participants suggested that images drawn from 'traditional' material 
culture, images of 'things that have been around since olden days,' make contemporary 
Japanese feel 'relaxed,' at ease' or 'peaceful' (hotto suru, anshin suru). The comments 
of Mr. Ando, the business owner quoted earlier, suggest that this gendered world of 
material 'tradition' is the focus of nostalgia and escapist desire. He noted that the cliched 
images of Japaneseness include notable people, places, practices and material objects 
from the nation's past; but, he added, 'There were those things in history, and some of 
them are still in Japan, but Japan today is not like that. . . . It is different from the reality. 
[But] there is a wish that things could be that way. . . with your wife dressed in kimono, 
waiting for you to come home, or a beautiful water scene, or a flying kite, or a spinning 
top.' In Mr. Ando's vision of Japan as it could be, and perhaps should be, gender is 
employed as a category through which a comforting sense of stability and security is 
maintained. 
Not all participants uncritically accepted such widely circulating discourses of 
nation, however. Some participants challenged the existence of a unique and 
homogeneous Japanese material and symbolic culture. As Ms. Hara, a young public 
servant, argued, for example, 'There isn't a unique culture in Japan anyway. It was 
112 Each of these objects (deba-boochoo, o-kome, miso,wakame, udon/soba, 
ocha/Nihon7cha, zabuton, tatami, koma and tako, respectively) appeared at least 
briefly in the advertisements shown to focus groups. However interviewees who were 
not shown the advertisements also mentioned a number of these objects in their 
discussions of Japaneseness. 
113 The koto is a Japanese harp. Hina dolls (hina-ningyoo) are drawn from the March 
3"I Doll's Festival (Hina Matsuri), celebrated to pray for the happiness of daughters. 
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originally introduced from overseas in the olden days. . . from China.. . . The culture in 
Japan just isn't as unique as people overseas imagine. [For example,] there are only a few 
people who can get dressed in kimono by themselves.' In a similarly reflexive move, Ms. 
Honda, the well-travelled teacher quoted in the Introduction to this thesis, dissects the 
'fantasy' of Japanese cultural homogeneity. 'It is a fantasy that [people] believe there is 
only one language and only one culture in their world. . . . I'm a little different from other 
Japanese, because I don't have that fantasy that Japan is a monoracial nation.' 
Such fractures in the veneer of Japanese cultural homogeneity frequently emerge 
in participants' discussions of the diverse dialects of Japanese language. One teacher 
observed, for example, that there are 'foreign languages even within the Japanese 
language' [Mr. Oomori]; one young farmer noted his surprise at not being able to 
understand the language spoken by farmers from different regions of Japan [Mr. Iwabuchi 
Masao]; and one older farmer remarked that, 'Young people speak a language we can't 
understand' [Mr. Iwai]. 
That language nonetheless serves as a powerful marker of national identity is clear 
in participants' reactions to advertisements that mix images of 'traditional' Japanese 
culture with non-Japanese linguistic forms. As one high school boy observed, 
One ad that sells a Japanese thing but isn't a Japanesey ad is the Suzuran 
An [sweet bean jam] ad. . . . When you hear the word 'an,' it seems 
traditional, but when you actually see that commercial, it isn't really 
Japanesey. . . . The image of the an doesn't go with English. It actually 
clashes with it [Mr. Fujita]. 
Similarly, a teacher commented on another advertisement which features a woman in 
kimono with the product name written in English on the screen: 'Because it was written 
in English it would be the opposite (non-Japanesey), even though the images are 
Japanesey' [Mr. Oomori]. Likewise, a young farmer noted that she initially thought an 
advertisement featuring a samurai was quite Japanese, Tut because there was English 
writing in the background, I had to reconsider' [Ms. Mitsui]) 14 
114 Such comments also highlight the intersection between language and ethnicity, 
which is covered in more depth in this chapter's discussion of ethnicity. 
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Participants also linked supposedly unique features of Japanese language to 
notions of national identity. Such commonly identified features included Japanese 
honorific language, Japanese plays on words (goro awase or dajare), the convention of 
vertical writing, and the three distinctive character systems (hiragana, katakana and 
kanji) used in Japanese. What is interesting in terms of a discussion of the gendering of 
national identity, however, is that although participants demonstrated an awareness of 
such distinctive features of Japanese language, no participant mentioned another feature 
of the national tongue often remarked upon by foreign observers: the difference between 
male and female language. This conspicuous silence indicates that gendered linguistic 
practices are a taken-for-granted part of participants' everyday experiences, something so 
natural, and perhaps even seemingly universal, that it is not explicitly included in folk 
discourses of national identity. 
Finaly, in discussions of Japanese material and symbolic culture, participants 
occasionaly mentioned the aesthetic forms, practices, and principles thought to be 
distinctive to the nation. Some of these artistic pursuits are gendered, such as tea 
ceremony, discussed above. Others, such as the principle of wabi-sabi (simplicity and 
elegance), are not. Some participants also suggested that such aesthetic forms, and 
Japanese symbolic and material culture more generaly, are tools of nationalism. A group 
of female teachers, for instance, suggested that government and educational elites use 
'traditional' arts and symbols like the national flag and the national anthem, to promote 
the 'love' of country: 
Ms. Noguchi: School principals and vice principals and members of the 
board of education think it's internationalisation to raise 
the Hinomaru [the national flag] and sing Kimigayo' [the 
national anthem]. We teachers and the children have no 
choice. Most of the people in Japan have to obey. They 
say it's internationalisation. 
Interviewer: 	 Realy? 
Ms. Noguchi: Yes. And someone like [Prime Minister] Hashimoto 
Ryutaro is also one of them. 
Ms. Wada: 	 It's like kendo. He loves traditional things. 
Ms. Hayashi: 
Ms. Wada: 
He wants to protect Japanese traditions such as kabuki, 
shakuhachi music, and' Kimigayo. ' So their idea is that 
Kimigayo ' is a tradition we should not break. That's why 
they want us to sing it. I think protecting our traditions is 
necessary as well as exchanging traditional culture with 
other countries. But in our opinion, Kimigayo ' is not our 
tradition. 
They say, 'Know your country before knowing other 
countries.' The government says if you don't love your 
own country, including the Hinomaru and Kimigayo,' you 
won't be able to love other countries.' 15 
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In other words, while elites promote 'traditional' arts and symbols as an integral 
part of 'internationalisation,' in effect, these things serve to promote a nationalistic 'love' 
of country. The comments of Ms. Ueno, one of the educational elite to whom these 
teachers refer, seem to bear out this observation. She noted, 'I think everybody accepts 
the national flag and the national anthem as a way of loving their country.' 
In sum, in Japanese focus groups and interviews, the national material and 
symbolic culture emerges as a key dimension of national identity. The bulk of material 
artefacts associated with Japaneseness are drawn from the realm of largely feminine, and 
largely 'traditional,' pursuits, with this gendering of the national material culture serving 
to reinforce a long-standing gender binary which figures women as 'traditional' and 
backward-looking and men as progressive and future-oriented. Furthermore, the 
conspicuous absence of any discussion of gendered linguistic practices suggests that such 
gendered national practices have come to be seen as so natural and commonsensical that 
they are not considered unique or distinctive features of national identity. Finally, while 
some discussions of national aesthetic forms and principles reveal gendered associations, 
such artistic forms seem to serve another ideological function, as a rallying point for 
nationalism. 
Interestingly, however, folk accounts of Japanese material and symbolic culture 
are the site of strong contestations. Teachers, in particular, elaborated on the ways 
115 For a number of years, the Japanese national teachers' union has protested the use 
of the national flag and national anthem at school ceremonies, arguing that these 
symbols are strongly linked to Japan's twentieth-century militarism. 
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national cultural symbols are employed by the state to foster nationalism. Specifically, 
these Participants viewed the national anthem, the national flag and the notion of 
`monoracialism' as ideological tools used by elites to cultivate patriotism in 'ordinary' 
Japanese. The very existence of such critiques suggests, however, that any such state 
ideologies are not perfectly hegemonic. 
The environment 
Japanese participants' discourses of national identity were firmly grounded in images of 
the national physical environment. In participants' narratives of nation, the physical 
environment served as an affective symbol, a marker of identity boundaries, and a force 
presumed to shape the national character. 
A broad cross-section of participants, for instance, suggested that natural features 
such as cherry blossoms and Mt. Fuji are key symbols of the nation. A young male public 
servant suggested, for example, that 'Both young and old people would consider Japanese 
music and cherry blossoms and Mt. Fuji Japanesey' [Mr. Matsui]. Similarly a group of 





When the cherry blossoms are in full bloom, we think of 
hanami [flower-viewing parties]. When we watch the 
cherry blossoms on TV, it appeals to us. We think, 'The 
cherry blossoms have opened!' 
We've seen these images since we were young children. 
We've felt this same way since we were little. 
We feel this kind of thing is Japanese because we watched 
our parents feeling the same way. When they saw cherry 
blossoms, they said, 'Oh, the cherry blossoms have 
opened!' 
In this exchange, notions of space, time and domesticity intersect, for participants 
imagine a national space unchanged by the flow of history, a space to which they are 
connected through family 'traditions.' As this exchange suggests, both natural space and 
domestic space serve as affective symbols of national belonging: natural space for its 
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links to an imagined primordial past; and domestic space for its links to 'tradition.' 
While domestic space is gendered in the feminine, as argued earlier, it would be overly 
simplistic to argue that in Japanese narratives of nation the national space is discursively 
feminine. As the comments of the farmers above demonstrate, the links between gender, 
space and nation in folk discourses of national identity are only implicit and relatively 
weak. Participants draw stronger and more explicit links, however, between the physical 
environment, nation and ethnicity, to which I will devote the next section of this chapter. 
Ethnicised Discourses of Japanese National Identity 
'Race' and ethnicity were prominent themes in Japanese folk discourses of national 
identity. Participants constructed 'the Japanese' in three ways: as a territorial category 
(the people belonging to and in the national space); as an ethnic category (people who 
share certain long-standing cultural traits); and as a 'racial' category (people who share 
certain genetically inherited traits). Participants used two terms, jinshu and minzoku, to 
explicitly discuss the biological and cultural traits presumed to be unique to the Japanese. 
Jinshu, usually translated 'race,' is comprised of the character for 'person' and the 
character for 'kind,' type' or 'species.' Minzoku, variously translated as 'race,' people,' 
'nation' or 'ethnic group,' consists of the character for 'people' or 'nation' and the 
character meaning 'family' or 'tribe.' However, in contemporary usage, the sense of 
'race' is far from explicit in the terms Nihon fin (Japanese person/people), minzoku and 
even jinshu; rather, there is a constant conceptual slippage between notions of 'nation,' 
'ethnicity' and 'race.' 116 
In analysing Japanese transcript data, therefore, it is not always easy to determine 
whether discourses of national identity constitute ethnicised discourses. Participants' 
116 Furthermore, in discussing inshu ' and minzoku,' Morris-Suzuki (1998: 87), 
drawing on Wallerstein, notes, 'All efforts at fixing these Japanese terms to stable 
English translations, indeed, is frustrated not just by the slipperiness of the Japanese 
words themselves, but also by the fact that the English words "race," "nation," and 
"ethnic group" are "used with incredible inconsistency" (Wallerstein 1991b, 77).' 
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descriptions of the national character, social relations and social ethics, for example, are 
only sometimes explicitly racialised/ethnicised. For instance, a number of participants, 
mainly teachers and public servants, drew on the notion of the Japanese as a `monoracial 
people' (tan'itsu minzoku), a concept used to explain, and to some extent legitimate, the 
rejection of foreigners. As one older public servant explained, 'We are a monoracial 
people, so our way of thinking is not open toward foreigners, especialy people from 
South East Asia' [Mr. Sen]. The notion of a monoracial Japan also alowed participants 
to acknowledge the existence of ethnic Others within the nation, while at the same time 
denying their difference. As Mr. Hamabata, a retired teacher, noted, 'There used to be 
native people in Hokkaido caled the Ainu people, and in Okinawa caled the Ryuukyuu 
people, [but] they were assimilated into the Japanese.' The notion of the monoracial 
nation also provided a focal point for what seemed to be more difuse anxieties about the 
social changes associated with globalisation. Mr. Taguchi, a prominent senior public 
servant who would later rise to the upper echelons of city hal, voiced concern that as an 
increasing number of `monoracial Japanese' intermarry with foreigners, monoracial Japan 
wil experience the 'racial problems' typical of the United States and Canada: 
We are basicaly a monoracial people. We have hardly anyone besides 
monoracial Japanese people 	 If [even] one percent of our population 
had international mariages and had children, there would be a racial 
problem (jinshu mondai) which would be worse than in America 	  
Japan is going to face this problem which advanced nations such as 
America and Canada have already resolved. It is going to be a large issue 
ethnicaly, legaly and structuraly. 
Later he added, 'If my daughter wanted to marry a foreigner, I wouldn't say yes.' This 
remark reveals both an intimate connection between patriarchy and discourses of national 
identity, and the notion of ethnic Japanese proprietorship over the nation, Mr. Taguchi 
assumes the right and responsibility to regulate not only his daughter's behaviour, but 
also the behaviour of foreign Others in the nation. 
In other participants' discussions of the national character, social relations and 
social ethics, there was a blurring between notions of 'racial' phenotypes (usualy skin, 
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hair and eye colour), language and behaviours, making it difficult to determine the degree 
to which narratives of nation are ethnicised. For instance, a broad cross-section of 
participants, including teachers, public servants, employees, business owners and retirees, 
noted that Japanese people feel frightened of, and/or inferior to, foreigners; however, 
participants explained such feelings in various ways. In a relatively explicit reference to 
'racial' phenotypes as the source of discomfort, Mr. Matsui, a public servant, recounted 
his trepidation the first time he met someone 'tall and blonde.' Likewise, Mr. Ando, a 
business owner, told how the people of Hirogawa were 'nearly paralysed with shock' the 
first time a black musician performed at the local concert hall. He explained, 'He was 
pitch-black black . . . And I think quite a few Hirogawa people had never seen a black 
man before.' 
Other participants suggested that language differences were the main source of 
their anxieties over interacting with foreigners. As Ms. Takayama, an employee, noted, 
'If an English-speaking person spoke to a Japanese, most Japanese people would just 
avoid them because they can't speak the language.' Likewise, Mr. Kuzume, a business 
owner argued, 'Talking face to face with foreigners repulses everybody, at least a little. If 
someone says they don't feel like this, they're not telling the truth.' Still other 
participants suggested that their discomfiture is the result of foreigners' behaviour. As 
Mr. Yamazaki, an employee, observed, 'Once I lived on the mainland for a while. I saw 
some Chinese or Korean people who looked very much like Japanese. But I found they 
speak their languages very loudly right next to us on the train. We Japanese don't speak 
that loudly in public places. This is Japaneseness. But they don't care how they annOy 
others.' 
Just as notions of 'race,' language and behaviour overlapped in participants' 
descriptions of the national character, social relations and social ethics, making it difficult 
to state conclusively that such discourses are ethnicised, ethnicity was only an implicit 
part of participants' accounts of the everyday practice of the nation. Clearly, for some 
participants, customs which were perceived to be particularly central to national identity, 
such as o-chuugen (mid-year gift-giving), are disrupted by the presence of foreigners. 
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Commenting on an advertisement which features a foreigner receiving o-chuugen from a 
Japanese acquaintance, one older farmer noted, 'I didn't think [the ad] was very Japanese. 
It was o-chuugen, but it was showing a foreigner' [Ms. Uchida]. It is clear that, to the 
participant, the presence of the foreigner negated the Japaneseness of the custom; what is 
unclear, however, is whether the foreigner's ethnicity per se, or some other characteristic 
is the perceived source of this negation. 
Similarly, in discussions of everyday labour practices, a smal number of 
participants problematised the labour of foreigners; however, the extent to which notions 
of ethnicity shaped their judgements is unclear. For example, Ms. Ochiai, an employee, 
suggested that 'some Japanese have lost their jobs' to South East Asians; and Mr. 
Iwabuchi Masao, a young farmer also quoted above, recaled an incident in which a 
Filipina entertainer/prostitute in Hirogawa 'made some trouble.' He noted, 'There wil be 
no more Filipinas in Hirogawa; public morals put a stop to it.' I 17 While both participants 
pointed out the foreign origins of these workers, it is not clear whether it is the workers' 
ethnicity or simply the disruptive nature of their labour which is perceived as problematic. 
The ethnicity, or 'race,' of foreign labourers was more clearly problematised by 
Mr. Taguchi, quoted at some length above regarding 'international' marriages. 
Interviewed on another day, he reiterated some of his concerns about Japan's impending 
'race problem;' however, he focused more specificaly on foreign labourers: 
The Japanese are prety much a monoracial people (tan'itsu minzoku). 
But due to the need for low cost labour, Japan has to accept people from 
overseas whether we like this idea or not 	 Once the percentage of the 
non-Japanese population goes up to more than one percent, the social 
structure of Japan wil change. This is going to be a big problem. The 
race problem (jinshu mondai) which a lot of other countries have 
experienced wil happen to Japan. 
Likewise, notions of 'race,' or specificaly of skin colour, were also fairly explicit 
in some participants' discussions of the national material and symbolic culture. A group 
117 Such comments reveal the eroticisation of South East Asian women in Japan. 
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of female teachers, for instance, suggested that the use of 'white' foreigners in 
advertisements enhances the image of the product. 
Ms. Noguchi: 	 It would make a beter image if foreigners, especialy 
people with white skin were used. 
Ms. Wada: 	 It creates the image of a department store specialising in 
high-class brands, very fashionable and trendy. 
Ms. Kondo: 	 I just realised that ads present a high-class image when 
they use foreigners. 
Ms. Wada: 	 Yes, I agree. 
Ms. Matsumoto: People other than Asians. 
Ethnicity is used here as a status marker in the realm of Japanese material culture; 
'whiteness,' as distinct from Japaneseness and Asian-ness, is perceived to be prestigious, 
'fashionable' and 'high-class.' 
Notions of ethnicity and material culture also intersected, at least implicitly, in the 
comments of Mr. Hata, a young public servant, who noted, 'We Japanese people have 
changed. . . . Compared with people in the olden days, we've become less Japanese. But 
that doesn't mean we've been foreign-ised (gaikokujin-teki-ka, a neologism meaning 
literaly 'becoming like a foreigner'). If you could compare us to the pure Japanese 
people (junsui na Nihonjin), we are less Japanese. For example, Japanese children today 
don't play with kites or tops. . . traditional Japanese toys.' While the term 'pure 
Japanese' is not an explicitly 'racial' designation, it has overtones of 'blood' or 
'breeding.'118 By implication, then, (ethnicaly) 'pure Japanese' are those who surround 
themselves with the objects of 'traditional' material culture. Stil, the participant was 
careful to point out that contemporary Japanese who do not do so, are not necessarily 
'foreign-ised.' This indicates that while material culture is associated with ethnicity, 
material practices are not always understood to determine ethnicity. 
118 `Junsui' consists of the characters for 'pure' (jun) and 'essence/elegance' (sui). 
'fun' is also used in compounds meaning 'ful-blooded,' thoroughbred' or 'purebred' 
(junketsu, junketsushu, junshu). 
18. 3 
Participants in all social locations observed that Japanese, particularly younger 
Japanese, are becoming more tolerant of foreigners. As Ms. Shimizu, a young farmer, 
suggested, 'Children these days don't feel anything negative about being friends with 
foreigners, although people of an older generation are not like this.' However, there is no 
indication that the perceived differences between 'foreigners' and 'the Japanese' are 
disappearing. In one illuminating exchange, Ms. Osada, a public servant quoted earlier, 







Do you think we [foreigners] could become Japanese? 
I think [you yourself] have a Japanesey way of thinking, a 
little. 
Do you think people from Western countries can become 
Japanese? 
I don't think they can. And they don't have to be. They can 
have their own identities. 
And if I lived here from now on and had children, do you 
think they could become Japanese? 
I think they would be very nearly Japanese. Their way of 
thinking. 
This exchange reveals a notion of biological 'race underpinning the participant's 
understanding of Japaneseness. Those without Japanese ancestry can eventually learn to 
think like the Japanese, and even become 'very nearly' Japanese; but, seemingly divided 
by 'race' or ethnicity, the categories 'foreigners' and 'the Japanese' are mutually 
exclusive. 
Finally, ethnicised visions of the nation are most readily apparent in participants' 
discussions of the national space. For instance, the terms participants used to talk about 
foreigners reveal complex interpenetrations of ethnicity and space. The most frequently 
used term for foreigners, gaijin (literally 'person from the outside'), was used primarily in 
references to 'white' foreigners. Similarly, common terms for Americans (Amerika-jin) 
and Westerners (Seiyou no hito) effectively excluded 'non-white' Americans and 'non- 
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white' Westerners. Alongside such seemingly generic but implicitly ethnicised terms for 
foreigners, participants frequently used the ethnically specific terms koku-jin (1)lack 
person') and Ajia-jin (`Asian person,' a term which usually is not seen to include the 
Japanese); however participants rarely used the ethnically specific term for 'whites,' 
haku-jin ('white person'). Unless specifically identified as 'black' or 'Asian,' therefore, 
participants assumed foreigners and foreign spaces to be ethnically 'white,' the 
essentialised Other to Japan and the Japanese. 
Foreigners, in other words, were distinguished both by their perceived 'racial' 
Otherness and by their spatial Otherness: they were frequently called simply mukoo no 
kata,' or people from 'over there.' Just as Japanese national space was perceived to be an 
ethnically Japanese space, foreign spaces were perceived by many participants to be 
ethnically Other spaces, which are dangerous and frightening. Ms. Ochiai, an employee, 
went into great detail about her trip to London where she was cheated by `a bad person, a 
scary person;' a young farmer noted that 'Overseas places have a scary image. They're 
different from Japan' [Ms. Shimizu]; and a teacher noted, 'I know it's not good to say 
this, but when I was in America, I was scared because tall black people surrounded me. I 
felt like running away' [Mr. Takahashi]. As noted in the previous section, many 
participants suggested that Japan is `behind' or even 'below' the West. A public servant 
observed, for example, `Even if our technology is very advanced, we still feel inferior, 
especially to America. People want to be like them [because] although we make great 
products, we can't beat the Americans as humans' [Ms. Hara]. However, this sense of 
marginality or inferiority was somewhat mediated by defining foreign spaces as 
dangerous and frightening, and Japanese spaces as safe and familiar. 
Participants suggested, however, that Japanese national space is being transformed 
by a perceived influx of foreign visitors and workers. Participants including older male 
public servants, male and female employees, male and female farmers and male business 
owners, suggested that social order in urban areas, Tokyo in particular, is being 
undermined by the presence of foreigners. 
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I am scared because I often hear on the news that foreigners [in Japan] 
have committed a bank robbery with guns and killed people [Mr. 
Hosokawa, young farmer]; 
There are a lot of foreign workers in Shinjuku [Tokyo] including Turks or 
Brazilians, and some of them commit offences. We see it on TV. But it 
hasn't happened around here yet [Ms. Aiba, older farmer]; 
There aren't many people around here from South East Asia, but in the big 
cities they are employed to do manual labour. And perhaps some 
Japanese have lost their jobs because of them [Ms. Ochiai, employee]. 
Such comments suggest anxieties over the loss of ethnic Japanese proprietorship of the 
nation as non-Japanese become more visible in the nation's larger cities. 
While other participants did not voice such concerns about the crime, violence and 
job losses that foreigners are said to bring to Japan, they did suggest that the presence of 
the Others can render Japanese national spaces foreign. Both female teachers and male 
employees discussed the phenomenon of eki-mae -ryuugaku (literally 'studying abroad in 
front of your local train station'). The expression refers to the popular practice of 
studying a foreign language (usually English), often with foreign teachers, at language 
schools near train stations. The term reveals the extent to which the presence of 
foreigners and of foreign languages are imagined to transform national space into foreign 
space. 
This intersection - of space and ethnicity, or the ethnic characteristics of both 
Japanese and Others, emerged even more clearly in participants' discussions of space and 
climate as elements shaping human behaviour. Ms. Takayama, an employee quoted 
above, observed, for example that people from Hokkaido 'don't fuss over details,' people 
in Honshu are 'tight-fisted,' people from Kyushu are 'open-hearted' and people from 
Tohoku are 'sentimental.' When asked why this is so, she replied, 
Probably the climate. Hokkaido and Tohoku are cold places. They have 
to be patient and stay inside the home for months and months during the 
cold season. They are not good at expressing themselves, or they don't 
say things to express their feelings in words.. . . But Kyushu is warmer. 
There is more sunshine. So they are brighter (akarui) and they don't get 
sentimental. 
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Likewise, Ms. Higuchi Sachi, the mother-in-law of the business woman quoted 
earlier, observed differences between Hokkaido and Bangkok, which she had recently 
visited: 
Bangkok was a developing country. I noticed the poverty there. It's 
probably because it's in a tropical area. People in Hokkaido have to 
prepare for winter, so we always have to think how to live. But over there 
it's very warm. . . . They might feel they don't have to work very much. 
So the country is like that. 
Mr. Iwabuchi Masao, a young farmer and the son of the elder Iwabuchis quoted 
earlier, neatly summed up the role the environment plays in shaping regional or ethnic 
characteristics: 
From a worldwide point of view, people from warm places have a Latin 
way of thinking (Laten-kei no kangae kata), and people from cold places 
with a lot of snow have a way of thinking like Germans or Danes (Doitsu-
jin to/ca Denmaaku-jin mitai no kangae kata). 
With such sentiments being relatively common among participants, it is not 
surprising that many suggested that Japan's geographical position and its topography have 
profoundly shaped Japanese national identity. A broad cross-section of participants 
suggested that because Japan is a small nation with few natural resources, the Japanese 
are hardworking peace-loving people. A business owner observed, for instance, 'We 
haven't had any choice other than to work hard to improve our quality of life, because we 
don't have natural resources, because we live in a small nation' [Ms. Tanaka]. Similarly, 
Mr. Saisho, a retiree, noted, 'Since the olden days, the Japanese people have tried to work 
in harmony with others. Because there have been so many people living in a small land, 
they have avoided conflicts as much as they could. This is how we built Japan. This is a 
national historical characteristic in Japan.' 
Another national characteristic described frequently by participants, an inability to 
accept outsiders, was also attributed, in part, to Japan's geographical location, specifically 
to its position as an 'island nation' ('shima-guni '). In comments typical of those among 
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public servants, business owners, employees, farmers and retirees, a group of teachers 
explained why Japanese people have dificulties accepting foreigners: 
Mr. Takahashi: It's because we have an island nation mentality (shima-
guni konjoo). 
Mr. Sato: 	 Because we have an island nation mentality. But in 
places like Europe where they have diferent nations on 
one continent, there are diferent races and languages. 
People are used to that from the time they're young 
children. However, when we see people from other 
countries, we see them as foreigners. 
Mr. Takahashi: In this way, we are exclusive. We are not skiled in 
accepting new things. . . . It could be said that Japanese 
people have the strongest racial prejudice (finshu henken) 
in the world. 
Later in the interview, these teachers drew on another concept related to Japan's 
position as an island nation, sakoku, Japan's 'closed country' policy, from the early-1600s 
to the mid-1800s. Participants frequently suggested that during this period of self-
imposed national isolation the Japanese developed a strong sense of ethnic exclusivity, a 
trait said to characterise contemporary Japanese. As one employee explained, 
There are stil some characteristics which developed when Japan was a 
closed nation. For example, if people have blue eyes, or wel-defined 
features, or are Ainu, they are considered a diferent people from the 
Japanese, which they shotildn't be. . . . We even expect them to have 
diferent points of view and a diferent human nature from us, even though 
we are the same human beings. . We have this preconception that only 
Japanese people can understand Japanese people [Mr. Yamazaki]. 
Furthermore, the teachers quoted above suggested that it is not only a sense of 
ethnic exclusivity which developed during sakoku, but actual 'racial' homogeneity: 
Mr. Sato: 	 We're shackled with sakoku. 
Mr. Takahashi: So we're monoracial. 
Mr. Sato: 	 That's because of sakoku. 
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Mr. Takahashi: Yes, sakoku. 
Mr. Sato: 	 If we didn't have sakoku, Japan wouldn't exist. 
Notions of space were used to differentiate not only between 'we Japanese' and 
foreign Others, but also between different Japanese sub-groups. As mentioned earlier, 
there was a tension in participants' discussions between the ideal of national unity or 
homogeneity and an awareness of significant regional diferences in language and ways of 
life. Some participants even suggested that Japanese regional identities are, in fact, much 
stronger than any sense of Japanese national identity. Using Kyushu as an example, Ms. 
Honda, a teacher, explained: 
The culture in Kyushu is strong and obviously each town has its own 
culture. They can talk about a lot of differences between Fukuoka and 
Oita or Miyazaki. . . . Each prefecture in Kyushu has their own identity 
and people wil say so loudly. People have a strong identity as an Ooita-
ken-jin [a person from Oita] that is a lot stronger than their identity as a 
Japanese. . . . They have a strong consciousness of belonging to the place 
they live. . . . Their community identity comes first, then their identity as 
a Japanese comes second. 
In addition to such diferences at the prefectural level, there was a perceived gulf 
between urban and rural areas and between Hokkaido and the Japanese 'mainland.' 119 It 
is perhaps not surprising that participants from rural Hirogawa viewed Japan's cities with 
some wariness. In comments strikingly similar to those made by rural Australian 
participants, Japanese participants suggested that cities are impersonal and alienating 
spaces. As one public servant, a life-long resident of Hirogawa noted, 'Maybe it's the 
same throughout the world that when people live in a large city they probably don't know 
their next door neighbour and wouldn't go out with them, and so on. People don't want 
to be meddled with in a big city. However, in a smal town, people are friendly and their 
group consciousness (nakama ishiki) is strong' [Mr. Imai]. 
Rural areas and rural inhabitants were also seen to lag behind urban centres. As 
another public servant observed, 'There are diferences between Japanese people who live 
119 Residents of Hokkaido frequently refer to Honshu as naichi,' the 'mainland' or 
'homeland.' 
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in cities and Japanese people who live in the countryside. . . . In the countryside, there are 
actually old traditions and customs and they are hard to change' [Mr. Matsui]. Such 
comments reveal an awareness of the marginality of rural Hokkaido relative to urban 
mainland spaces. In elaborating the differences between Hokkaido and the mainland, Mr. 
Hashimoto, an employee, suggested that Hokkaido is so different it is like a foreign 
country, and is treated as such by the central government of Japan which provides 
Hokkaido (and Okinawa) special development assistance funds akin to foreign aid. 'We 
are like the foreigners of Japan,' he notes. Likewise, Ms. Takayama, an employee who 
worked in Tokyo for several years when jobs were hard to find in Hokkaido, explained, 
'Hokkaido is far from Tokyo, so the economy of Hokkaido is behind the economy of 
central Tokyo. So when there is damage to the economy, the impact is greater in country 
areas like Hokkaido and Kyushu.' 
The sense of Hokkaido's marginality within Japan is even clearer in the comments 
of one young public servant who noted, simply, 'I've heard that people from Hokkaido 
are looked down on in Honshu' [Ms. Osawa]. However, Ms. Hara, one of her colleagues, 
was quick to point out that while Hokkaido may be on the periphery, its communities are 
characterised by more social cohesiveness than other areas. She noted, 'They [mainland 
urban areas] have some community social life, but not as much as we do, because 
Hokkaido is in the countryside, and people here think that's important.' Again, in a move 
similar to that observed among rural Australian participants, these rural Japanese 
participants acknowledged their geographic and socio-political marginality, and yet they 
inverted it by suggesting that, compared to cities, rural areas are more 'traditional,' more 
community-oriented, and in some ways more authentic examples of national values and 
ways of life. 
As argued earlier, it is crucial not only to describe the various dimensions of 
national identity, but to examine the ways they are used by participants and the ways they 
mirror, sustain and challenge hierarchies of gender and ethnicity. While the imagined 
national space is not strongly gendered in the narratives of nation detailed above, it is 
strongly ethnicised. Participants conceived of 'the Japanese' to be a 'racial' as well as a 
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spatial category, just as 'foreigners' were defined as both 'racially' and spatially distinct. 
In other words, in discourses of national identity 'the Japanese' and 'foreigners' are 
constructed as essentialised alters, characterised both by inherited biological and cultural 
traits, and by their location in specific national spaces. By engaging in such discourses, 
participants discursively mark out ethnicised boundaries of national identity which 
obscure the presence of ethnic Others, such as the Ainu, the Burakumin and Chinese and 
Korean residents of Japan, within the national space. 
Likewise, to contest the marginality and perceived inferiority of rural areas, of 
Hokkaido and of Japan more generally, participants defined these peripheral spaces as 
safe, 'traditional' and socially cohesive. In so doing, the Japanese 'myth' of harmonious 
homogeneity, described by some participants earlier in the chapter, is reinforced. 
Furthermore, participants used the notion of Japan's spatial isolation (and the self-
imposed isolation of sakoku) to explain a national intolerance of Others. The logic of 
geographical determinism was used to naturalise, and to some extent legitimate, what 
participants themselves call 'racial prejudice.' 
At the same time, however, some participants challenged the validity of the notion 
of racial or cultural homogeneity by cataloguing the great diversity of linguistic forms, 
cultural practices and character traits in different regions of Japan. Some also explicitly 
voiced disapproval of Japanese 'racial prejudice.' These and other counter-narratives of 
nation are covered in greater detail in the following section. 
Discourses of National Identity: Sustaining and Challenging Social Hierarchies 
On one hand, the widely circulating gendered and ethnicised discourses of national 
identity described above naturalise and legitimate current social hierarchies which 
privilege male over female and 'Japanese' over 'non-Japanese' ethnicity. On the other 
hand, such hegemonic discourses do not go unchallenged in participants' discussions. 
Many participants read against the grain of such discourses, critiquing them and 
constructing counter-narratives of nation grounded in their own experiences. While I 
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have already discussed some of these complexities, I wish to examine in greater detail the 
ways participants generated and used such counter-narratives of national identity. 
For instance, both male and female participants suggested that the kind of 
'traditional' images of Japaneseness associated with femininity and domesticity make 
them feel 'relieved,' at ease' or 'relaxed.' They viewed the nostalgia of such feminised 
discourses of national identity as an antidote to the anxieties over rapid social changes. 
However, other participants, particularly women, contested what they considered 
gendered clichés of Japaneseness. 120 Female teachers, female public servants and female 
business owners suggested that contrary to popular images of 'traditional' Japanese 
femininity, contemporary Japanese women work, drink beer, play golf, get hangovers and 
travel alone just like men. For women who are discursively relegated to the realm of the 
domestic, the passive and the archaic by gendered clichés of Japaneseness, contesting 
such discourses is a way of claiming a role for themselves which is public, active and 
contemporary. It is a way of writing themselves in to contemporary discourses of national 
identity. 
The ideological force of images of 'traditional' Japanese femininity is clear, 
however, in that many of these same participants returned to such clichés in the process of 
explaining their own marginality as women. For instance, Ms. Sasaki, a business woman 
quoted several times above, first actively rejected the patriarchal domestic arrangements 
which her colleagues suggested are typical of Japan; when the other business women 
noted that they serve their fathers and husbands the best food first and eat the inferior 
food themselves, she interjected, 'I take the best part right away!' Yet later in the 
interview, Ms. Sasaki argued that because men and women are biologically different, 
because women must bear children, and because men have the natural capacity to make 
120 Mr. Ando, the businessman quoted a number of times above, is the only male 
participant to contest gendered images of 'traditional' Japaneseness to any degree, by 
suggesting that they simply represent a 'fantasy' or 'ideal' of Japaneseness. However, 
he also noted that, 'Japanese men wish women to be neatly dressed, to bow 
respectfully, to wear kimono, and to wait for us at home,' a remark which reveals that 
despite his awareness that such an 'ideal' is unrealistic, he may have perceived it as 
desirable. 
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decisions while women have the natural capacity to 'endure,' men and women 'could 
never be equal/the same' (issho). Despite her earlier contestation, this explanation, 
underpinned by notions of 'traditional' Japanese femininity, naturalises and legitimates 
the patriarchal social relations in which she is enmeshed. 
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that discourses of Japanese 
national identity are not only gendered, they are also ethnicised, either explicitly or 
implicitly, in ways which discursively construct an ethnically homogeneous Japan. This 
discourse of ethnic homogeneity has three primary effects. First, it denies the existence, 
or the distinctiveness, of ethnic Others in Japan. In so doing, the discourse of 
homogeneity silences the voices of marginalised groups such as the Ainu and Ryuukyuu 
people and Korean and Chinese residents of Japan, and thus contributes to their on-going 
subordination. Secondly, the discourse of ethnic homogeneity naturalises and legitimates 
the rejection of foreigners in Japan. At least one participant, Mr. Taguchi, a local 
political figure quoted above, suggested that foreign workers and foreign spouses are 
problematic because they will cause 'race problems' heretofore unseen in Japan. 
Perceived threats to Japanese 'racial' purity can also be understood as perceived threats to 
the authority of those in positions of power, to the authority of men over women, of 
capital over labour, and of ethnic Japanese over ethnic Others. Thirdly, and finally, the 
discourse of ethnic homogeneity serves to reinforce the authority of the state. -If the 
nation is imagined to be a homogeneous, organic whole, which has evolved naturally 
through the millennia largely untouched by outside influences, the state itself can be 
understood as a natural and native institution of that highly integrated structure. The state 
is figured, then, not as a tool of the establishment or an oppressor of the masses, but the 
natural and legitimate extension of 'the people.' By this logic, resistance to state 
authority can be dampened, as struggle against the state becomes as futile as a struggle 
against oneself. 
However, some participants, again principally female participants, contested 
notions of Japanese ethnic or cultural homogeneity. Participants noted: 
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There isn't a unique culture in Japan anyway. It was originally introduced 
from overseas in the olden days [Ms. Hara, public servant]; 
It is a fantasy that [people] believe there is only one language and only one 
culture in their world. . . . I don't have that fantasy that Japan is a 
monoracial nation [Ms. Honda, teacher]; 
I don't think Japanese people think differently to other people. It's 
probably much the same anywhere. . . . It doesn't matter what colour of 
hair or eyes we have. We all perceive a lot of things in similar ways [Ms. 
lwabuchi, older farmer]. 
Again, it is suggestive that it is women who most vocally contested dominant 
discourses of Japanese national identity based on the notion of ethnic and cultural 
homogeneity. While some participants are generally more reflexive than others, it seems 
that people who are marginalised within widely circulating discourses of national identity 
on the basis of an ascribed characteristic such as gender, are more likely to contest such 
discourses. 
I noted in the previous chapter that even those Australian participants who most 
strongly critiqued widely circulating discourses of national identity nonetheless utilised 
such tropes as they negotiated discourses of Australian national identity. The same holds 
true for Japanese participants. Although Ms. Hara rejected the notion of a 'unique culture 
in Japan,' she had earlier explained the Japanese custom of o -chuugen (mid-year gift-
giving) in the following way: 'If someone is really helpful, we send them a gift. But why 
do we do that? Because it's Japan. It's our ancient custom. It's our culture.' Likewise, 
while Ms. Honda critiqued the notion of Japanese monoracialism, she returned several 
times during our interview to the theme of pan-Asian ethnicity; specifically, she 
mentioned 'psychological' differences between 'Asians' and 'white' Europeans and 
North Americans. Similarly, although Ms. Iwabuchi rejected the notion of fundamental 
differences between 'Japanese' and 'non-Japanese,' in the course of our focus group she 
and her colleagues exchanged information about the foreign farm workers in their 
township and surrounding communities. Comments regarding 'how many' and 'what 
kind of' foreigners resided nearby suggested that foreigners were considered sufficiently 
different so as to be the subject of interest and conversation. 
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As I argued earlier, such apparent contradictions should not be taken as an 
indication that the hegemonic discourses of national identity are unassailable. The fact 
that participants broke away from such discourses even momentarily suggests that these 
discourses are imperfect, unstable and contestable. Furthermore, participants' perceptions 
of the research process may have shaped the way they drew on widely circulating images 
of Japaneseness. That is, participants may have framed their own experiences and 
perceptions in the terms of reference established by authorised discourses of national 
identity for the benefit of a foreign researcher. In any case, counter-narratives such as 
those participants constructed, whether brief or more elaborated, contribute to the subtle 
reshaping of discourses of national identity over time. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have examined the ways categories of gender and ethnicity crosscut five 
dimensions of national identity in folk discourses of Japaneseness: national archetypes 
and the national character; social relations and social ethics; everyday practice; material 
and symbolic culture; and the environment. I have argued that discourses of national 
identity are gendered and ethnicised in ways that mirror, sustain and challenge the 
material marginalisation of women and ethnic minorities in Japan. 
Specifically, most folk discourses of nation construct men as active agents of 
national progress, and women as passive, domestic bearers of 'tradition,' while ethnic 
minorities are either rendered virtually invisible or constructed as essentialised Others. 
Such constructions reproduce both the dual ideologies of patriarchy and ethnic Japanese 
proprietorship of the nation, and the material effects of these ideologies. However, even 
as participants contribute to such gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity, 
they challenge such discourses. Some participants, particularly women, explicitly 
rejected the notions of Japanese ethnic homogeneity and 'traditional' Japanese femininity. 
Drawing on their own experiences, they constructed counter-narratives in which women 
195 
and ethnic minorities play more active, more contemporary and more prominent roles in 
discourses of Japanese national identity. 
Folk discourses of Japanese national identity evidence considerable overlap with 
mass mediated and authorised discourses. In particular, the 'traditional' feminine 
symbols of Japaneseness which feature prominently in television advertisements are 
evoked regularly in folk discourses of national identity. Likewise, in participants' 
explications of national identity, they employ concepts such as omote/ura,honne/tatemae 
and haji, which epitomise Japanese uniqueness in the authorised discourses of the 
Nihonjinron. Furthermore, there is significant overlap between participants' claims of 
Japanese ethnic homogeneity and authorised discourses and practices which obscure the 
presence of ethnic Others in the national community. This does not suggest, however, 
that authorised discourses of national identity ultimately determine folk accounts of 
Japaneseness. Rather, the evidence presented here suggests that there is a constant 
interplay between diverse discourses of national identity; and these discourses are 
unstable, dynamic and open to contestation. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
GLOBALISATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITIES IN AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN 
In the previous four chapters I examined the discursive construction of gendered and 
ethnicised national identities in Australia and Japan, and argued that people in these two 
national contexts employ such discourses in ways which both sustain and challenge 
current social hierarchies based on gender and ethnicity. What remains to be examined in 
this study is how globalisation is related to these discursive constructions of national 
identity in Australia and Japan. 
In the first part of this chapter, I draw on Australian and Japanese transcript data 
to explore how Australians and Japanese experience, understand and respond to recent 
globalising social changes, principally in the form of Australian multiculturalism and 
Japanese internationalisation. I then examine the relationship between these globalising 
changes and discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan. 
Folk Discourses of Globalisation 
Australian and Japanese participants' accounts of globalisation reveal a high degree of 
engagement with globalisation, primarily in the form of Australian multiculturalism and 
Japanese internationalisation. 121 A number of themes emerge out of participants' 
discussions of globalisation. Most notably, a large number of both Australian and 
Japanese participants discussed the following: the inevitability of globalisation; 
globalisation as a source of entertainment and novelty (a kind of global bazaar/bizarre); 
globalisation as an engine of social progress; and globalisation as a source of social 
121 Because I suspected that Australian participants would distinguish between 
globalisation and multiculturalism, I asked them about both. However, since, as 
explained in Chapter Three, the term 'internationalisation' (kokusaika) effectively 
encompasses all globalising processes, and because there is no other equivalent 
Japanese term for `globalisation' as I have defined it, I asked Japanese participants 
only about 'internationalisation.' However, as I argue below, the similarities between 
participants' discussions of globalisation, multiculturalism and internationalisation 
suggest that, in folk discourses, these three terms are largely synonymous. 
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disintegration. However, throughout Australian and Japanese discussions, there was little 
consensus about the significance or the consequences of globalisation. Participants 
constantly constructed, contested and reconstructed the meanings of such key terms as 
`globalisation,"multiculturalism' and 'internationalisation,' and provided shifting and 
complex accounts of the links between these phenomena and national identities. 
Globalisation as lived experience 
Participants in both Australia and Japan remarked with some regularity that globalisation 
is 'a fact of life' [Jack, Australian farmer], 'a reality' [Roger, Australian teacher], 
'something we can't avoid' [Mr. Ando, business owner], or 'a necessity' [Ms. Shimizu, 
Japanese farmer]. Such statements appear to be informed both by widely circulating mass 
mediated and authorised discourses which suggest that globalisation is a key dynamic in 
contemporary industrialised societies, and by participants' lived experiences of 
globalisation. 
Both Australians and Japanese provided detailed accounts of their engagement 
with globalisation. For instance, although I did not systematically record data on 
participants' family backgrounds, in the course of interviews and focus groups, roughly 
fifteen percent of Australian participants noted that they were migrants, or children of 
migrants, from either Southern, Central or Northern Europe, the United Kingdom or New 
Zealand. A further ten percent noted that they were either married to a migrant or had 
family members who resided overseas. In addition to such personal encounters with 
migration, a large number of participants, including both male and female farmers, public 
servants, teachers and employees, recounted stories of international travel, and/or 
suggested that international contacts were an important part of their jobs or businesses. 
Interestingly, however, Australian participants' lived experiences of globalisation 
and their perceptions of the relevance of globalisation to their lives were often quite 
different. Despite being migrants themselves, or living among migrants, having a number 
of international connections through business and travel, and encountering the global 
through everyday consumption practices (which participants explain include exposure to 
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global mass media, the Internet, and 'ethnic' food), many participants stated that 
globalisation and multiculturalism are not relevant to their everyday lives. For example, 
Anne, herself a British migrant, challenged the relevance of globalisation by arguing that 
it is merely 'a nice long word which people who really don't understand what it means 
say as often as possible, because it sounds good.' Likewise, Bernard, also a British 
migrant, suggested that multiculturalism is of little importance to him, despite his 
observation that sometimes migrants outnumber locals at his neighbourhood pub. He 
noted, 'I must admit I haven't really thought an awful lot about [multiculturalism], 
because it doesn't affect us down here.' Similarly, when asked whether she feels the 
effects of globalisation in her community, Carrie, a female employee responded, 
Not a great deal, really. I mean we have got, as I said, like my next-door 
neighbour, he's an American. And I know a few, I suppose, I know some 
people from England, [and] there is New Zealand. But not a great deal. 
Or not to my knowledge anyway. I mean, there could be, in town, and that 
sort of thing. But down here, there aren't many from the different parts of 
the world. 
This excerpt is interesting, first, because it reveals that Carrie sees globalisation as largely 
irrelevant to her lived experiences; she does not consider her everyday encounters with 
migrants from the United States, New Zealand and the United Kingdom to be part of a 
larger process of globalisation. Secondly, the excerpt reveals the degree to which Carrie's 
perceptions of globalisation and multiculturalism overlap. In this response, globalisation 
and multiculturalism are seen to be effectively identical; both are equated with the 
presence of migrants from non-English-speaking backgrounds. 
Similarly, other participants suggested that, while globalisation and 
multiculturalism may have far-reaching effects, they are not relevant to their ei/eryday 
lives. Teachers Phillip and Roger, for instance, argued that while globalisation and 
multiculturalism have affected Australia as a whole, their local rural communities have 
not felt these effects. Interestingly, both participants, in separate interviews, suggested 
that the effects of globalisation are only felt in wealthier segments of Australian society. 
In their economically depressed rural communities, they explained, most people are 
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unable to aford imported commodities, computers to access the Internet, or overseas 
travel, and therefore their encounters with globalisation are limited. Likewise, they 
argued, because their communities are experiencing high unemployment, there are no 
jobs to draw migrants to the area, and therefore the impact of multiculturalism is limited. 
Such observations neatly capture the perceived conflict between people trying to 
make their livings in the increasingly stagnant economy of rural Australia, and the 
relatively prosperous urban intelectuals who make their (our) living studying and writing 
about globalisation. Also exposed is a tension between authorised and mass mediated 
discussions of globalisation and everyday experiences of globalisation. These 
contradictions become apparent in participants' ambivalence toward globalisation. 
Focus group discussions reveal a high degree of disagreement among participants 
over both the meaning and the perceived impact of globalisation and multiculturalism. 
For example, this exchange among four business owners reveals four distinct 
understandings of globalising processes: 
Charles: 	 [Globalisation] certainly does afect my business. . . . I mean, 
we are on the Internet these days. I can get inquiries from the 
U.K., America, anywhere. . . I can communicate almost 
instantly with those people through e-mail. And that, to me, is 
globalisation working in our industry. . . . This country just 
couldn't exist without the globalisation of its economy. 
Edward: 	 But do you think, Charles, that. . . because of the costs 
involved in geting onto these networks, that it's now 
impossible for a single bloke to open a [business] in 
Plainsview? And it wil be more so next year and the year 
after. . . . Globalisation is concentrating ownership of 
businesses into smaler and smaler hands. 
Conrad: 	 I must admit that I don't have a very good feeling or 
understanding of globalisation. 
Trent: 	 Australia sort of seems to be globalised more than anyone 
else. You know, like al the people that come in here, but you 
don't hear of groups of Australians migrating to China or like 
that. And I find here now, even in my business, that we get 
quite a few diferent migrants down here, you know, diferent 
people. 
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In this brief excerpt, it is clear that Charles associated globalisation with the expanded 
opportunities afforded by new technologies; Edward focused on what he perceives to be 
the changing balance of power brought about by the globalisation of capital; Conrad 
admitted that he simply does not understand globalisation; and Trent equated 
globalisation with migration and multicultural diversity. 
Clearly participants defined `globalisation' and 'multiculturalism' in a variety of 
ways, reflecting the diversity of definitions circulating through government, academic and 
popular discussions of these two contemporary buzzwords. The way participants defined 
these terms undoubtedly informed their perceptions of the relevance of globalisation and 
multiculturalism to their lives. Many participants who associated `globalisation' with 
phenomena such as global financial markets, multinational corporations, or supra-national 
political entities like the United Nations, regarded it as largely irrelevant to their lives. 
However, many of those who conceptualised `globalisation' as contact with people, 
commodities and information from outside Australia regarded it as a significant part of 
their everyday lives. Likewise, those participants who associated 'multiculturalism' with 
the presence of large numbers of 'non-white' or non-English-speaking background 
migrants saw little evidence of this phenomenon in their predominantly 'white' 
communities. However, those participants who associated 'multiculturalism' with 
expanded knowledge of other cultures and attitudes of 'tolerance' and 'acceptance' 
tended to perceive multiculturalism as a dynamic force in their local communities. 
Likewise, the comments of a large number of Japanese participants suggest that 
they are actively engaged in globalisation, particularly through travel, work and 
consumption practices. Although I did not systematically gather data on participants' 
overseas experiences, in the course of interviews and focus groups almost twenty-five 
percent of participants noted that they had travelled abroad for business, pleasure or 
study. Furthermore, a large number of participants, including teachers, public servants, 
business owners and farmers, suggested that international contacts were an important part 
of their jobs or businesses. Finally, participants in all social locations indicated that 
imported commodities were increasingly a part of their everyday lives. 
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Despite describing extensive encounters with the people, commodities and 
information associated with globalisation, or internationalisation, most Japanese 
participants suggested that it is not particularly relevant or meaningful to them. In the 
words of participants: 
I think Japanese people, including myself, really don't know what 
internationalisation is, although the word has really spread [Ms. Wada, 
teacher]; 
It's now the age of internationalisation. . . but it is difficult to say what 
internationalisation actually is [Mr. Hata, public servant]; 
I don't really understand what [internationalisation] means. It hasn't 
really penetrated here. I think people here don't really consider it 
important [Ms. Sasaki, business owner]; 
In our everyday lives, no one is aware of internationalisation very much, 
unless people have some connection to internationalisation through their 
work [Mr. Takenaka, employee]; 
I hear the word [internationalisation] very often, but I don't usually think 
about what it means [Ms. Mitsui, farmer]. 
Even Mr. Taguchi, a senior public servant who led early prefectural study-abroad 
programs to North America, initiated international student exchange programs in 
Hirogawa, and was instrumental in publishing Hirogawa's first information pamphlet for 
foreign visitors, suggested that internationalisation has not had much of an impact in 
Hokkaido. He explained that, unlike city dwellers, rural Japanese are still willing to 
undertake manual labour, so there is no need to recruit foreign workers for these low-skill 
jobs. With this low level of migration, he reasoned, the impact of internationalisation is 
limited. 
In contrast to such views, some participants stressed the centrality of 
internationalisation in their everyday lives. For example, when asked whether 
internationalisation was relevant even to farmers in a small town like Hirogawa, these 
young farmers responded: 
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Mr. Hosokawa: Yes, I think so. 
Mr. Kada 
Mr. Hosokawa: 
It's the most relevant to us! 
I think it's relevant on the technological side.. . . There 
are many people who use imported machines. If we 
consider the specific details, every farmer is involved 
with imports. .. . So, that considered, I think 
internationalisation is necessary. 
As was the case with Australians' understandings of globalisation and 
multiculturalism, Japanese participants understood internationalisation in a variety of 
ways, and the way they defined internationalisation determined its perceived relevance to 
their lives. As suggested above, a large number of participants expressed confusion over 
what internationalisation entails; therefore it is not surprising that they doubted its 
relevance in their lives. Furthermore, participants such as Mr. Taguchi, quoted above, 
equated internationalisation with migration, a phenomenon which has little impact on the 
everyday lives of Japanese in a small rural community such as Hirogawa. Finally, still 
other participants, such as the young farmers quoted above, equated internationalisation 
with the realms of technology and the economy. Thus defined, internationalisation was 
perceived to have a profound impact on their livelihoods and lives. Regardless of their 
perceptions of internationalisation, however, Japanese participants in all social locations 
discussed everyday encounters with the people, commodities, information and processes 
associated with internationalisation, indicating a high level of engagement with 
globalisation as I have defined it. 
The inevitability of globalisation 
One of the few points on which most Australian and most Japanese participants agreed is 
the inevitability of globalisation, sometimes expressed as the 'necessity' to globalise. 
When asked whether globalisation is good or bad for their respective nations, a large 
number of participants provided similar answers: 
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Whether it's good or bad. . . it's a fact of life. You can't stop it, or you 
can't say anything about it [Jack, Australian farmer]; 
It's not a mater of good or bad. We have to go through this. It's just 
something we can't avoid. . . . It's necessary [Mr. Ando, Japanese business 
owner]; 
I think it's necessary and we have to go ahead with it. [If we don't] we 
wil be isolated from other countries [Ms. Wada, Japanese teacher]; 
I think you've got to [globalise], or you get left behind [Roy, Australian 
public servant]. 
Even participants who were critical of globalisation did not suggest that their 
nations could, or should try to, withdraw from it. Australian business owners Leanne and 
• Nick, for example, advocated tight restrictions on immigration, and the implementation of 
protectionist tarifs, measures they suggested would insulate the Australian economy and 
Australian culture from the disruptive forces of globalisation. However, they also 
indicated that it is acceptable, even desirable, for Australia to engage in global trade, but 
only as a provider, not a consumer, of global commodities. 
Leanne: 	 We're kiling our own pigs. We're digging them into the 
ground. We're throwing out our oranges. 
Nick: 	 Because we dropped our tarifs. 
Leanne: 	 And Australia is the only country on this bloody earth that can 
be self-sufficient. It is the only continent on the face of the 
earth that can be self-sufficient. We have got everything. And 
quite frankly, why we let the rest of the world dictate to us, I 
have no idea. 
Nick: 	 And stuf the United Nations, because they are not doing 
anything for us except harming us. 
Leanne: 	 This is Australia. We can be self-sufficient. And if they want 
our stuff, they can bloody wel pay for it. I don't need your 
oranges. I have got my own oranges but if you want my 
oranges you can buy them. I've got my own pork. I don't 
need your pork. 
Nick: 	 That's exactly right. 
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There were no such outspoken critics of globalisation amongst Japanese 
participants. However, even those who voiced reservations about, or criticisms of, 
globalisation did not advocate retreating from it. For example, a group of older male 
farmers lamented the fact that because of the globalisation of trade, specifically the 
liberalisation of Japan's market, 'We don't know what the future of farming holds' [Mr. 
Iwai]. As one man noted, 'I wonder how we can go on' [Mr. Iwabuchi]. After further 
discussion they agreed, however, that without globalisation, Japan as a whole would not 
enjoy the level of prosperity it currently does. 
Mr. Iwabuchi: 
Mr. Aiba: 
If we didn't have many imports, farmers could make a 
good living. . . . If there were no imports. . . we could sell 
our produce at the price we wanted. However, as a whole, 
Japan has benefited from kokusaika in manufacturing and 
exporting cars, electrical goods, video players and so on. 
If there were no kokusaika, Japan would still be a 
miserable country like North Korea.I 22 
If it had continued to be like the olden days, Japan would 
be like North Korea. I suppose we should admit that we 
are fortunate to be like this. 
Mr. Iwabuchi: If Japan weren't internationalised, our standard of living 
wouldn't be the same. 
Participants in Australia and Japan clearly had a variety of opinions on whether 
globalisation is good or bad, whether it presents new opportunities or threatens 
'traditional' ways of life. However, there was widespread agreement that globalisation is 
inevitable, a necessity of the contemporary world, for better or for worse. 
The global bazaar/bizarre 
A second theme in Australian and Japanese folk discourses of globalisation centred 
around commodity and spectacle. A consumption-oriented, even voyeuristic, engagement 
with globalisation emerged out of Australian and Japanese discussions of globalisation, 
multiculturalism and internationalisation. Participants stressed both the new 
122 Mr. Iwabuchi used the expression mijime na kuni,' literally, a miserable or 
pitiable country, which probably refers to the North Korean food shortages which 
were making headlines in Japan at the time of the interview. 
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commodities, knowledge and experiences available in the increasingly global 
marketplace, the global 'bazaar,' and the pleasure of gazing upon the alien, the novel, the 
'bizarre' people, places, practices and objects which globalisation brings to their 
doorsteps, or often to their lounge-room televisions. 
In Chapter Five I quoted an Australian teacher, Phillip, in his description of the 
goals of multiculturalism: 'To try their food, to watch their dances, to view their films, 
let them speak their language and respect them for that. . . . It add[s] a lot of colour.' His 
description highlights two of the most prominent themes in Australian participants' 
discussions of globalisation and multiculturalism, food and spectacle. A broad cross-
section of participants, including male and female teachers, public servants, business 
owners and farmers, argued that food is a major part of globalising change in Australia. 
In fact, in discussions of globalisation and multiculturalism, food emerged as one of the 
most common, and non-threatening, ways of encountering the Other. Even business 
owner Leanne, who was highly critical of globalisation and multiculturalism, reflected 
positively on the kind of smorgasbord multiculturalism to which her mother, as a migrant, 
contributed: 
We used to have multicultural day at school. . . out in the middle of Hick 
Town. 123 We had a multicultural day once a year. . . . We had these 
stands, and they would have, like, a picture of the national dress of the 
country, the flags, and say if it was France, I think it was a picture of the 
Eiffel Tower or something, and the Arc de Triomphe and stuff like that. 
And then we had some French food, and there were French bottles of wine 
and things like that. .. . My mum used to do a [display] for them. And 
everyone would go for [her food], because they had all been to my house 
and had [her cooking]. And they were happy to accept all of that. . . . 
They were very accepting of that sort of multiculturalism. 
Leanne went on to argue, however, that while this kind of taste-testing at the global 
bazaar is acceptable, multiculturalism has gone 'too far' in Australia, to the point where 
the integrity of the national culture is compromised. 'We have lost something along the 
way,' she noted. 'We have lost our Australian identity.' 
123 'Hick Town' is Leanne's own term for her home town. 
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I will return to the issue of changing national identity below. First, however, 
another theme to emerge out of participants' discussions of multiculturalism and 
globalisation, was the pleasure of viewing the spectacle associated with globalising 
trends. Participants including teachers, public servants, business owners and farmers, 
spoke positively about the festivals, costumes and art forms, as well as the 'colour,' 
which 'ethnics' introduce into Australian society. Participants' choice of the terms 
'colour' and 'colourful' reveal a blurring of literal colour (the skin, hair and eye colour of 
'ethnics') and metaphorical colour (the pleasant novelty of viewing Other people, 
practices and commodities). As Paula, a teacher, noted, 
I would just like to see more of it [ethnic diversity in her school]. And 
more of a wider representation than just the Anglo-Saxon, you know. So 
maybe some Asian children or some African children. . . just to make it a 
more colourful mix in the school. I shouldn't use the word "colour" 
[laughing] . . . but, yes. 
While Australian participants stressed largely the pleasurable aspects of 
consuming the commodities and spectacles of the global bazaar/bizarre, some also 
suggested that this consumption comes at a high social cost to the nation. Just as Leanne, 
quoted above, suggested that too much multiculturalism undermines Australian national 
identity, a group of high school girls expressed concerns that Australia's national debt 
will grow from an over-reliance on imports (which they nonetheless refer to as 'the cool 
stuff). Likewise, Rose, a business owner, voiced fears that access to inappropriate 
material on the Internet would 'pollute young minds' in Australia. Similarly, a group of 
female farmers raised concerns about the foreign values being imported along with 
foreign commodities. As Mary Ann noted, 'Influences like McDonalds and other 
worldwide things like Coca Cola. . . really are trying to get their message out to 
everybody. . . . I think that's the concept I have trouble with--just the values that that 
brings with it.' 124 
124 It is possible that participants chose McDonalds and Coca Cola as examples 
because I had shown them television advertisements for both of these products. 
However, even before they had seen these advertisements, some participants offered 
these products as examples of globalisation. 
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Ted, a public servant, also gave McDonalds as an example of the negative effects 
of globalisation, specifically, the threat globalisation poses to cultural diversity. He 
observed, [McDonalds] represents the worst side of globalisation. . . . It sort of breaks 
down those identities, the local character of those areas. It Americanises everything.' 
Likewise, Louise, an older farmer, was among a number of participants who voiced 
concerns over the perceived homogenising effects of globalisation: 
Whilst I believe that globalisation is good, I mean, you go around and the 
kids are speaking with American slang. . . . Far better that American 
children speak American slang and Australian children speak Australian 
slang, and British children speak British slang. . . . Because that's the 
loveliest thing about being able to go around the world and see all the 
different cultures and traditions and the way people live. . . . [But] when 
you see the young kids, even the way they dress, the baggy, long shorts 
and the baseball caps on backward. It doesn't matter if you are in France, 
England, South Africa. . . . Everybody's sort of trending toward the same 
common denominators, you know, in everything. So I don't know. I 
think it would be a great pity. 
Even such concerns about cultural homogenisation appear to be consumption-oriented, 
however. In the above excerpt, it is not cultural diversity for its own sake that Louise 
fears losing; rather, she disapproves of cultural homogenisation, 'because that's the 
loveliest thing about being able to go around the world and see all the different cultures 
and traditions and the way people live.' In other words, she disapproves of such 
homogenisation because it would deprive her of the pleasurable spectacle of diversity, the 
global bazaar/bizarre. 
Japanese participants also focused on the global as bazaar/bizarre in their 
discussions of internationalisation. Participants consistently described 
internationalisation in terms of encounters with foreign commodities, with foreign 
languages, and with foreign people. Japanese participants in all social locations discussed 
the material changes internationalisation has introduced to their everyday lives. A wide 
range of participants suggested, for example, that the adoption of 'Western,' and 
especially 'American' food, clothing and household items is a key part of 
internationalisation. When asked to define internationalisation, Ms. Osada, a public 
servant, explained that, 'Japan is changing to be like foreign countries.. . . Japan copies 
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what America does. For example, people in Japan used to have Japanese-style houses 
with tatami rooms, but now they have big, luxurious houses. Because the age has 
changed, people copy Western styles.' 
A group of male teachers took up a similar theme when discussing the increasing 
use of English and English loan words in Japan, another feature of internationalisation 
frequently noted by a wide range of participants.125 
Mr. Takahashi: Japanese think it's cool if they use English words. Even 
if there are translations in Japanese and it's not 
appropriate to use English words, they stil intentionaly 
use the English terms for such things as the news, or for 
anything. 
Mr. Sato: 	 They use English words in an unnatural way. 
Mr. Takahashi: 	 Japanese people are easily influenced by foreign culture, 
especialy by Western culture. They are afected easily. 
So people younger than us, those under twenty, or junior 
and senior high school students, would think it's cool. 
Participants including high school students, teachers, public servants, employees and 
retirees, suggested that learning another language, usualy English, is one way of 
becoming a kokusaijin (literaly an 'international person;' however, the term 'global 
citizen' captures the sense of the term more closely). While some suggested that learning 
English is necessary, 'because there are a lot of foreign people in Japan now, and you 
have to be able to talk to them' [Ms. Doi, high school student], others stressed that they 
study another language because it is 'interesting,' and 'enjoyable' [female employees]. 
Many also hoped to use their language skils to establish friendships with foreigners. 
While foreign commodities and even languages to a certain degree, are part of the 
global bazaar which participants described in their discussions of internationalisation, 
foreign people were seen by many to be a source of pleasurable spectacle. As Mr. 
Miyake, an employee, noted, 'People in the countryside of Japan just like to see 
foreigners. They're a rarity.' Likewise, a group of female public servants explained: 
125 For a detailed discussion of the use of English and English loanwords in Japan, 








We don't see many people from overseas here. We get 
excited when we meet them. 
We get flustered. 
We are not surprised, but we want to take a photograph of 
them. 
Or shake hands with them or talk with them. 
But when we meet Chinese or Korean people, we're not as 
excited as when we meet Westerners. 
Because of the face. 
We don't realise they're not Japanese. 
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The ethnicity, or 'face,' of non-Asians is not only novel, 'bizarre,' and therefore 
pleasurable to gaze upon, it is also, in a sense, cornmodified. In the above exchange, 
foreigners themselves become part of the global bazaar, objects to be admired, desired 
and photographed.I 26 
Although a broad cross-section of Japanese participants equated 
internationalisation with the global bazaar/bizarre detailed above, an equally wide range 
of participants stressed the inadequacy of such consumption-oriented, or voyeuristic, 
understandings of internationalisation. Participants including teachers, public servants, 
business owners and farmers, suggested that internationalisation is not simply a matter of 
learning a foreign language, adopting a foreign 'lifestyle' (by which participants generally 
mean adopting imported commodities), or even travelling abroad. Rather, 
internationalisation was said to require a genuine understanding and acceptance of Other 
cultures and Other people, and two-way cultural exchanges, as this group of teachers 
indicated: 
126 If, from a Foucauldian perspective, surveillance is power, then photography is an 
act of power maintenance and a photograph is the material evidence of that power. 
Therefore, snapshots of foreign Others and foreign objects can be seen as a way of 
managing the complex mixture of fear and fascination with these Others, or Other-
objects. See Crawshaw and Urry (1997). 
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Interviewer: 	 What do you think internationalisation is? 
Mr. Sato: 	 That's difficult to answer. 
Mr. Takahashi: 	 If we are just learning the English language, that's not 
internationalisation. 
Mr. Oomori: Internationalisation is even in our teachers' guide. If we 
were asked what internationalisation is, we would 
answer that it's not only studying languages but also 
learning about different cultures and customs. That 
would be internationalisation. 
Mr. Takahashi: 	 To do that, we have to be able to introduce our culture 
to- 
Mr. Oomori: 	 Yes, it's not only accepting other cultures, but also 
introducing our culture to others. That's 
internationalisation, according to the teachers' guide. 
Interviewer: 	 Could you give any examples of what you might do to 
introduce Japanese culture? 
Mr. Oomori: 	 What would we do? It's hard to imagine because I'm 
not realy involved in this sort of thing. . . I'd rather 
leave the major part of internationalisation, such as 
culture, to people who do it for a living. 
This exchange highlights not only perceptions that internationalisation is more than 
merely spectacle and consumption, but also a perception that internationalisation is being 
managed by people Who 'do it for a living.' 
Perceptions of this professional staging of internationalisation also emerged out of 
participants' discussions of international imagery in advertisements. As mentioned in 
Chapter Six, many participants suggested that advertisers use foreign actors, setings and 
languages to give their product a 'cool' or 'high class' image. A group of teachers took 
this point one step further to suggest that 'internationalisation' is simply a novel way of 
seling products. Commenting on an advertisement which featured a foreign actor, they 
noted: 
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Ms. Kondo: 	 It seems like an international image but- 
Ms. Wada: 	 It's just something to manipulate consumers and get their 
atention. 
Ms. Noguchi: A means of seling a product. 
This exchange suggests that internationalisation serves not only to facilitate the 
consumption of Other commodities and spectacles, but that internationalisation itself is a 
commodity, a saleable signifier which imbues material objects with symbolic value. In 
short, internationalisation becomes an exploitable image, 'a means of seling a product.' 
The passage again highlights the centrality of the global bazaar/bizare in Japanese 
encounters with, and folk discourses of, globalisation. Although many Japanese and 
Australian participants chalenged this essentialy consumerist and voyeuristic orientation 
to globalisation, the transcript evidence above suggests that this is one important way 
participants conceptualised globalisation. However, rather than viewing such an 
orientation as a superficial response to globalisation, such a response shows that 
participants draw on their everyday lived experiences in the process of interpreting the 
globalising social processes which are transforming their worlds. It is to these perceived 
transformations that I turn next. 
Social progress and social crisis 
As I suggested above, among both Australian and Japanese participants, there was litle 
consensus about the consequences of globalisation; participants in both national setings 
suggested that globalisation is a source of both social progress and social crisis. Both 
Australian and Japanese participants suggested, for example, that globalisation has the 
capacity to promote democracy, greater environmental awareness, the development of a 
freer and more peaceful `borderless world,' and greater equality for al people regardless 
of their gender or ethnicity. However, they also suggested that globalisation fuels 
undesirable social trends (such as the breakdown of families, communities, and values, 
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and the increase in crime and social inequality), and has the potential to destabilise their 
respective national economies, and undermine their respective national identities. 
Regarding the democratising effects of globalisation, for instance, Japanese 
retirees explained that although they had been manipulated by the national leadership 
during World War II, with globalised information and communication technologies now 
available, 'We know more about what's happening, so we are not going to be fooled 
again' [Ms. Hamabata]. Similarly, older Australian farmers suggested that globalised 
mass media create greater political transparency, making it more difficult for national 
leaders to abuse their positions of power. As one farmer put it: 
The general speed of communication and information is so rapid, and 
everything that occurs around the world is known instantly to everybody 
around the world. . . . And you can't be in isolation. Like China might try 
to. . . keep in isolation. But everybody that has got access to television, 
which nearly everybody has these days, can see what is happening in the 
world, and can't be kept behind information barriers, like they could in the 
past. . . . So that stops a lot of the mumbo-jumbo that kept people in their 
place, by dictators and what have you in the past. It can't be swung these 
days [Gus]. 
A broad cross-section of both Australian and Japanese participants also associated 
globalisation with issues of environmental protection and world peace. For instance, 
when asked ho W she would define globalisation, Lisa, an Australian teacher, explained, 
Well, I suppose it's just a consciousness thing, isn't it. That we are not 
just part of a country or even a district, but a world. And I suppose with 
issues like, you know, pollution and war and things like that, that you have 
to take responsibility for them as part of the world, not just part of a local 
culture. . . . That's the kind of concept I try to get across to the kids. That 
we are all in one world. 
Likewise, explaining Japan's need to internationalise, Ms. Noguchi, a Japanese teacher, 
commented, 'Because the globe is one and we all share the same atmosphere, we can't 
just improve our own country. . . . There are problems such as water and air pollution, and 
since we live together on one planet, we want to get together to discuss them.. . . So we 
can't be isolated from the [rest of] the world.' 
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A number of Australian and Japanese participants also shared a utopian vision of a 
`borderless world,' characterised by world peace, a high degree of trust and cooperation 
between different regions of the globe, and the unfettered circulation of people, goods and 
knowledge. In discussing the economic and social consequences of internationalisation, 
for instance, Ms. Kuroda, a Japanese business owner, detailed a plan she said she had had 
since childhood. In Ms. Kuroda's hopes for the future, she envisioned a world divided 
not into nations, but into productive units. Some geographical areas would specialise in 
agricultural production, and others in manufacturing, mineral extraction and so on, with a 
system of cooperatively owned and managed global transportation and communications 
networks. 'When that happens,' she explained, 'there will be no war.' In a similarly 
optimistic vision of the future, Dominic, an Australian public servant, expressed hopes 
that globalisation will lead to the obliteration of national borders and the lifting of 
restrictions on work and travel in all regions of the globe. He admitted that some people 
would object to such a system out of the fear that newcomers would take their jobs; but, 
on the contrary, he explained, 'It is not actually taking something away from me. It is 
giving me a bigger village to run around in.' 
Participants in both Australia and Japan also suggested that globalisation is 
breaking down inequalities based on gender and ethnicity in their respective nations. A 
broad cross-section of both Australian and Japanese participants, for instance, suggested 
that as memories of World War II start to fade, there is a consequent reduction of racism 
in their respective countries, and greater openness to new people, practices and ideas. 
Some participants also argued that such globalising processes are particularly significant 
for women. Both male and female teachers in Australia, for instance, explained that the 
economic restructuring associated with globalisation has provided women with expanded 
job opportunities, while jobs for men have become increasingly scarce. While the 
teachers noted the liberating possibilities for women, however, they also suggested that 
such changes were provoking a backlash among some sectors of their local communities. 
Japanese participants in a wide range of social locations also argued that 
globalising social changes have particular consequences for women. For instance, Ms. 
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Ueno, the senior teacher quoted at some length in the previous chapter, spoke about the 
gradual increase in high-rank female educators in the prefecture. When asked what she 
thinks is driving such changes, she responded, 'This is related to international matters, 
such as the discourse of gender equality. . . . The increase of female [senior teachers] is 
part of this.' In a similar vein, Japanese public servants suggested that 







Internationalisation has influenced equality for men and 
women. [Japan used to be] male dominated, but as other 
cultures have been introduced to Japan, it has become freer. 
. . . Women probably accept it [internationalisation] more 
than men do.. .. I think it's beneficial to women. 
To women more than to men? 
It's all about social power. 
Japanese women hope that Japan will adopt an 
American manner of respecting women. In America, 
men support women, even when they deliver babies. 
They consider it a job to be shared by both men and 
women. 
Women hope this will change to their own benefit. . . . 
People like to accept the parts of internationalisation 
which are beneficial to them. 
The above exchange highlights not only a perception that the consequences of 
internationalisation are gendered, but also a perception that people have the power to 
accept or reject specific kinds of globalising social changes. However, relatively few 
Japanese or Australian participants suggested that people have the power to choose 
whether or not to be engaged with globalisation. Rather, participants more commonly 
discussed the destabilising and disintegrative effects of globalisation. Participants in both 
nations, for example, noted the negative economic impacts of globalisation, an especially 
strong theme among farmers. Some participants even suggested that globalisation is 
actually a plot, by other nations or supranational organisations such as the United Nations, 
to weaken and control their respective nations. For instance, while a number of 
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Australian business owners and farmers argued that `globalisation,"free trade' and a 
'level playing field' are simply concepts used by more powerful nations to more fully 
exploit less powerful nations, one Japanese business owner, Ms. Osumi, more explicitly 
linked a number of globalising social changes in Japan with an American plot to 
gradually transform and weaken the nation. She explained: 
Another point I've heard is that we were a defeated nation, and this has 
had an influence little by little, as America intended. It is just over fifty 
years since the war. When Japan was defeated and surrendered 
unconditionally, America didn't ruin Japan all at once. As they planned, 
during the last fifty years, America has changed Japan from the inside 
through education, entertainment, sports, music, movies, etcetera, and 
Japan was taken in by this. What we are seeing in Japan is its results. 
That was written in a book, and it made me feel it was right. .. . It was a 
plan to make Japan less industrious. 
Two points are of particular interest here. First, Ms. Osumi explained that she took this 
argument from a book. This highlights the extent to which folk discourses of 
globalisation are informed by other widely circulating discourses. Secondly, although 
Ms. Osumi is somewhat atypical in detailing such a conscious conspiracy by a specified 
national Other, her opinions simply represent a more extreme version of those expressed 
by a large number of both Japanese and Australian participants, who suggested they are 
powerless to stop the undesirable social trends associated with globalisation. 
Among such undesirable social changes, both Japanese and Australian participants 
identified the breakdown of families, communities and values and the increase in crime 
and social inequality. In Chapter Six I discussed Japanese perceptions that globalising 
social changes were leading to the decline of the work ethic and national morals and to a 
possible 'race problem' resulting from an increase in marriages between Japanese and 
non-Japanese. Some Japanese participants also expressed concern over the crime 
perceived to accompany internationalisation. As one young male farmer noted, 'There 
are drugs and guns which weren't a problem before. Since overseas relationships have 
deepened, marijuana, heroin, stimulant drugs, and guns have spread in Japan. It's scary. 
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These kind of cases are happening often these days in Japan, and I feel that this is a part 
of internationalisation' [Mr. Hosokawa]. 
Similarly, a broad cross-section of Australian participants suggested that 
globalisation is turning rural communities into 'ghost towns,' resulting in high 
unemployment, welfare dependency and the consequent breakdown of families and 
community spirit. Furthermore, in comments strikingly similar to those made by 
Japanese participants, many Australians expressed concerns about the rise in crime, drug 
use and violence thought to be a result of globalisation. Female retirees observed, for 
instance, that migrants have made Australia 'more violent;' male public servants and 
male and female business owners suggested that drug trafficking and violent clashes 
between 'ethnics' have increased as a result of increased 'non-white' immigration; and 
one public servant noted that globalisation has introduced a 'criminal element' not seen 
before in Australia [Nancy], an interesting act of selective memory, given that many of 
Australia's earliest European colonisers were exiled convicts. 
Australian business owner Edward, perhaps best captured the fear and pessimism 
which many participants, both in Australia and Japan, expressed about globalisation, 
when he observed: 
[It's] a terror, really, globalisation. . . . In globalisation, everything 
becomes the bloody same Western culture, per se, which is absolutely 
lousy. . . . All those magnificent different buildings and the different 
languages, globalisation is attempting to destroy all that, and make just 
one terrible modern Western culture--[one] hedonistic, self-seeking, 
destructive society. 
While Edward is atypical in the passion with which he denounced globalisation, he 
touched on a number of key themes among other participants, themes of social 
disintegration, moral decline, and cultural loss. 
Social location and responses to globalisation 
As I have already noted, I began conducting interviews and focus groups in Australia and 
Japan with the expectation that people in different social locations would encounter, 
understand and respond to globalisation in quite different ways. I anticipated that I would 
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find significant differences between age groups and occupational groups, and between 
male and female participants. Overall, differences between these groups were less 
prominent and more subtle than expected. 
There were no discernible differences between male and female accounts of 
globalisation. The most prominent differences between the groups in their accounts of 
globalisation were differences by age. In general, younger age groups reported a higher 
degree of engagement with global commodities, technologies and national Others. 
However, of all age groups in the study, the youngest participants, high school students in 
both Australia and Japan, demonstrated the least detailed understandings of globalisation; 
few seemed to have consciously contemplated globalisation previously, and some were 
unfamiliar with the concept. Among the oldest participants in the study, Australian and 
Japanese retirees, quite the opposite was true. That is, of all age groups, retirees detailed 
the lowest degree of engagement with global products, technologies and national Others; 
however, they constructed more detailed accounts of issues of globalisation than student 
participants. This suggests that globalisation is increasingly in the realm of the taken-for-
granted in Australia and Japan. Those who have grown up in an environment of 
intensified globalisation, do not perceive of globalisation as problematic, but simply as a 
fact of life. It is those who have witnessed the acceleration of globalising social changes 
over recent decades who regard globalisation as an 'issue,' requiring conscious thought 
and deliberate action. 
Likewise, there were subtle differences in the ways different occupational groups 
encountered and conceptualised globalisation. Employees and students only addressed 
globalisation in general terms, and I was unable to identify any recurrent themes in their 
accounts. However, farmers' accounts of globalisation focused primarily on commodity 
imports and exports and so-called 'free-trade' issues. Teachers focused primarily on the 
use of global communications technologies to enhance the learning experience. Public 
servants concentrated on learning from other countries how to improve local 
communities, while protecting their communities from the perceived ill effects of 
immigration and cross-cultural conflict. Many retirees focused on the perceived 
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disintegrating effects of globalising social changes. And business owners concentrated on 
the issues specific to their enterprises: imports of the technology or materials they 
require; ways to serve an increasingly diverse clientele; ways to exploit new technologies 
to increase sales; and ways to remain financialy viable smal businesses in the face of 
global competition. 
Such diferences suggest that people in diferent occupational groups are atuned 
to diferent aspects of globalisation, those aspects which most profoundly afect their 
economic wel-being. However, it should be noted that there was a great diversity of 
responses to globalisation within each of these groups. In al of the occupational groups, 
there were individuals who disapproved of globalising changes and individuals who 
approved of them, individuals who embraced them and individuals who resisted them. 
Furthermore, it was not uncommon for a single individual to express shifting and, at 
times, contradictory responses to globalisation. 
Both Australian and Japanese accounts of globalisation are characterised by a 
high degree of ambivalence about globalising social changes. Such ambivalence is seen 
most clearly in focus group discussions in which participants negotiated meanings and 
responses to globalisation to reach a provisional consensus on the social transformations 
they had experienced. In order to show these constantly shifting understandings and 
responses to globalisation, I wil quote at some length a group of Australian public 
servants: 
Audrey: 	 The thing about globalisation is that to me it means 
'American.' . . . The Coke and McDonalds stuff just gives me 
the shits, because it's so in-your-face, and. . . so much money 
is spent on infiltration. . . . Everywhere. Beijing! I went to 
Beijing, and there's people queued up outside McDonalds! 
Denise: 	 So it's obviously working! 
Robyn: 	 But why, why? I don't like the food, and that's about the only 
thing I don't like about them, but if they've got a successful 
business and their business is employing the people in those 
areas. . . what is significantly wrong with it? 
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Audrey: 	 What I find significantly wrong with it is--to me it's just 
watering down-I do think that once you start to water things 
down and make McDonalds a global thing, it means the West-
-the culture of the West-is generaly American. . . . And that 
gives me the shits. 
Denise: 	 But it's not just the West that's affected by it. 
Audrey: 	 No, you're right. . . The whole world is being affected by this 
American-ness. And it just means that eventualy you get to 
the point where there's no variety and--it's just one--I don't 
know, it's the lowest common denominator stuf, I suppose. 
Robyn: 	 I was just going to get of McDonalds as such, but stil on the 
food issue. And food has helped globalisation as far as we're 
concerned. Because you look up the North Hobart street 
where you've got al these diferent eating establishments, and 
they're great. Italian. 
Denise: 	 Oh we love that! 
Audrey: 	 Wouldn't you say that's more multiculturalism than 
globalisation? Because it's not a company becoming 
multinational. It's multiculturalism. I see it as different. 
Denise: 	 I'm inclined to think [globalisation is] a sort of a blending. 
There's going to be no differences. . . . It's going to be like 
this one culture. 
Robyn: 	 I see globalisation . . . as opening the world up to everyone 
through the Internet and communications. . . I see it more as 
an access thing. With globalisation . . . you've got the ability 
to fly to England. . . . You've got the ability to see other areas 
instead of just the back doorstep. And that's what I see as 
globalisation. . . . And because of that, I think. . . that you're 
going to get al of the mixing so that there'l be. . . 
assimilation [of] different cultures. . . rather than maintaining 
your individualities. 
Audrey: 	 [Robyn is] looking at a more broad-based perspective. . 
What I was saying is more of a reaction against American-
ness I think. And I know a lot of people that feel the same 
way. I think it's a general reaction from the whole area. .. 
So perhaps that's a reaction more against American-ness than 
globalisation as a concept. 
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Lynete: 	 Yeah, I agree with parts of what you both said. Globalisation. 
. . . I mean it's al about globalisation. And, [Audrey], when 
you spoke, I agreed totaly with what you said. And when 
[Robyn] spoke, I thought, 'Oh yeah, technology is very 
important.' 
Audrey: 	 And I changed my mind too! [laughing] 
Lynete: 	 You see [Robyn] came up with a positive side, whereas we 
just thought-- 
Audrey: 	 'America's taking over! Oh God!' 
This extended passage shows that within a group of individuals of the same sex, 
occupation and generation, there are diverse understandings of and responses to 
globalisation. In this exchange, participants associate globalisation with economic and 
technological opportunities (job creation and access to transportation and information 
technologies), and with both cultural diversification (increasing multiculturalism), and the 
decline of cultural diversity (the Americanisation of world cultures). The discussion 
neatly demonstrates the instability of the concept of globalisation, as wel as the many 
diferent ways participants encounter the global in their everyday lives, and the flexibility 
with which they respond to the globalising -social transformations they are experiencing. 
Not only do these participants actively interpret and reinterpret globalising processes in 
light of changing contexts, they also explicitly reflect on the maleability of these 
interpretations. 
National Identity and Globalisation 
In discussions of the social changes associated with globalisation, Australian and 
Japanese participants in a wide range of social locations noted the potential for 
globalisation to destabilise national identity. Such accounts suggest that participants for 
the most part did not share my conceptualisation of the discursivity of national identities. 
Rather, most conceptualised national identity as a relatively stable national 'character' 
inherited from past generations, and yet stil responsive or vulnerable to social change. 
221 
In Australia, for example, older male farmers noted that, with ethnic 
diversification of the population, it is now harder to define or describe Australian identity, 
and that globalisation is 'removing particular local identity.' Likewise, Ted, a public 
servant, noted that under globalisation, 'There's a potential for a loss of identity and the 
loss of local character.' Similarly, high school girls, male retirees, Lisa (a teacher), and 
Leanne (a business owner), suggested that, with intensifying globalisation, Australia is 
increasingly losing the cohesive national ethnic identity and culture perceived to have 
once existed. 
Likewise, in Japan, Ms. Ueno, the senior teacher quoted at some length earlier, 
suggested that internationalisation (especially the global flow of information) is 
undermining the nation's long-standing 'island nation mentality' (shima-guni konjoo). 
Similarly, older male farmers suggested that internationalisation (particularly the 
liberalisation of global trade) is leading to a decline of Japanese ways of life; and Mr. 
Kuzume, the owner of a factory producing 'traditional' Japanese products, noted, 'When 
internationalised, there is a risk that we will lose the important culture of our race.' 
Even while Australian and Japanese participants noted the general potential of 
globalisation to destabilise national identity, many participants suggested that their 
particular country's national identity is resilient enough to withstand the homogenising 
pressures of globalisation. In Australia, for instance, Paula, a teacher, explained that 
globalisation is changing Australian society in myriad ways. However, she added, 
Whether it's changing our identity, I don't really think so, no. I think 
Australians are pretty proud of what we are and what we have made of the 
country. . . . And I guess I still see our identity as being fairly solid. . . . I 
have thought about that, about whether we are becoming so global we lose 
ourselves in it and forget who we are. But I don't think that will happen. 
Similarly, Mr. Tsuya, a Japanese public servant, remarked, 'Even if the controls [on 
trade] are eased and the market is opened up to America and so on, we have our own 
culture and we wouldn't change our ways one hundred percent, because we have our own 
culture and customs which internationalisation won't change.' So, while Australian and 
Japanese participants voiced concerns over the possible loss of distinct national 
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characteristics in the face of globalisation, they also suggested that superficial changes to 
the nation's way of life do not pose a threat to its overarching national identity; they 
characterised their own nation's identity as resilient, enduring and resistant to the 
influences of globalisation. 
At the same time, both Australian and Japanese participants incorporated 
changing social conditions into their visions of the imagined national community. This is 
seen most clearly in regards to changing gender roles in Australia and Japan, changes 
which many participants associated with globalisation. As detailed in this and the 
previous two chapters, shifting gender relations feature prominently in both Australian 
and Japanese folk discourses of national identity. In fact, such changes are an integral 
part of participants' narratives of nation, whether they use such changes to demonstrate 
the progressive nature of their respective countries, or to define a more 'authentic' or 
'traditional' national identity in contrast to recent developments. 
Similarly, in Australia at least, the nation's changing ethnic composition was a 
central theme in participants' narratives of nation. Again, such changes were used by 
some participants to construct the nation as a bastion of tolerance and progress, while 
other participants used such changes to reflect on the loss of an earlier, more authentic 
'white' Australian identity. In Japan, participants incorporated ethnic Others into their 
narratives of nation in a slightly different way. While participants seldom suggested that 
ethnic Others should, or even could, become part of the imagined community (for 
instance, by migrating to Japan, becoming citizens and integrating with mainstream 
Japanese society), the theme of increasing inter-ethnic contact consistently surfaced in 
discussions of Japanese national identity. Many participants argued that only through 
understanding Other cultures and Other peoples could they truly understand what it means 
to be Japanese. 
While Australian and Japanese participants clearly incorporated the changing 
gender and ethnic relations associated with globalisation into their imaginings of nation, 
there is little empirical evidence to suggest that globalisation is diminishing the salience , 
of discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan. To the contrary, the evidence 
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presented in this thesis suggests that globalising social conditions are favourable to the 
generation of the kinds of gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity 
documented in the previous chapters. 
In Australia, for instance, the recent Constitutional Preamble debate demonstrates 
that when faced with potentially significant socio-political changes, Australian 
politicians, the mass media and non-elites alike constructed strongly gendered and 
ethnicised discourses of national identity. The draft Preamble(s) of 1999 discursively 
marginalised women and ethnic minorities, and in so doing reasserted masculine 'white' 
proprietorship of the nation. In Japan, participants suggested that advertisers consciously 
use nostalgic images of 'traditional' femininity and 'pure Japanese' (junsui na Nihonjin) 
to ease people's anxieties about the kinds of rapid social changes associated with 
globalisation. Such discursive constructions render women archaic and passive, and 
ethnic minorities invisible, thus reproducing both patriarchal ideology and the ideology of 
ethnic Japanese proprietorship of the nation. In both Japan and Australia, then, it appears 
that these kinds of gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity are perceived 
as antidotes to anxieties over rapid social changes, including those changes associated 
with globalisation. 
Although some participants' accounts of globalisation echoed state and academic 
accounts of cultural homogenisation, economic and political domination, and the 
destabilisation or loss of national identity, there is little evidence that national identities 
have lost their salience under globalised social conditions in Australia and Japan. 
Participants still constructed confident and cohesive narratives of nation, accounts of 
what their respective nations are and are not. Globalisation does not `destablilise' 
national identities, because national identities are inherently unstable, negotiated, 
constantly in flux. Globalisation does not render discourses of national identity 
irrelevant, because globalisation is, above all, about encounters with the Other—Other 
people, Other commodities, Other information, Other ways of life—both from beyond 
national borders (for example, foreigners and foreign ways), and within them (with 
internal Others including, for example, women, ethnic minorities and groups based on 
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marginalised sexual orientations). As social scientists from Cooley (the 'looking-glass 
self') to Said ('Orientalism') and beyond have argued, only through encounters with the 
Other can we define who we are, whether as individuals, as ethnic, religious or other 
social groups, or as nations. When the Other is encountered, the search for essential(ised) 
differences, for unique and definitive traits, begins, resulting in the generation of 
dichotomous classifications: us/them, male/female, 'white'/'coloured,' 
advanced/primitive and so on. Once such categories inform the national imaginary, they 
are only reinforced by further encounters with the Other, until imagined communities are 
largely constituted by images of 'us' and 'them.' 
Summary and Conclusions 
I began this chapter with two goals: to examine the ways Australians and Japanese 
experience, understand and respond to globalisation; and to explore the links between 
globalisation and gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity in Australia and 
Japan. 
Evidence offered above suggests that most Australian and Japanese participants 
are actively engaged in globalisation, as I have defined it, through their encounters with 
globalised flows of people, commodities, and information. Furthermore, participants in 
both national settings suggested that these encounters are profoundly changing their lives, 
from the foods they eat and the clothes they wear, to the ethnic composition of their 
neighbourhoods, the (declining) cohesiveness of their communities and families, and their 
ability to travel and communicate over ever greater distances. Some participants 
considered these changes to be ripe with possibilities and promise for a better future; 
others mourned the loss of familiar ways of life and looked to the future with 
apprehension. 
There was little consensus among participants regarding the meaning or 
significance of globalisation in their everyday lives. That participants' discussions of 
globalisation in both Australia and Japan were characterised by such ambivalence and 
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flux is a reflection of the uneven and contradictory nature of globalisation itself and 
authorised and mass mediated accounts of globalising changes. The Janus-faced 
character of globalisation is evidenced in participants' perceptions of its attendant threats 
and promises, its opportunities and losses. 
Finally, while there is evidence that participants accommodate changing social 
relations and material conditions in their narratives of nation, there is little evidence to 
suggest that national identities in Australia and Japan are losing their salience under 
increasing globalisation. To the contrary, the rapid social changes associated with 
globalisation appear to provide favourable conditions for the generation of discourses of 





I began this thesis with three primary goals: to examine the ways gendered and ethnicised 
national identities are constituted in Australia and Japan; to analyse the ways such 
discourses reflect, reproduce and challenge social inequalities based on gender and 
ethnicity in these two settings; and to explore the ways globalisation is related to 
discursive constructions of national identity in Australia and Japan. In this chapter I will 
recapitulate my empirical findings and discuss the contribution this thesis makes to an 
understanding of national identities in the context of globalisation. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
Gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan 
I have argued in this thesis that nations are more than a combination of geographical 
territories, human populations and social institutions. To borrow Anderson's (1983) 
term, nations are 'imagined communities.' They are 'imagined,' or symbolically 
constructed, through overlapping authorised, mass mediated and folk discourses of 
national identity. I have demonstrated in this thesis that in Australia and Japan these 
discourses of national identity are gendered and ethnicised in complex ways. 
In Chapter Three I reviewed state and academic discourses of national identity in 
these two national settings. I argued that, historically, authorised discourses have 
constructed Australia as largely 'white' and masculine, but that such constructions are not 
static or monolithic. Rather, widely circulating 'white' masculine discourses of 
Australianness are challenged by counter-narratives of nation. Recent debates over the 
inclusion of references to `mateship' and aboriginal 'custodianship' of Australian lands in 
the proposed Preamble to the Australian Constitution suggest that as the roles and statuses 
of women and ethnic minorities shift over time, so do gendered and ethnicised discourses 
of national identity. The eventual deletion of references to `mateship' reflect the 
increased political voice of Australian women in recent decades; and while references to 
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aboriginal 'custodianship' were not included in the final draft Preamble, widespread and 
earnest debate on this issue signalled an increasing recognition of the rights and roles of 
indigenous Australians. Although ultimately the Australian electorate rejected the draft 
Preamble, the heated debate over the potential marginalisation of women and indigenous 
peoples in a Constitutional Preamble suggests that gender and ethnicity continue to be 
central to narratives of nation in Australia. 
My analysis of authorised discourses of national identity revealed that in Japan 
such discourses are profoundly ethnicised and often at least implicitly gendered. 
Specifically, I argued that the Nihonjinron, discourses of Japanese uniqueness, hinge on 
the notion of Japanese ethnic homogeneity, even racial purity. Such discourses of 
homogeneity obscure the presence of ethnic Others in Japan, and thus make it possible for 
dominant social groups to ignore the material disadvantages facing indigenous peoples, 
the Burakumin, Korean and Chinese permanent residents of Japan and other marginalised 
groups in the nation. I also examined essentialised constructions of Japan and the West in 
the Nihonjinron, which contrast a feminine, emotional, receptive Japan with a masculine, 
rational, donative West. However,' stressed that Japanese narratives of nation are not 
somehow simply feminine; rather, depending on the context, discourses of Japanese 
national identity may emphasise either stereotypically feminine or stereotypically 
masculine traits. Significantly, however, in such discourses of national identity, women 
are consistently represented as domestic and 'traditional,' while men are constructed as 
public and dynamic. 
In Chapter Four I analysed mass mediated discourses of national identity in 
Australia and Japan, and found evidence that these discourses are both gendered and 
ethnicised in ways that are largely consistent with authorised discourses. My content 
analysis of Australian and Japanese television advertisements demonstrated that in these 
mass mediated narratives of nation, Australianness is most often embodied by 'white' 
male characters; 'traditional' Japaneseness is most often embodied by 'Japanese' female 
characters; and 'contemporary' Japaneseness is generally embodied by 'Japanese' males. 
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Ethnic Others are largely invisible in mass mediated representations of national identity in 
both countries. 
An analysis of audience responses to these mass mediated representations of 
national identity corroborated the conclusions from my content analysis. Australian 
participants rate advertisements with mostly 'white,' mostly male characters, as more 
'Australian' than advertisements with mostly 'ethnic,' or mostly female characters. 
Similarly, Japanese participants rate nostalgic advertisements (usually peopled by female 
characters) as more 'Japanese' than advertisements with more contemporary images 
(more often featuring men), and advertisements showing ethnic Others are perceived as 
less 'Japanese' than advertisements showing only ethnically Japanese characters. 
In Chapters Five and Six I examined folk discourses of national identity, those 
narratives of nation constructed by participants in Australian and Japanese focus groups 
and in-depth interviews. My analysis of the Australian data suggested that participants in 
all social locations, young and old, male and female, of a variety of occupational 
backgrounds, construct similarly gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity. 
In participants' discussions of the national character and national archetypes, social 
relations and social ethics, everyday practice, material and symbolic culture, and the 
environment, 'white,' male pursuits and personae are privileged over female or ethnic 
Other figures and experiences. In folk discourses of Australian identity, women 
frequently fade from view while ethnic Others are positioned as threats to the national 
social order. However, such widely circulating discourses of national identity do not go 
unchallenged. A broad cross-section of participants note that such discourses are merely 
a collection of clichés from a national mythos which largely excludes women and ethnic 
Others. Additionally, a smaller subsection of participants, principally those who are 
marginalised in such discourses by virtue of their gender, ethnicity or other social 
characteristics, actively deconstruct and reinvent such narratives of nation to claim a place 
for themselves in the national imagined community. 
My analysis of the Japanese data revealed that folk discourses of national identity 
resonate strongly with notions of racial/ethnic homogeneity. Participants explain the 
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'unique' Japanese character, modes of social organisation, customs, language, and 
material culture as consequences of the nation's geographic, cultural and genetic 
isolation. Japan's internal ethnic Others, the Ainu and Ryuukyuu peoples, the Burakumin, 
and Korean and Chinese permanent residents, rarely appear in folk narratives of nation to 
challenge apparent racial/ethnic uniformity. External Others, principally those from -`the 
West' or elsewhere in Asia, appear as essentialised alters who serve to further confirm the 
distinctiveness of Japan and the Japanese. 
As well as being ethnicised, Japanese folk discourses of national identity are 
gendered. These discourses of Japanese identity are not straightforwardly gendered in the 
masculine, as in Australia, nor in the feminine; rather, participants draw on both 
masculine and feminine imagery in their narratives of nation. However, such imagery 
clearly reflects a gender binary in which women are positioned as domestic, 'traditional' 
and passive, and men as public, progressive and active. All but the youngest research 
participants suggest that Japanese society is characterised by patriarchal social relations, 
that it is a `man's world,' a `salaryman society,' a 'sexist society.' While many (usually 
older, usually male) participants speak of this national gender order with resignation or 
even tacit approval, other (usually younger, usually female) participants actively 
challenge it. Likewise, it is primarily female participants who contest widely circulating 
gendered and ethnicised discourses of Japanese identity. This suggests that those 
individuals who, by virtue of certain ascribed characteristics, are marginalised, 
essentialised or rendered archaic in discourses of national identity, are more likely to 
challenge such discourses in an attempt to insert themselves into the national imaginary. 
Discursive and material effects 
In this thesis I have examined the ways gendered and ethnicised discourses of national 
identity reflect, reinforce and challenge the material marginalisation of women and ethnic 
minorities in Australia and Japan. The widely circulating gendered and ethnicised 
discourses of Australian and Japanese identity documented throughout this thesis 
marginalise women and ethnic minorities by rendering them irrelevant, archaic or 
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virtually invisible. At the same time, however, the counter-narratives of national identity 
constructed by participants contest this marginalisation. 
In Chapter Five I argued that notions of egalitarianism, which feature so 
prominently in folk discourses of Australian identity, help legitimate the subordination of 
women and ethnic Others. If Australian society is seen as a meritocracy in which all 
people compete on an equal footing, then the lower social position of certain individuals 
or groups can be attributed to their inferior abilities or motivation. Such an explanation 
implies that those in power achieved their privileged positions purely through their own 
superior abilities. Likewise, it implies that those in subordinate positions are there due to 
their own personal failings, but that they too may reach privileged positions if they work 
hard enough. 
Similarly in Japan the discourse of racial/ethnic homogeneity obscures the 
presence of ethnic Others and the disadvantages they face. As I argued in Chapter Six, 
this notion of homogeneity serves the interests of dominant social groups because if the 
nation is imagined to be a naturally evolved organic whole then current social hierarchies 
will likely be constructed as 'natural' and necessary. Likewise, participants use notions 
of biology (the naturally evolved characteristics of men and women and of the Japanese 
'race') to explain and even legitimate patriarchal power relations in Japan, and to explain 
the necessity of excluding foreign Others from full participation in the national imagined 
community. 
Moreover, both Australian and Japanese participants use gendered and ethnicised 
discourses of national identity in the process of making sense of their location within the 
imagined community. Some (usually relatively privileged) participants construct 
narratives of nation that centre on their own experiences: Australian businessmen 
suggest, for example, that the 'real' Australian is 'the working man,' while older male 
farmers in Japan suggest that the rural way of life is quintessentially Japanese. However, 
many participants from subordinated social groups explain their own marginality with 
reference to gendered and ethnicised narratives of nation. An Australian migrant from 
southern Europe, for example, constructs a largely 'white,' rural, Anglo-centric narrative 
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of the nation, far removed from his life as an ethnic Other who has lived in several large 
Australian cities; and a Japanese female public servant describes in detail the 'typical 
Japanese,' and then notes that she herself is not like this. In both of these instances, 
individuals from subordinated social groups construct discourses of national identity from 
which they themselves are excluded, stories which mirror their own marginalisation 
within the national community. 
Globalisation and gendered and ethnicised national identities 
The final goal of this thesis was to explore the way globalisation is related to gendered 
and ethnicised national identities in Australia and Japan. In Chapter Seven I argued that 
there is little empirical evidence that globalisation has rendered Australian and Japanese 
national identities obsolete; to the contrary, globalised social conditions appear to be 
conducive to the construction of gendered and ethnicised discourses of national identity. 
While Australian and Japanese participants in all social locations report a high 
level of engagement with globalisation in their everyday lives, there is no consensus 
among participants regarding the scope and the consequences of globalisation. 
Participants' accounts of globalisation are characterised by ambivalence and constant 
renegotiation. These shifting, even contradictory, accounts of globalisation reflect the 
contradictory nature of globalisation. The outcomes of globalisation are diverse and 
uneven. Depending upon the particular context globalisation may lead to innovation and 
change or to a search for 'authenticity' or `tradition;' it may lead to increased 
opportunities for some people and increased exploitation for others. 
Some participants suggest that globalising changes threaten long-standing, 
cherished ways of life, while others argue that globalisation opens up new economic, 
political and personal opportunities. Likewise, while some participants suggest that, as a 
general principle, globalisation threatens global cultural diversity and the distinctive 
national traits seen as central to national identities, most also note with confidence that 
national identities in their respective nations are strong enough to withstand the 
homogenising force of globalisation. 
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Furthermore, participants suggest that globalisation affects people in different 
social locations differently. Teachers in Australia, for instance, argue that globalisation 
has class and spatial dimensions, in that only wealthier and largely urban Australians are 
able to capitalise on the economic and cultural opportunities associated with 
globalisation. Australian participants also note that globalisation affects men and women 
differently. Participants report that, in PlainsvieW at least, global economic restructuring 
is forcing men out of work. These participants suggest that while women's job 
opportunities and public visibility have expanded somewhat, women are increasingly the 
targets of violence by the men who are displaced and threatened by such changes. 
Finally, in Australian transcript data, globalisation has a clear ethnic/racial dimension. 
Ethnic Others, particularly migrant Others, are constructed as the bearers of globalising 
social changes, both positive and negative. They are welcomed for the pleasurable 
diversity of commodities and customs they bring to the country, and at the same time 
feared and criticised for the crime and wider social disorder they are said to introduce to 
Australian society. 
Likewise, Japanese participants suggest that globalisation has spatial, gender and 
ethnic/racial dimensions. A broad cross-section of participants argue that globalisation is 
most rapid in the nation's urban areas, particularly those on the mainland of Honshu. 
Moreover, they suggest that in Japan, women stand to benefit more than men from 
globalisation, because globalisation is likely to bring greater gender equality to the nation. 
As in Australia, ethnic Others are constructed as the bearers of globalisation. While 
foreign ethnic Others (especially 'whites') are welcomed both for their novelty value and 
for the new perspectives they bring to the nation, intermarriage with them is identified as 
a potential cause of social disintegration, specifically of 'racial problems.' Internal ethnic 
Others, such as indigenous peoples, the Burakumin and Korean and Chinese residents of 
Japan, are rarely mentioned in discussions of globalisation. These internal Others are 
obscured by the discourse of Japanese ethnic homogeneity. 
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Contributions to the Understanding of National Identities 
In this thesis I have made both empirical and theoretical contributions to a fuller 
understanding of national identities in the context of globalisation. Having reviewed my 
empirical findings above, I conclude here by revisiting the theoretical issues I raised at the 
start of the thesis. 
Imbricated discourses of national identity 
I have argued that the social scientific literature to date has lacked rich, explicit and 
consistently applied definitions of national identity. On the one hand, national identity 
has been conceptualised as the natural 'essence' of a nation's land, people and ways of 
life: a conceptualisation that over-stabilises and naturalises what are shifting narratives 
located within specific relations of power. On the other hand, national identity has been 
defined as individuals' affective attachments to national, or even sub-national, social 
groups: a definition that fails to account for the mutual construction of these collective 
identities. One of my key contributions in this thesis is my treatment of national identities 
as discourses (specifically sets of imbricated authorised, mass mediated and folk 
discourses) of national belonging, which are malleable, inherently unstable and 
collectively constructed. 
I have demonstrated here that there is significant overlap between authorised, 
mass mediated and folk discourses of national identity, and yet there are prominent 
differences between them. This has two implications for future analyses of national 
identities. First, it suggests that national identity is not simply a top-down construct, 
invented by powerful elites to serve their interests. Active contestations and the 
construction of counter-narratives by participants suggest that even widely circulating 
authorised and mass mediated discourses of national identity are never totalising 
constructions. 
Second, it demonstrates the importance of analysing multiple sites of the 
construction of national identities. That is, while scholars of national identity to date 
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have concentrated their analyses largely on a limited range of textual materials, such as 
novels, official histories or government documents, my work here suggests that for a 
fuller understanding of national identity it is essential to analyse the way a multitude of 
discourses compete with, transform and/or reinforce one another. In addition, it is 
essential to examine not only textual products, but also discursive processes. For 
ultimately, discourses have no life of their own; they only have effects as they are created, 
employed, embraced or resisted by individuals. 
It is also worth reiterating that the boundaries between authorised, mass mediated 
and folk discourses are not always clear. Not only are there thematic overlaps between 
them, but some participants, such as teachers and public servants, are themselves agents 
of the implementation of government policies. As such participants construct discourses 
of national identity, the analytical distinction between folk and authorised accounts is 
blurred, highlighting the necessity of analysing the ways national identities are negotiated 
in a variety of social contexts. 
Globalisation and national identities 
A second contribution I have made to the scholarship on national identities lies in my 
examination of the complex relationship between globalisation and national identity. My 
explication of the discursivity of national identities exposes the flawed logic of theorists 
who suggest that globalisation is undermining or destabilising national identities 
worldwide. That is, it is meaningless to theorise about the destabilisation or de-centring 
of national identities when these identities are inherently unstable and without unified 
'centres.' 
Additionally, the empirical evidence I have presented here suggests that in a 
context of increasing globalisation Australians and Japanese actively construct narratives 
of nation in ways that reflect and help explain their own locations within their national 
imagined communities. That discourses of national identity are used by participants to 
explain their own place in the national (and/or international) social order suggests that 
such discourses retain their salience in the face of globalising social changes. 
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Such conclusions confirm Robertson's (1992, 1995) thesis that the global and the 
local (or the national in this case) are mutually constitutive; the global shapes the local, 
even as the local shapes the global. The incorporation of the global by the local/national 
is highlighted by the treatment of foreigners, recent migrants and ethnic minorities in 
Australian and Japanese discourses of national identity. In both national contexts these 
Others are positioned as alters against whom the national Self is defined. This suggests 
that discourses of national identity are always already constructions of 'foreign' Others; 
therefore they are also inherently discourses of globalisation. 
'Marginality' as an analytical category 
In a third contribution to an understanding of national identities, I have demonstrated here 
that the concept of 'marginality' may serve as a useful analytical category in research on 
national identity. A sense of marginality pervades both Australian and Japanese folk 
discourses of national identity at three levels: at the level of the nation's location within 
the world; at the level of the local region's location within the nation; and at the level of 
the individual's location within the nation. 
In both national settings, for example, participants explain purported features of 
the national character with reference to national geographic isolation. Specifically, both 
Australians and Japanese argue that their respective nations are characterised by a 
national chauvinism (sometimes identified as 'racism' or 7inshu henken') that is the 
natural consequence of being 'island nations.' Participants explain that not sharing land 
borders with other nations has had two primary effects on the national character: it has 
meant that the national character has developed without much influence from the outside; 
and it has meant that people of the nation are largely unfamiliar with, and therefore 
suspicious of, foreign Others. In the first of these, geographic marginality is used to 
support claims of national cultural uniqueness; in the second, it is used to account for, or 
even legitimate the symbolic and/or material exclusion of foreign Others from the 
national imagined community. 
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Similarly, participants in both Tasmania and Hokkaido stress the geographic, 
political and economic marginality of their local region. Participants report that their 
region is struggling economically; is losing young people to mainland population centres; 
lags behind the rest of the nation in terms of popular culture, fashion and other trends; and 
is regarded by 'mainlanders' as backward. At the same time, however, participants in 
Tasmania and Hokkaido turn their region's marginality into a source of pride, by arguing 
that their communities have existed relatively unchanged for generations; are insulated 
from the effects of globalisation; and therefore are more 'traditional,' more 'authentically' 
Australian or Japanese than the cities at the 'centre' of their respective nations. In other 
words, in both Tasmania and Hokkaido, participants use the trope of rural marginality to 
symbolically place themselves at the centre of the national imagined community, to write 
themselves in to discourses of national identity. 
It must be noted that while there are striking similarities between the Australian 
and Japanese tropes of rural and 'island nation' marginality in discourses of national 
identity, these may not be more universal tropes in the construction of national identities. 
Due to geo-political realities, most nations worldwide do not have the luxury of 
imagining themselves to be geographically and culturally isolated; therefore the 'island 
nation' trope cannot be understood as a more universal feature of discourses of national 
identity. Moreover, further research is needed to determine whether people in a range of 
national and local contexts associate rurality with more 'authentic' forms of national 
identity. To this end, research focusing on both urban and rural populations in a variety 
of locations within Australia and Japan would provide insight into the ways individuals 
incorporate their respective localities into visions of the national imagined community. 
The concept of 'marginality' is also analytically useful in understanding the ways 
participants position themselves relative to authorised and mass mediated discourses of 
national identity. Specifically, my analysis of folk constructions of national identity 
suggests that Australians and Japanese who are marginalised within the national imagined 
community are more likely than others to contest widely circulating discourses of national 
identity. Most prominently, many women in both Australia and Japan spoke out against 
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their material subordination relative to men, and their symbolic marginalisation in 
discourses of national identity. Nonetheless, many of these women also framed their own 
material marginalisation within the same exclusionary discourses they critiqued. In this 
way, marginality served as a trope to explain, even naturalise, the subordination of 
women in these two national settings. 
This highlights the material effects of discourses of national identity. Throughout 
the thesis I have sought to understand the ways such discourses mirror and reinforce the 
marginalisation of women and ethnic minorities by naturalising their subordination. Few 
ethnic minority individuals live in the communities I studied, and therefore I do not have 
sufficient data to draw conclusions regarding the way such Others position themselves 
vis-à-vis discourses of national identity. However, based on the comments of Australian 
and Japanese women, and at least one ethnic minority Australian man, I would anticipate 
that research focusing on ethnic minorities in these two nations would find similar 
patterns of resisting, critiquing and appropriating widely circulating discourses of national 
identity. 
Cross-national comparison 
I have made further contributions to the scholarship on national identity through my use 
of cross-national comparisons. Analysing discourses of national identity in closely 
matched communities in Australia and Japan has allowed me to identify both national 
specificities and seemingly more general trends in the construction of national identities. 
Feminist and postcolonialist understandings of national identity 
First, my comparison of constructions of national identity in Australia and Japan 
generally reconfirms the findings of feminist and postcolonialist scholars who suggest 
that in contemporary nation-states women and ethnic minorities are symbolically 
marginalised in ways that mirror and reinforce these groups' material subordination. 
However, my findings do not wholly support McClintock's assertions that women 
generally serve as the 'symbolic bearers of the nation' and are represented as largely 
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'traditional,' antiquated and passive (McClintock 1993: 62, 66). My analysis of the 
Japanese data suggests that national identity may be feminised or masculinised depending 
on the discursive context. This is consistent with Morris-Suzuki's argument that in 
Japanese narratives of nation 'notions of femininity and masculinity have been deployed 
and combined in various ways to create visions of the nation which suited particular 
historical and political contexts' (Morris-Suzuki 1998: 135). My analysis of the 
Australian data demonstrates that in this national context it is not women but men who 
are associated with 'tradition,' with past values and ways of life. These data from Japan 
and Australia have important implications for future scholarship on the marginalisation of 
women within discourses of national identity. The data suggest that it is crucial to 
examine the subtleties of such gendered discourses in each national context, rather than 
formulating theoretical generalisations which do not account for local understandings of 
such discourses. 
My findings lend support to Hage's (1998) argument that Australian narratives of 
nation are ethnicised in ways that naturalise and reinforce the dominance of the 'white' 
majority. I have incorporated elements of Hage's argument into a feminist and cross-
national analytical framework to examine the ideologies of patriarchy and ethnic 
proprietorship in both Australia and Japan. I concluded that widely circulating discourses 
of national identity are inscribed with, and reinscribe, patriarchal ideology in both 
national settings, and the ideologies of 'white' proprietorship in Australia and ethnic 
Japanese proprietorship in Japan, the taken-for-granted notions that 'whites' and ethnic 
Japanese are the rightful owners and governors of their respective countries. Such cross-
national similarities suggest that these may be more general features of constructions of 
national identity worldwide. 
The applicability of globalisation theories to 'non-Western' contexts 
Second, my comparison of Australia and Japan has allowed me to examine whether 
Western explanations of the dynamics of globalisation are equally applicable to a 'non-
Western' context. Admittedly, the concepts of 'East' and 'West' are problematic, both 
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beCause they essentialise and totalise culturally diverse regions, and because Japan itself 
has an economic and political profile that sets it apart from the rest of the 'East' in many 
-ways. That said, I did find slightly different national responses to globalisation in the 
form of Australian multiculturalism and Japanese internationalisation. While Australian 
multiculturalist discourses focus largely on managing national ethnic diversity, Japanese 
internationalisation focuses primarily on forging political, economic and cultural alliances 
across national borders. Furthermore, I found that within each national setting, 
individuals in different social locations experienced and perceived globalisation in 
different ways. 
Both of these findings are consistent with the theoretical position I developed in 
Chapter Three: that is, although globalisation is demonstrably transforming political, 
economic and cultural relations worldwide, its effects are neither unidirectional nor 
uniform. These findings also support Robertson's (1992, 1995) conceptualisation of 
globalisation as an articulation of the global and the local; and they challenge suggestions 
that globalisation leads inevitably toward the homogenisation of cultures and identities 
worldwide. 
Future Research 
The empirical data analysed in this thesis provide a rich understanding of gendered and 
ethnicised discourses of national identity in Australia and Japan, and the ways such 
discourses mirror, maintain and challenge the subordination of women and ethnic 
minorities in these two contexts. The findings reported here suggest the importance of 
examining the ways other marginalised social groups are positioned relative to discourses 
of national identity. Further research is needed to test whether the discursive processes 
examined here apply to groups marginalised (materially and symbolically) on the basis of 
class, sexual orientation, disability or other characteristics. 
Furthermore, one strength of the kind of qualitative research presented in this 
thesis is that it yields a nuanced account of constructions of national identity in specific 
communities at specific points in time. I sampled a broad cross-section of the population 
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in the communities I studied in order to better understand the ways participants' social 
locations shaped their constructions of national identity. However, a systematic 
examination of the material conditions within which discourses of national identity were 
generated was beyond the scope of this project. Therefore, further research is required to 
chart the ways people's constructions of discourses of national identity vary with the 
specific material conditions of their social locations, and the ways such constructions vary 
between geographical locations and over time in Australia and Japan. 
To conclude, in addition to the detailed empirical data I have presented here, I 
have contributed to a fuller understanding of gendered and ethnicised national identities 
in the context of globalisation in four key ways: I have analysed both the discursive 
products and discursive processes of constructions of national identity and investigated 
the multiple levels and sites of these discursive constructions; I have scrutinised the links 
between globalisation and discourses of national identity; I have examined the 
complexities of 'marginality' in negotiations of national identity; and I have presented 
cross-national comparisons designed to better reveal both national specificities and more 
general trends in the construction of national identities. This analytical framework 
provides a useful model for future scholarship on national identities. 
APPENDIX ONE 
DRAFT PREAMBLE TO THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
On 23 March, 1999, Prime Minister John Howard released the following proposed 
Preamble to the Australian Constitution: 
With hope in God, the Commonwealth of Australia is constituted by the 
equal sovereignty of all its citizens. 
The Australian nation is woven together of people from many ancestries 
and arrivals. 
Our vast island continent has helped to shape the destiny of our 
Commonwealth and the spirit of its people. 
Since time immemorial our land has been inhabited by Aborigines and 
Torres Strait Islanders, who are honoured for their ancient and continuing 
cultures. 
In every generation immigrants have brought great enrichment to our 
nation's life. 
Australians are free to be proud of their country and heritage, free to 
realise themselves as individuals, and free to pursue their hopes and 
ideals. We value excellence as well as fairness, independence as dearly as 
mateship. 
Australia's democratic and federal system of government exists under law 
to preserve and protect all Australians in an equal dignity which may 
never be infringed by prejudice or fashion or ideology nor invoked against 
achievement. 
In this spirit we, the Australian people, commit ourselves to this 
Constitution. 
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APPENDIX TWO  
REVISED DRAFT PREAMBLE TO THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 
On 11 August, 1999, Prime Minister John Howard released a revised version of a 
proposed Preamble to the Australian Constitution. It read, as follows: 
We the Australian people commit ourselves to the Constitution: proud 
that our national unity has been forged by Australians from many 
ancestries; never forgetting the sacrifices of all who defended our country 
and our liberty in time of war; upholding freedom, tolerance, individual 
dignity and the rule of law; honouring Aborigines and Torres Strait 
Islanders; the nation's first people, for their deep kinship with their lands 
and for their ancient and continuing cultures which enrich the life of our 
country; recognising the nation-building contribution of generations of 
immigrants; mindful of our responsibility to protect our unique natural 
environment; supportive of achievement as well as equality of opportunity 
for all; and valuing independence as dearly as the national spirit which 




DESCRIPTION OF ADVERTISEMENTS SHOWN TO AUSTRALIAN AND 
JAPANESE FOCUS GROUPS  
Australian and Japanese focus groups were shown thirteen television advertisements from 
their respective countries. Below is a list these advertisements, in the order in which they 
were shown to participants, along with the key characteristics of these advertisements. 


















A Banjo Paterson-style poem 
about the product is read by a male 
voice, as people are shown using 








Still black and white photos of 
Don Bradman and his cricket team 
are shown while 'Waltzing 










An overheated school boy makes 
his way home through a cartoon 
Australian landscape, while his 
mother waits in their ice-cold 
house to serve him `Cottees 
Cordial.' 








Shots of physically active young 
men and women are alternated 







A young woman prepares for a 










A surf 'iron man' competes 






















A 'Thai' mother (speaking in Thai) 
teaches her daughter how to make 







Two male customers and a male 
publican watch with amusement as 











Soft-focus close-ups of a mother at 
home with her children, teaching 
them to read. 
10 Humorous 
mixture of ., 	 ' old and 
new 
Lamb 'White 









A family sits down to Sunday 
dinner, and a father feigns ofence 
at the 'tandoori lamb.' But the 
camera puls back to show his 
'white' daughter's 'Indian' 
husband and 'mixed' children. 
Everyone laughs. 






A young man thinks about what he 









Filmed in black and white, a 
farmer in shorts, a singlet, boots 
and an Akubra, batles to plug up 
holes in his old water tank. Then, 












An 'Asian-Australian' father 
works in the family restaurant and 
is comforted by his daughter when 
he drops a dish. 
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A woman in kimono seems to be a 
tea ceremony teacher, but she 
serves her business-suited 










A man asks his wife to clean the 
toilet, but then enjoys cleaning the 
toilet himself with a new quick-
wipe. 







Two men in yukata drink canned 
tea, the younger man agreeing with 









(female) , "children 1 
A foreign female teacher teaches 
English to Japanese girls. They 
mispronounce her name, Anne, as 
'An.' 





A male artisan in kimono studies a 










A young woman in yukata drinks a 









A woman in kimono invites us to 
view a variety of scenes, with 
images including chery blossoms, 
a Japanese kite and a hand-held 







Two 'Japanese' teenage boys 'rap' 
about Sprite, as a crowd of 









A samurai charges through a 
deserted street with sword drawn, 



















A man practises his golf swing at a 
driving range while a woman looks 
on; then he drinks a beer. 







Men and women at a business 
meeting have upset stomaches. 
One of the women offers her 
colleagues antacid tablets. 








Three women sing and dance as 
they deliver mid-summer gifts, but 
they mistakenly visit the wrong 
house. 





..., 'man and 
woman 
When a male boss orders a female 
employee to take out the garbage, 
she fantasises about throwing him 
out along with the rubbish. 
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